The juntas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger launch an AES television — Russia wins the narrative war in 2026

Bamako, October 4, 2026. In Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey, the front is no longer just played out on the tracks of Liptako-Gourma. The three military regimes of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) have just launched a joint television channel, with reported Russian support according to the Financial Times. The choice of media is revealing. An army can lose a forward post and still maintain its narrative; a junta that loses the narrative loses its urban support much more quickly.

A political tool before being a channel

The project is presented as a showcase of the sovereignty of the AES. This is consistent with the institutional break initiated since the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger: withdrawal from ECOWAS, denunciation of French cooperation, and the search for a regional framework controlled by the military. The television gives a daily form to this break. It can broadcast statements, show operations, select images of heads of state, and present security setbacks as steps in a national reconquest.

On the ground, this function matters. In the Sahel, populations do not live within impermeable borders: they follow markets, pastoral corridors, and supply routes. Jihadist groups also move between control zones. An AES channel can therefore create a common political space more quickly than a joint force can create a common military capability.

Russia provides a model for informational warfare

The Russian support reported by the Financial Times should not be reduced to a question of equipment or funding. Moscow primarily offers a method. The message is simple: Russia would be the partner that respects the sovereignty of the juntas, while the former European powers would be associated with injunctions, sanctions, and the failure of Barkhane.

This narrative finds a favorable ground, but it has an operational limit. A channel can explain an attack; it cannot secure a road. Recent episodes in Mali have reminded us of this. In September, Reuters reported that more than a hundred Malian soldiers had been killed in attacks attributed to militants linked to al-Qaeda, while the army spoke of evacuation and strikes against enemy positions. The gap between the statement and the observed reality then becomes the true test of credibility.

Southern Libya and the Lake Chad basin remain off the radar

On the same day, meetings between the foreign ministers of Egypt, Libya, and Chad focused on counter-terrorism cooperation and the revival of the Sahelo-Saharan framework, according to Ahram Online and Egypt Today. This initiative highlights what the AES television does not control: the northern approaches to the theater of operations. The routes connecting Fezzan, Tibesti, and northern Chad do not stop at Bamako's communication.

The risk is that of two parallel architectures. To the south, the AES is building a narrative and regime solidarity around Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. To the north, Egypt, Libya, and Chad are seeking to reactivate a distinct security coordination. Between the two, traffickers, armed groups, and jihadist networks exploit the spaces where no one has a permanent chain of command.

What this channel will actually change

• In the short term: it will strengthen the discipline of the official discourse after each attack and provide the three juntas with a common stage.
• In the medium term: it could facilitate political recruitment, the mobilization of volunteers, and the legitimization of a lasting Russian presence.
• But: it will not resolve the lack of local intelligence, the protection of convoys, or the maintenance of isolated bases.

A television channel is a multiplier of cohesion. It is not a multiplier of firepower.

The available information remains incomplete regarding the exact funding, programming, and command structure of this channel. It would therefore be premature to speak of a fully integrated media apparatus. But the strategic signal is clear: after contesting the inherited diplomatic borders, the AES is beginning to challenge the informational space. For JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, the next battle will not just be to take a village. It will be to make it believed, before the juntas, that the state will never return there.

Sources

• Financial Times, “Sahel juntas launch TV channel with Russian backing,” October 4, 2026.
• Ahram Online, “Egypt, Libya, Chad FMs discuss reviving Sahel-Saharan bloc, strengthening regional security,” October 5, 2026.
• Egypt Today, “FM holds trilateral meeting with Chadian, Libyan counterparts to discuss enhancing counter-terrorism cooperation,” October 5, 2026.
• Reuters, “Al Qaeda-linked militants kill more than 100 Malian soldiers in attack this month,” September 2026.
• The Guardian, analysis on the rise of violence linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the Sahel, September 16, 2026.