The Alliance of Sahel States in the Face of Intensifying Terrorism in 2026

Submitted by: Marie DuboisMarie Dubois
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The security situation in the Sahel region is experiencing unprecedented deterioration in the first quarter of 2026, as the Sahel States Alliance (AES) struggles to halt the advance of terrorist groups. Recent data reveals an alarming situation: JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) now controls up to 60% of Burkinabé territory, while the Islamic State in the Sahel Province demonstrates increasing operational sophistication.

The strategic failure of the military juntas is becoming increasingly evident. Since coming to power between 2020 and 2023, the military regimes of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso justified their coups by citing the inability of civilian governments to counter the terrorist insurgency. Breaking with their traditional Western partners, notably France and the United States, these juntas have forged alliances with Russia, China, and Turkey. Yet, the results are catastrophic: in 2024, more than half of the terrorism-related deaths worldwide occurred in the Sahel.

The January 2026 offensive against Dori Hamani Airport and Air Base 101 in Niger, the headquarters of the AES Unified Force, marks a symbolic turning point. This coordinated attack, using drones, small arms, and mortars, demonstrated that even the most strategic military infrastructures are no longer safe. JNIM launched one of its most sophisticated operations in Burkina Faso, mobilizing hundreds of fighters to simultaneously attack military and civilian targets in several provinces.

The institutional response remains largely inadequate. On January 21, 2025, the AES announced the creation of a joint armed force of 5,000 soldiers intended to combat regional jihadism. However, this initiative has yet to materialize effectively. ECOWAS is attempting to establish a counter-terrorism force of 2,000 men by the end of 2026. But at the current pace of territorial consolidation by JNIM, this force risks becoming obsolete even before it is operational.

Questions of funding, air capabilities, and intelligence gathering remain unanswered satisfactorily. Even more concerning, the persistent political divisions between the AES and ECOWAS compromise any effective coordination. Washington is observing this situation with concern, especially as the escalation of the conflict in Iran now monopolizes American attention and resources.

Moscow is accelerating its cooperation with the continent, with intergovernmental commission meetings scheduled for the first half of 2026 with Tanzania, Algeria, Guinea, Nigeria, and Mali. However, disillusionment is growing within the AES regarding the Russian forces of the Africa Corps, increasingly perceived as mercenaries with limited engagement rather than true partners in security cooperation.

In this context, Washington is cautiously trying to re-establish dialogue. The United States lifted sanctions against three senior Malian officials in February 2026 and is finalizing an agreement with Bamako allowing intelligence gathering in Malian airspace. However, for intelligence gathering to be truly effective, Washington should engage with all three states of the AES.

The economic dimension of this crisis should not be underestimated. The war in Iran has caused a spike in energy prices that particularly affects Niger and Mali, net importers of petroleum products. JNIM exploits this vulnerability by closing transit corridors and attacking fuel trucks in Mali to isolate the country from its regional trading partners.

Since 2019, JNIM has methodically expanded its influence to the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea, building a sophisticated network capable of undermining state authority throughout the region. This expansion has created a proto-state extending from AES members to most coastal nations of West Africa. The risk of attacks against the ports of the Gulf of Guinea poses a direct threat to international trade.

This situation places the international community in a strategic dilemma. Sustainable stability in the region would require military and financial commitments far beyond what is currently feasible. The 68,933 people killed since 2012 and the three million displaced are not just statistics: they represent the gradual collapse of state authority in a region that could become the new global sanctuary for transnational terrorism.

Classification
Region
Africa
Analytical Domain
Operational
Primary Category / Secondary Categories
Military Operations / Logistics
Subcategory
Defensive Action
SALUTE Report
Size
5,000 soldiers (AES joint force)
Activity
Counter-terrorism operations against JNIM and ISIS in the Sahel region
Location
Burkina Faso · Niger
Unit
Alliance of Sahel States (AES)
Time
January 2026
Equipment
droneslight weaponsmortars
Summary

JNIM controls 60% of Burkina Faso as the AES struggles to counter terrorism. In January 2026, a coordinated attack targeted the Dori Hamani airport and base 101 in Niger, highlighting vulnerabilities in military infrastructure. The AES's joint force of 5,000 soldiers remains largely ineffective, while JNIM's operational sophistication increases, threatening regional stability.

Key Facts
  • JNIM controls 60% of Burkina Faso territory.
  • AES announced a joint force of 5,000 soldiers.
  • January 2026 attack on Dori Hamani airport and base 101 in Niger.
  • Over half of global terrorism deaths in 2024 occurred in the Sahel.
  • JNIM has expanded influence to coastal West African states.

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