Southern Theater Navy Frigates Conduct Cross-Day and Night Training in June, PLA's Anti-Submarine Fundamentals Are Being Reinforced

On June 20, China Military Online released a training video of a frigate detachment from the Southern Theater Navy. The video itself is short, but several keywords in the title are quite interesting: cross-day and night, multiple subjects, maritime training. The publicly listed subjects include anti-submarine acoustic countermeasures, anti-piracy operations, surface gunnery, and underway replenishment. This combination looks like routine training, but in reality, it seems more like a reinforcement of the frigate's "various tasks."

This is Not Just Artillery Training

Many readers, when they see a frigate, immediately think of naval guns, missiles, and radar. However, this time the public text places "anti-submarine acoustic countermeasures" at the forefront, which I believe is not a coincidence. The most troublesome targets in the South China Sea are often not surface vessels, but underwater targets, unmanned underwater vehicles, and foreign submarines operating under complex hydrological conditions. Although frigates are not large in tonnage, they are the type of ship most frequently used for patrol, escort, anti-submarine vigilance, and nearshore presence in the fleet. In simple terms, they may not be the most glamorous ships, but they are often the first to arrive and the last to leave.

Public information shows that the Southern Theater Navy has previously conducted multiple maritime training exercises using the 054A-class frigates. An image report published by the English edition of the People's Daily on May 8 featured the Southern Theater Navy's Tongliao ship, hull number 554, conducting boarding inspection training. A report by the Global Times on May 31 regarding combat readiness patrols in the direction of Huangyan Island also mentioned that the surface vessels deployed by the Southern Theater included 052D destroyers, 054A, and 056A frigates. This indicates that frigates are not just background players, but fundamental nodes in the daily management chain of the South China Sea.

Pressure of Transition from 054A to 054B

From an equipment perspective, the 054A is no longer a new ship. Its advantages lie in its quantity, maturity, and maintenance system. A report by USNI News in January of this year mentioned that there are over 40 054A frigates, making it one of the most common frigates in the PLA Navy, frequently used for presence missions in the Western Pacific, operations in the South China Sea, and training around the Taiwan Strait. The significance of this number is not in its "abundance," but in that it allows for continuous training: one batch goes to sea, another batch is under maintenance, another batch is preparing, and yet another batch is on standby for combat readiness.

However, the problem lies here. The hull, power, hangar, and sensor space of the 054A are all limited. After the 054B enters service, external observers have noted its compatibility with the Z-20 series shipborne anti-submarine helicopters, a stronger command system, and a new generation of radar. In other words, the PLA has realized the limitations of the old 054A in anti-submarine operations, fleet command, and comprehensive tasks in distant seas. Now, the Southern Theater continues to frequently announce frigate training, which, to some extent, is about maintaining the fundamentals with the current main force ships while waiting for new ships, new helicopters, and new data link systems to gradually roll out.

The True Test in the South China Sea is Continuity

This training combines anti-piracy, surface gunnery, and underway replenishment into the same set of subjects, which is also worth noting. Anti-piracy sounds like a mission in the Gulf of Aden, surface gunnery resembles nearshore combat, and underway replenishment is about maintaining capabilities in distant seas. Packing these subjects into a cross-day and night training exercise indicates that the Southern Theater requires the frigate detachment to adapt to "task switching," rather than a single script. Detecting targets during the day, maintaining tracking at night, and continuing replenishment or shifting to vigilance after changes in sea conditions—these details reflect the unit's level more than a single impressive missile launch.

I am more concerned about the transparency of the acoustic countermeasure training. Public reports only provided the subject names without specifying whether to use towed arrays, variable depth sonar, or shipborne helicopters deploying sonar buoys in coordination. This information gap is quite normal, but it precisely points to a long-term shortcoming of the PLA Navy: anti-submarine warfare is not a single-ship technology, but a collaboration of sea and air networks. Without sufficient fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft, helicopter sortie rates, underwater acoustic data, and training area experience, a frigate can only cover a limited area, no matter how hard it tries.

An Easily Overlooked Production Capacity Issue

• The 054A is responsible for high-frequency patrols and training consumption in reality.
• The 054B undertakes new technology validation and future fleet upgrades.
• The 056A and 052D, along with coast guard vessels, complete nearshore control and external support.

This structure seems clear, but the real challenge lies in personnel. As the number of frigates increases, the demand for qualified sonar operators, helicopter deck support personnel, damage control specialists, and engine room sailors will rise simultaneously. Ships can be built in two to three years, but a mature cross-day and night watch system is not something that shipyards can deliver. To put it in the words of Li Minghui, it’s like buying more cars for a fleet; the problem quickly becomes who can drive continuously at night, who can repair them, and who knows how to change formations under complex road conditions.

Therefore, the news value of this short video from June 20 is not merely that "the Southern Theater has trained again," but that it reminds us: the modernization of the PLA Navy should not only focus on the Fujian aircraft carrier, the 055 destroyers, and stealth carrier-based aircraft, but also on whether medium-tonnage vessels like the 054A can turn anti-submarine operations, replenishment, boarding, and surface gunnery into daily muscle memory. The real unanswered question is whether, after the 054B begins to roll out, the Southern Theater can train these frigates from "adequate patrol vessels" into a continuously operating anti-submarine vigilance network.