The Evolution of the Russian Drone Doctrine: From Mass Production to the Concept of "Carrier Drones"

In the last 48 hours, the Russian military industry has demonstrated significant shifts in its approach to the production and application of unmanned aerial vehicles, indicating the formation of a new tactical doctrine in the context of a protracted conflict.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has decided to significantly increase the order for the strike UAV "Upyr-18," produced by the company "Ural Drone Factory." This was announced on February 19, 2026, by the general director of the enterprise, Vladimir Tkachuk. According to his statement, positive feedback from operators working with these systems in the combat zone has become the basis for a substantial expansion of the state contract.

"Upyr-18" is a strike drone with an 18-inch frame, capable of carrying a payload of up to 10 kilograms over distances of tens of kilometers. In military circles, this system is already being compared to the legendary Soviet tank T-34 for its simplicity of design and reliability in operation. Such a comparison is not accidental: like the T-34, which could be produced in large quantities with relative ease of maintenance, the "Upyr-18" demonstrates the philosophy of mass production of affordable combat systems.

This strategy reflects a broader trend in Russian military doctrine: compensating for technological lag in certain areas through quantitative superiority and the adaptation of proven solutions. According to official Russian sources, by February 2026, the Russian army is equipped with modern weapons at 70 percent, although the definition of "modern" in this context remains a subject of debate among Western analysts.

Alongside the ramping up of traditional strike UAV production, Russian military engineers have demonstrated an innovative approach to the use of existing systems. On February 17, 2026, footage appeared on social media showing the use of the "Geran-2" drone as a "carrier drone" for delivering FPV drones deep into Ukrainian territory.

A Russian military blogger published a video, allegedly filmed over the Sumy region, demonstrating the separation of an FPV drone from the flying "Geran-2." According to the source, the "Geran" UAVs are used as signal relays for controlling FPV drones, which detach from the carrier as they approach the target. Another military blogger emphasized the particular importance of such use of "Gerans" after Russian forces lost access to Starlink terminals.

Ukrainian expert on unmanned technologies and electronic warfare, advisor to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Sergey Beskrestnov reported on February 3 about the use of the "Gerbera" UAV (a cheaper trap version of the "Shahed"/"Geran") by the Russian side as carriers for strike or reconnaissance FPV drones. The "Molniya" drones were also used in a similar role.

The concept of "carrier drones" represents a tactical innovation that addresses several tasks simultaneously. First, unlike the "Gerbera," the "Geran-2" is capable of continuing its movement toward its own target after releasing the FPV drone, providing a double strike. Second, FPV drones delivered deep into enemy defenses can be used for reconnaissance and adjusting the strike of the main carrier. Third, such a system partially neutralizes Ukrainian electronic warfare capabilities, which effectively suppress traditional control channels for drones.

These tactical innovations are developing against the backdrop of growing economic pressure on the Russian economy. According to an analysis by the Institute for the Study of War published on February 19, 2026, high-ranking European intelligence sources estimate that President Putin is not seeking a quick resolution to the conflict, as the Russian economy is not yet on the brink of collapse. However, the same sources warn of "very high" financial risks in the second half of 2026.

Bloomberg reported on February 18 that Russian oil companies drilled 3.4 percent fewer operational wells in 2025 compared to 2024, due to Western sanctions and the strengthening of the ruble, which have reduced industry revenues. Revenues from oil and gas fell to a five-year low in 2025. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged in September 2025 that Russian authorities expect a 30 percent drop in the share of oil and gas revenues in the budget in 2026.

Nevertheless, the Kremlin demonstrates confidence in the economy's ability to support military efforts. At a meeting with representatives of the Saudi television channel Al-Arabiya on February 18, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed Russia's maximalist demands in negotiations: recognition of the annexation of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, Ukraine's renunciation of NATO membership, limitations on the Ukrainian armed forces, and the replacement of the current government with a "friendly" regime to Russia.

In the context of these political demands, military-technical development takes on special significance. The mass production of "Upyr-18" and experimentation with the concept of "carrier drones" indicate that the Russian military leadership is preparing for a continuation of the conflict of medium intensity for an indefinite period.

At the same time, the Russian side is clearly betting on asymmetric solutions: instead of attempting to achieve technological parity with Western systems supplied to Ukraine by a coalition of 34 countries, Russia is focusing on mass production of relatively simple and cheap systems that allow for rapid implementation of tactical innovations.

As of February 20, 2026, according to Ukrainian data, the total losses of the Russian armed forces have reached approximately 1,257,880 personnel since the beginning of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. These figures, while requiring independent verification, indicate the scale of human resources that Moscow is willing to invest in achieving its strategic goals.

Thus, the development of unmanned technologies in the Russian armed forces reflects a broader strategic dilemma: the need to balance between growing economic constraints and the desire to maintain military pressure of sufficient intensity to achieve political goals. The concept of mass production of simple systems with the potential for tactical adaptation may prove more sustainable in the long term than attempts to compete in high-tech segments, where Western superiority remains significant.

The question is how long the Russian economy can sustain this strategy amid expected increased financial pressure in the second half of 2026. This time horizon likely explains the Kremlin's persistence in negotiations and its desire to secure concessions before economic realities demand painful decisions.