The 2026 Two Sessions Under Xi Jinping's Anti-Corruption Storm: Expansion of Defense Budget and Military Reconstruction

The 2026 Two Sessions Under Xi Jinping's Anti-Corruption Storm: Defense Budget Expansion and Military Reconstruction

Author: Li Minghui | hiwars.com Chinese Military Defense Commentator

Countdown to Opening: Timeline of the Two Sessions

The 2026 National Two Sessions are about to officially commence. On March 4, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) will open first at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, marking the beginning of this year's Two Sessions; on March 5, the Fourth Session of the 14th National People's Congress (NPC) will follow, during which the Premier will announce the defense budget figures for 2026 in the government work report. This figure will serve as the most direct barometer for observing the trajectory of China's military power.

Against the backdrop of escalating Sino-U.S. strategic competition and dramatic changes in the regional security landscape, this year's military topics at the Two Sessions are receiving more attention from the international community than ever before. The recent purges within the PLA leadership just before the Two Sessions have given the outside world a new understanding of Xi Jinping's will and strength in controlling the military.

Purge Continues: Shock Signals Before the Two Sessions

On February 26, 2026, less than two weeks before the opening of the Two Sessions, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress announced the revocation of the NPC representative qualifications of nine active-duty senior PLA generals—this is one of the largest single-day purges in Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption campaign in the military since 2023.

So far, this round of military rectification has involved a total of 101 senior military officers, covering about 52% of the core positions in the PLA leadership. The purged individuals span multiple strategic military branches, including the Strategic Support Force, Rocket Force, Navy, and Army Aviation, many of whom held key positions involved in command during combat readiness exercises.

From a timing perspective, Xi Jinping's choice to continue the purges just before the Two Sessions carries significant political signaling. On one hand, it demonstrates the Central Military Commission's firm stance of zero tolerance towards military corruption to all representatives attending the Two Sessions; on the other hand, it also lays the groundwork for potential new rounds of high-level personnel adjustments after the Two Sessions, clearing obstacles in advance.

It is noteworthy that several of the purged generals are closely related to arms procurement, weapons development, and military industrial contracts. This indicates that the deeper logic of the anti-corruption purges is not only about discipline rectification but also about systematically cutting off the military-industrial interest chain—this will directly affect China's weapons procurement model and efficiency in the coming years.

Budget Expansion: Strategic Will Behind the Numbers

In 2025, China's defense budget was $286 billion, a year-on-year increase of 7.2%, maintaining an expansion trend that has outpaced GDP growth for several consecutive years. In 2026, various analyses generally expect the increase to remain in the range of 7% to 9%, which means defense spending will exceed the $300 billion to $310 billion mark.

However, the gap with the United States remains vast. The U.S. defense budget for fiscal year 2026 has reached a record $1.01 trillion, more than three times that of China. This figure not only represents an absolute monetary suppression but also exerts continuous psychological pressure on Chinese strategic planners—Beijing must make optimal strategic trade-offs within limited resources.

From the patterns observed in previous Two Sessions, the announced defense budget figures are often carefully designed: they must demonstrate the determination to safeguard core interests while avoiding excessive concern from neighboring countries. The expected increase for 2026 is likely to be around 8%, presenting a posture of steady expansion rather than radical leaps.

In terms of budget structure, military observers expect that 2026 will focus on increasing investments in the following areas: nuclear force modernization, space and anti-satellite capabilities, cyber warfare and electronic warfare, drone swarm technology, and aircraft carrier battle group construction.

Energy Security Threats: Strategic Anxiety in the Strait of Hormuz

The ongoing Middle East crisis has evolved from regional conflict into a direct threat to China's core strategic interests. The Strait of Hormuz sees approximately 20% of global trade in oil passing through daily, with about 60% of China's oil imports transiting this narrow waterway. Should the strait be blocked or significantly disrupted, China's energy security would face a historic shock.

This vulnerability has become one of the core driving forces behind the PLA Navy's strategic expansion. During the Two Sessions, military representatives are likely to propose strengthening long-range operational capabilities, advancing port construction along the "String of Pearls" strategy, and accelerating the formation of combat capabilities for aircraft carrier groups. Recent trends indicate that the Chinese Navy has begun regular escort fleet deployments in the Indian Ocean, but there remains a significant gap between existing forces and the sustained operational capabilities required to protect long-range energy corridors.

Type 004 Aircraft Carrier: Nuclear Power Ambitions and the 2035 Blueprint

The construction progress of China's fourth aircraft carrier (designated Type 004) has continued to attract high attention in the international defense community. Analysis of satellite images and shipyard dynamics from multiple sources indicates that the Type 004 aircraft carrier exhibits several technical features of a nuclear propulsion system—including unusual reactor compartment layout signs and specifications for desalination and power systems compatible with nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

If this assessment is accurate, the Type 004 will become China's first nuclear-powered surface vessel, marking a historic leap in the PLA Navy's strategic projection capabilities. A nuclear-powered aircraft carrier does not require frequent refueling and can theoretically operate continuously in any ocean, fundamentally changing the endurance of China's long-range power projection.

In line with Xi Jinping's goal of building a military by 2035, China has planned to maintain no fewer than nine aircraft carriers in its combat sequence before 2035. If this number is achieved, it will make China the second-largest aircraft carrier power in the world, after the United States.

Strategic Assessment: Short-Term Trauma vs. Long-Term Restructuring

Regarding the ongoing deepening of military purges, there are two distinctly different evaluative frameworks in the strategic community. The short-term trauma theory argues that the large-scale purge of 101 senior officers will inevitably create fractures and psychological shocks within the command system. The short-term vacancies in some key positions, combined with the time required for successors to establish command authority, may have a substantial impact on the PLA's joint operational coordination capabilities in the next 12 to 24 months.

The long-term restructuring theory holds the opposite view: while purging corrupt networks may cause command chaos in the short term, it fundamentally eliminates the tumor of peacetime corruption and wartime ineffectiveness. A significant portion of the purged generals are considered "paper generals"—promoted through bribery, with questionable actual combat capabilities. Trading purges for genuine combat effectiveness is a price Xi Jinping is willing to pay. From Xi Jinping's strategic logic, he clearly accepts the judgment of short-term pain for long-term gain—using 2027 and 2035 as strategic target nodes, the current purges are laying the personnel and organizational foundation for winning battles at these two time points.

Key Observations for the Two Sessions

Based on the above analysis, it is recommended to focus on the following signals during this year's Two Sessions: first, whether the defense budget increase announced on March 5 exceeds 8.5%; second, the density and intensity of expressions related to combat readiness and practical training in the government work report; third, the appearance of newly appointed military commission members and major leaders from various theaters, providing insight into the new power structure post-purge; fourth, public statements from military representatives regarding Taiwan and South China Sea issues during the Two Sessions.

Conclusion

The military topics of the 2026 Two Sessions are a highly compressed reflection of current Chinese political logic: anti-corruption purges and military expansion proceed in parallel, with short-term chaos and long-term restructuring advancing simultaneously. Xi Jinping is playing a grand game—exchanging the suffering of one generation for the combat effectiveness of the next generation of the military. On March 5, when the defense budget figures are read out in the Great Hall of the People, the world will receive the latest information on this strategic game.

Li Minghui, hiwars.com Chinese Military Defense Commentator, focusing on Chinese military strategy, PLA modernization, and Indo-Pacific security dynamics.