The JNIM Offensive of February 2026: Analysis of a Coordinated Campaign and Burkinabè Military Responses

The coordinated offensive launched by Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in February 2026 across the central Sahel, with Burkina Faso as the main theater, marks a strategic turning point in the dynamics of the Sahelian conflict. This campaign, unprecedented in scale for several months, reveals both the persistent operational capabilities of the jihadist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the structural vulnerabilities of the region's defense and security forces, while highlighting a government response that strives to regain military initiative.

The analysis of events in February 2026 allows for the identification of several key trends: an internal context within JNIM marked by tensions and defections, a strategy of mass violence targeting both fighters and civilians perceived as supporters of the state, and a Burkinabè military response that combines ground operations and airstrikes to reclaim positions lost for several years. These developments are part of a protracted struggle where each side attempts to shift the balance of power in its favor.

The defection of Sadou Samahouna, a senior JNIM commander in the Eastern region of Burkina Faso and younger brother of Abu Hanifa, the emir of the group for Niger, serves as the immediate trigger for this offensive. According to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) group, Sadou joined the Islamic State in the Sahel (ISSP), a rival group affiliated with the Islamic State, with a small contingent of fighters. Although the number of defectors is limited, Sadou's influence and network have raised concerns within JNIM's leadership regarding internal cohesion and the risk of further defections.

This defection occurs in a context of ongoing rivalry between JNIM and ISSP for territorial and ideological control of the Sahel. The first major attack of the campaign took place on February 4, when JNIM attacked a Nigerien military base in Makalondi, near the Boni area where Sadou had defected. This operation appears to have aimed at asserting the group's power and deterring other members from following the same path.

The offensive then moved to Burkina Faso, where JNIM targeted the Burkinabè armed forces and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), a state-supported civilian militia. The Eastern, Central-North, and Northern regions were particularly affected. According to ACLED, the campaign involved more than 30 attacks in Burkina Faso alone, resulting in the deaths of over 120 soldiers, forest guards, and VDP fighters. The use of mass violence by JNIM reflects tactics often associated with ISSP, an approach that seems to resonate with certain segments of JNIM's fighting base.

The attack on February 14 against Titao, in the Northern region, perfectly illustrates the brutality and planning of this campaign. Just before 7 a.m., hundreds of JNIM fighters entered the town on motorcycles and in pickup trucks. According to testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch from 20 people, including 10 direct witnesses, some fighters attacked the military base while others deployed in the market, shooting at civilians and setting shops on fire. Telecommunications infrastructure was destroyed, and the exits from the town were blocked.

About 200 soldiers from the Rapid Intervention Battalion 21 (BIR 21), involved in counter-insurgency operations, and several hundred militia members were based in Titao. Witnesses report that JNIM fighters opened fire on all the men they found in the market area, sparing women and children. A 37-year-old farmer told Human Rights Watch: "I hid behind a wall while the men trying to flee were shot before my eyes. I lost my uncle – I found his body with a face disfigured by multiple gunshot wounds."

Human Rights Watch examined a list compiled by witnesses of 27 victims, aged 25 to 50. International media also reported that 7 Ghanaian nationals died in the attack. The Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed on February 14 that "a truck carrying tomato traders from Ghana... was caught in a terrorist attack in Titao." The attack also caused significant damage to infrastructure, including the destruction of a telecommunications tower in the center of Titao, confirmed by the analysis of satellite images from February 14 captured at 11:32 a.m.

On February 22, another deadly attack occurred in Manni, in the Eastern region. JNIM fighters surrounded the market around 1 p.m., trapping everyone inside. Four traders, aged 47 to 61, were executed, and their shops were set on fire after an attack on the gendarmerie post and militia positions. According to witnesses, JNIM targeted these men because their sons had joined the VDP. A 43-year-old nurse reported hearing a jihadist say over a walkie-talkie, in Gourmantché language: "Do what we were asked to do quickly, and we will withdraw soon."

These attacks are part of a deliberate strategy by JNIM to target communities perceived as supporting or having ties to the VDP. On January 29, nine women aged 29 to 51 had already been kidnapped near the village of Sollé, besieged by JNIM for four years. The women, who had gone to collect increasingly scarce firewood, were taken to an abandoned camp about five kilometers from Sollé, interrogated about their alleged ties to the VDP, and threatened with rape. A 42-year-old woman stated: "Two fighters told their commander: 'These women said they were looking for wood, but they could be VDP wives come to spy on us.' They wanted to treat us as war booty." The women were eventually released the next day after interrogation, but with the order to wear the veil and a warning that they would be killed if captured again.

In response to this offensive, the Burkinabè armed forces launched a series of counter-offensive operations in February 2026, with the support of the VDP. According to the Burkina Information Agency, the defense and security forces successfully regained control of several strategic localities in the Sahel region that had been occupied by armed groups since 2019. Among the towns brought back under government control are Tongomayel, Béléhédé, and Pobé-Mengao, all located in the northern part of the country.

Military officials described the fighting as intense, particularly in the northern areas where militant groups had maintained strong positions for several years. Despite violent clashes, security forces claim that operations ended with the withdrawal of militants from several strongholds. On February 16, soldiers from the BIR 29 unit operating in the village of Pini confronted armed fighters and neutralized several while recovering weapons and other equipment. The same day in Kantchari, militants fled their positions, abandoning weapons and supplies.

Additional operations were conducted in areas including Diapaga, Djembédé, Lankoué, Koro, Lei, and Bantoro near the Mouhoun region. Later in the month, security forces also repelled an attack by militants in Kombouari in the eastern part of the country near Fada N'Gourma. According to the Timbuktu Institute, the Burkinabè armed forces claimed to have neutralized at least 100 fighters during February 2026.

The military response also involved an increased use of air power. On February 15, Burkina Faso's state television reported that the army had conducted airstrikes in response to the Titao attack, with BIR 21 soldiers intervening on the ground. A week later, Security Minister Mahamadou Sana visited Titao and stated that authorities were supporting residents with medical supplies and humanitarian aid. The use of drones, attack helicopters, and fighter jets is part of a trend observed elsewhere in the region, notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the army has intensified its air war against the M23 rebel group.

This escalation of violence has dramatic humanitarian consequences. Since the beginning of the insurgency in Burkina Faso in 2016, JNIM and other armed Islamist groups have repeatedly attacked civilians and forcibly displaced tens of thousands of people. The Burkinabè military junta, which came to power in 2022, has also targeted civilians during counter-insurgency operations. According to Human Rights Watch, these attacks constitute manifest war crimes, as all parties to the armed conflict in Burkina Faso are bound by international humanitarian law, including common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary laws of war, which prohibit summary executions, attacks against civilians and civilian property, rape and other sexual violence, and looting.

The JNIM offensive in February 2026 also occurs within a broader regional context. While JNIM was conducting its campaign in Burkina Faso, ISSP launched its own offensive in the Burkinabè Sahel on February 9 and 10. The group attacked and stormed JNIM positions in several villages, killing more than 40 JNIM fighters, thus highlighting the persistent challenge to JNIM's regional dominance. This rivalry between the two jihadist groups further complicates the security landscape and creates tactical opportunities for government forces, but also risks escalating violence.

The situation in Burkina Faso also reflects the challenges faced by the states of the Sahel States Alliance (AES), composed of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These three countries, led by military juntas after successive coups, launched a unified military force in early March 2026 to combat the jihadist insurgency that has destabilized the region for over a decade. However, their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in early 2026 has weakened regional security cooperation mechanisms.

At the same time, there is a potential rapprochement between the United States and certain AES countries. According to several sources, Washington is close to concluding an agreement with Mali that would allow the resumption of flights of planes and drones over Malian airspace to gather intelligence on jihadist groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. One of the immediate objectives would be the search for an American pilot who was kidnapped in neighboring Niger while working with Christian missionaries. U.S. officials suspect that the pilot may be held by JNIM.

The February 2026 offensive reveals several strategic lessons. First, JNIM retains significant operational capacity despite ongoing military pressures. The coordination of more than 30 attacks in one month demonstrates sophisticated planning and robust logistical networks. Second, the strategy of targeting the VDP and communities perceived as supporting the government aims to erode popular support for the authorities and deter civilian collaboration with security forces. Third, internal tensions within JNIM, illustrated by the defection of Sadou Samahouna, create vulnerabilities that the group's adversaries could exploit.

On the government side, the recapture of towns occupied since 2019 represents an important tactical success, but the sustainability of these gains remains uncertain without a permanent presence of security forces and without economic development to consolidate state authority. The increased use of air power suggests a shift towards more technology-intensive operations, but also raises questions about the risks of civilian casualties and dependence on foreign partners for technical and logistical support.

Finally, the conflict in Burkina Faso is part of a broader Sahelian dynamic where factors of violence include not only jihadist ideology but also governance failures, economic inequalities, the marginalization of certain communities, and spillover effects from crises in neighboring countries. The JNIM offensive of February 2026 and the subsequent Burkinabè counter-operations are just one episode in a protracted conflict whose resolution will require multidimensional responses that go well beyond the military dimension alone.