Sahel: When Government Forces Become More Deadly Than Jihadists

The latest data on the security situation in the Sahel reveals a troubling reality: in Burkina Faso and Mali, national security forces and their allied militias are now killing more civilians than the jihadist groups they are supposed to combat. This alarming development calls into question the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism strategies adopted since the successive military coups that struck the region between 2020 and 2023.

According to data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) for the year 2025, the Burkinabè army and members of the pro-government militia Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland killed 523 civilians, while Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISSP) killed 339. This disproportion is even more pronounced in Mali, where government forces accompanied by Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group were responsible for the deaths of 928 civilians in 2025, compared to 329 attributed to jihadist groups.

These figures represent a dramatic reversal from the situation that prevailed just a few years ago. Human Rights Watch emphasizes that Burkinabè security forces and their allied militias "appear to be more brutal and violent" than the militant groups themselves. Collected testimonies report mass executions, arbitrary arrests, and the destruction of entire villages, often without tangible evidence of collaboration with the insurgents.

The arrival of Russian Wagner forces, initially presented as a miracle solution following the withdrawal of French troops and the United Nations mission in Mali, has only worsened the situation. Their approach is characterized by haphazard tactics and massive human rights violations, frequently targeting civilian populations without clear evidence of jihadist presence. This counterproductive strategy fuels resentment among local communities towards the state, creating fertile ground for recruitment by insurgent groups.

In Burkina Faso, the expansion of voluntary defense forces has exacerbated these challenges. Although recruitment into these militias has been significant, the exclusion of certain communities, particularly the Fulani, has intensified social divisions. State security forces have also been involved in large-scale abuses, including mass executions of civilians. These approaches have proven not only ineffective in countering jihadist violence but have paradoxically contributed to recruitment by reinforcing grievances among affected populations.

Jihadist violence, far from receding, continues to expand geographically and intensify. JNIM, Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the region, has demonstrated its operational capacity through coordinated attacks against military targets, including high-profile assaults in capitals. The group has also refined its strategy by increasingly targeting economic infrastructure: by blocking access to fuel and essential goods, attacking transport and trade centers, JNIM seeks to undermine state authority and destabilize governments from within.

The expansion into the coastal countries of West Africa represents a major strategic evolution for these groups. Benin has experienced a significant increase in attacks linked to groups based in the Sahel, despite efforts to strengthen border security. The country has deployed 3,000 soldiers along its border with Burkina Faso and Niger in an attempt to reduce the scale of incursions. Nevertheless, data shows a 70% increase in deaths caused by JNIM between January and December 2025 compared to the first eleven months of 2024.

This southward expansion can be explained by several strategic factors. Jihadist groups seek to access ports and new sources of revenue. They skillfully exploit porous border areas, taking advantage of political instability to establish lasting positions. The attempted coup in Benin at the end of 2025 illustrates this fragility: if the state weakens further in Cotonou, it is likely that JNIM will push even further south and establish an even stronger foothold in the country.

In the face of this situation, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana have managed to better contain the threat, at least for now. Côte d'Ivoire experienced a series of attacks in 2020-2021 but has since managed to control the violence, with no confirmed attacks since then. Ghana, despite considerable community tensions in border areas, has also largely succeeded in keeping jihadist assaults at bay. Both countries have combined security measures with broader strategies focused on development, infrastructure, and decentralization, thus addressing some of the underlying factors of extremism.

The lessons from the Sahel are clear: jihadist groups systematically exploit local grievances and community tensions, particularly between herding and farming communities. By aligning with marginalized groups and offering protection, they manage to build support and extend their influence. State responses that target communities indiscriminately or rely on poorly trained militias risk reinforcing these dynamics and further stimulating recruitment.

The Global Terrorism Index 2026 highlights that in 2025, half of the terrorism-related deaths worldwide occurred in the Sahel region. This chilling statistic illustrates the scale of the crisis and the urgency for a strategic reassessment. The underlying conditions in the Sahel continue to favor the expansion of militant groups: governments struggle to provide basic services, economic opportunities, or infrastructure, particularly outside major urban centers. For many individuals, joining a jihadist group offers both income and protection. Evidence shows that ideological commitment is not the main driver of recruitment; economic necessity and security concerns play a more significant role.

Effective responses require a more targeted and balanced approach. Military action must be precise and responsible, avoiding the widespread use of force that can exacerbate tensions. At the same time, efforts to strengthen governance, create economic opportunities, and improve infrastructure are essential. When communities have access to livelihoods and basic services, they are less likely to support or join militant groups.

The current situation demonstrates how instability can spread rapidly when underlying conditions are not addressed. Jihadist groups have shown an ability to adapt, expand, and exploit weaknesses in both governance and security. Understanding that this is not solely a security issue would greatly contribute to resolving the crisis that has spread so exponentially in recent years across the Sahel and is now dangerously approaching the ports of coastal West Africa.

Governments in the region must urgently reassess their strategies. The excessive use of brutal force against civilian populations only fuels the cycle of violence and strengthens the groups they seek to combat. A more nuanced approach, combining targeted security, economic development, social justice, and community reconciliation, offers the only sustainable path to stability. Time is of the essence: each passing day without a change in course brings the region closer to an even deeper humanitarian and security crisis.