Sahel: The Strategic Rivalry Between the Unified Force of the G5 Sahel and ECOWAS Redefines the Regional Security Architecture

West Africa is undergoing a period of major strategic reconfiguration with the emergence of two competing military architectures that reflect unprecedented institutional fragmentation. The Unified Force of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and the Rapid Deployment Force of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) embody two antagonistic visions of regional security, whose respective effectiveness will determine the future of a region facing increasingly intensifying jihadist violence.

The Unified Force of the AES, comprising 6,000 personnel, was officially launched in December 2025 with its headquarters based in Niamey, Niger. This initiative represents the third attempt by the central Sahel states to establish a joint security mechanism, following the failure of the Multinational Joint Task Force of Liptako-Gourma announced in January 2017 and the de facto dissolution of the G5 Sahel Joint Force in 2022-2023. The alliance includes Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, three countries whose military juntas have orchestrated a dramatic break with their former Western partners, particularly France, which is accused of neo-colonial interference in their security affairs.

The architecture of this new force reflects a clearly stated desire for strategic autonomy. Unlike the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which relied heavily on external funding with an annual budget of 423 million euros far exceeding national contributions, the AES states have instituted domestic funding mechanisms. Burkina Faso has created a Patriotic Support Fund, Niger a Solidarity Fund for the Safeguarding of the Homeland, and Mali a Support Fund for Basic Infrastructure Projects. On March 28, 2025, the three countries agreed to introduce an import tax of 0.5 percent to finance the confederal institutions, including the Unified Force.

This quest for financial autonomy is accompanied by a diversification of military partnerships. Equipment and armaments are now acquired from Russia, Turkey, Iran, and China. The Russian Africa Corps, successor to the Wagner Group, has become the AES's preferred security partner, although the terms of engagement vary significantly by country. In Mali, Russia provides military equipment and the Africa Corps participates in combat operations. In Burkina Faso and Niger, the engagement is limited to training missions. This Russian presence, estimated at around 2,000 fighters across the three countries, stands in stark contrast to the 4,000 French soldiers who previously operated under Operation Barkhane.

Operationally, the Unified Force of the AES presents significant structural innovations compared to its predecessor. The battalions of the G5 Sahel Joint Force were confined to designated geographical sectors, with pursuit rights limited to a radius of 100 kilometers on either side of national borders. In contrast, the units of the Unified Force are intended to operate across the entire territory of the three countries. The headquarters has full operational authority over the troops, allowing it to deploy and move forces without prior approval from national staffs.

The effectiveness of this tripartite coordination was demonstrated during Operation Yereko 2, conducted between February and March 2025 in the Liptako-Gourma area, where the borders of the three countries converge. However, the coordinated campaign launched by Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in February 2026 reveals the persistent limitations of this approach. JNIM carried out more than 30 attacks in Burkina Faso alone, resulting in the deaths of over 120 soldiers, forest guards, and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). This offensive followed the defection of Sadou Samahouna, a senior JNIM commander in the Eastern Burkina Faso region, to the Islamic State's Sahel Province (PSSI), illustrating internal tensions within jihadist groups and their tactical adaptability.

In response to this dynamic, ECOWAS is attempting to regain its regional security role after the de facto secession of the three AES states, which officially left the organization in January 2025. At a meeting of ECOWAS military chiefs in Sierra Leone in early March 2026, the bloc decided to activate its Rapid Deployment Force. The plan calls for the initial mobilization of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026, with a previously announced target of 1,650 personnel. This force aims to combat cross-border armed groups that are expanding their territory and refining their tactics throughout the region.

However, the current activation of the force faces major structural obstacles. Funding is the most acute constraint. Nigeria, which has traditionally provided 75 percent of personnel for ECOWAS missions and has been a major funder, no longer has the same capabilities as it did in the 1990s. The country's status as the giant of West Africa has declined due to poor economic management that led to high inflation in 2023, compounded by tensions generated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The economy is slowly recovering, but Nigerian defense forces are deployed on multiple fronts to combat several armed actors.

Potential alternative funding sources include the United States, which has been working with Nigeria since December 2025 to combat armed groups, and France, which is increasingly reaching out to Abuja after its eviction from central Sahel. However, the issue of operational coordination remains complex. ECOWAS will need to prioritize operational areas in the face of at least eight armed groups using heavily forested areas as refuges and movement corridors between countries.

The most critical dimension of this fragmented security architecture lies in the absence of coordination mechanisms between the AES and ECOWAS. The three AES countries are at the heart of the armed groups crisis, with several jihadist organizations operating along their shared borders. The effectiveness of the ECOWAS Rapid Deployment Force will depend on its ability to cooperate with the armies of neighboring states, many of which also face threats from violent extremism and criminal networks. Illicit supply and smuggling channels for operational resources (weapons, motorcycles, fuel, drones) destined for armed groups cross many borders in the region, including Nigeria, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal.

The Tarha Nakal exercise, conducted by the armed forces of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Togo in May 2024 in Tillia, Niger, demonstrates that pragmatic cooperation between AES states and non-members remains possible. The African Union appears well-positioned to resolve tensions between AES countries and their Gulf of Guinea neighbors. Politically, mediation efforts could rebuild trust and ease tensions. Regarding counter-terrorism, the AU could promote cooperation between the ECOWAS counter-terrorism force and the Unified Force of the AES.

The intensification of jihadist violence makes this coordination all the more urgent. Groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State regularly launch attacks against military outposts and civilian settlements, from Mali to Nigeria. At the end of January 2026, a group allied with the Islamic State targeted the international airport in Niamey, the capital of Niger. A faction linked to al-Qaeda has blocked fuel supplies to Bamako, the Malian capital, since September 2025, paralyzing mobility and essential services in the country.

The competitive dynamic between the AES and ECOWAS also reflects divergent visions of sovereignty and security governance. The military juntas of the AES have based their legitimacy on the promise of restoring national security after the perceived failure of civilian governments. Their withdrawal from ECOWAS was partly motivated by criticism that the bloc was not sufficiently supporting the counter-terrorism effort and was overly focused on politics and elections. If ECOWAS continues to develop its counter-terrorism capacity, it could gradually soften the AES's position.

The future of security in the Sahel and West Africa will depend on the ability of regional actors to transcend their political divisions to establish pragmatic operational coordination in the face of a terrorist threat that recognizes no institutional borders. The lessons from past failures, particularly that of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, must inform new security architectures. Financial and operational autonomy, diversification of partnerships, and above all, cross-border coordination are the essential pillars of an effective response to the jihadist violence that continues to destabilize the region.