The Yan'an Ship Launches Jamming Munitions for the First Time, Signaling a Strategic Shift in PLA Electronic Warfare from "Secrecy" to "Visibility"

In a CCTV military report at the end of January, there was a detail that could easily be overlooked: after the crew of the Yan'an ship (055-class destroyer No. 8) scanned the sea surface with binoculars, they issued the command "Prepare for starboard." Seconds later, four jamming munitions were launched from the vertical launch system on the right side of the ship, releasing jamming clouds in mid-air.

This is the first time the PLA Navy has publicly demonstrated the complete operational process of using electronic warfare jamming munitions in waters near Taiwan. Unlike previous vague statements about "foreign military reconnaissance," this time CCTV clearly showcased the entire process from radar detection, fleet coordination to jamming munition launch.

From "Not Speaking" to "Clearly Stating"

The PLA has always been tight-lipped about its electronic warfare actions around the Taiwan Strait. Even during the 2024 Eastern Theater Command's "Joint Sword" exercise, official reports only mentioned "electromagnetic space control," without ever disclosing specific equipment and tactical details.

This time is different. CCTV footage shows that after the Yan'an ship detected "multiple batches of foreign military aircraft approaching from different directions and changing course multiple times," it switched the radar to high-power mode to expand the detection range, then activated the electronic warfare system, preparing both active and passive jamming munitions. The footage clearly shows the Shandong ship simultaneously launching three carrier-based aircraft for target confirmation—this is a standard electronic warfare coordination process for carrier strike groups.

Notably, the program also showcased the Nanchang ship (the first ship of the 055 class) maneuvering to intercept two foreign vessels within the Liaoning ship's formation. Although CCTV did not specify the nationalities, the timing of these two actions occurred after the U.S. announced an $11.1 billion arms sale to Taiwan and after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi publicly stated that "China's military unification of Taiwan would trigger Japan's military intervention."

Jamming Munitions Are Not Missiles

It is important to clarify a potentially confusing concept: what was launched in the footage were "jamming munitions," not anti-ship missiles or surface-to-air missiles.

Jamming munitions are non-lethal electronic warfare equipment that disrupt enemy communications, radar, and electronic target systems through active or passive means. Passive jamming interferes with enemy radar tracking by releasing chaff, infrared decoys, and other reflective/radiative signals; active jamming directly suppresses or deceives enemy electronic devices by emitting directed electromagnetic waves.

The integrated electronic warfare system equipped on the 055-class destroyer includes three major modules: passive detection, active jamming, and decoy launching. According to publicly available information, the 112-unit vertical launch system (VLS) of the 055 can mix and match surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine missiles, and electronic warfare payloads. It is understood that electronic warfare payloads typically account for 10%-15%, meaning a single 055 can carry approximately 12-16 jamming munitions.

Compared to the U.S. Navy's Burke-class destroyer's AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare system, the 055 has the advantage of higher integration and broader jamming frequency coverage (reportedly covering everything from low-frequency radar to satellite communication bands). However, the U.S. military still has advantages in software algorithms and real combat data accumulation—this is a part that is difficult to assess from publicly available information.

The "First Shot" of Informationized Warfare

The PLA's theory of "informationized warfare" has been repeatedly emphasized since the military reform in 2015, but there has been a lack of evidence for practical training. This CCTV footage provides an important clue: electronic warfare is becoming a standard operational procedure for naval and air formations.

There are several details in the footage worth noting:

• Before launching jamming munitions, the Yan'an ship first had carrier-based aircraft from the Shandong ship take off for target confirmation—indicating that there is real-time data link support within the formation.
• The Nanchang ship executed interception tasks within the Liaoning ship formation, rather than the aircraft carrier maneuvering itself—indicating that the 055 has become the "shield ship" of the carrier formation.
• Both actions emphasized "high-power radar mode" and "full-status electronic warfare system"—indicating that the PLA has begun to publicly showcase the electromagnetic warfare concept of "detect and suppress."

From a tactical perspective, this process aligns with the U.S. military's concepts of "Distributed Lethality" and "Joint All-Domain Command and Control" (JADC2): it is not about single-ship operations, but rather all platforms within the formation sharing situational awareness and collaboratively implementing electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and fire strikes.

Mass Production Capability is the Real Threshold

From a technical standpoint, jamming munitions themselves are not high-threshold equipment. The real challenge lies in whether they can be produced on a large scale and whether a systematic capability can be formed at the formation level.

As of February 2026, eight 055-class destroyers have been commissioned, with two more undergoing sea trials. More than 30 052D-class destroyers (7,000-ton class) have been commissioned and are still under construction. Both classes of destroyers are equipped with integrated electronic warfare systems and VLS, theoretically capable of launching jamming munitions.

Calculating based on 12-16 jamming munitions per ship, the PLA's active destroyer fleet can carry approximately 500-600 electronic warfare payloads. This number may not seem large, but considering that jamming munitions are reusable tactical resources (they can be resupplied after launch), the actual sustained electronic warfare capability is much higher than this figure.

More importantly, the supply chain behind this is noteworthy. China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) is the main supplier of electronic warfare equipment for the PLA, with several research institutes such as the 14th, 29th, and 38th Institutes engaged in electronic warfare-related R&D. From publicly available annual reports of listed companies, Guorui Technology (a listed company under the 14th Institute) reported a 38% year-on-year increase in revenue from electronic countermeasure products in 2024, with a gross profit margin of 52%—indicating that electronic warfare equipment has entered a stage of large-scale production.

What is the Real Issue?

The recent public display of electronic warfare footage by CCTV sends a clear signal: the PLA no longer regards electronic warfare capabilities as a "secret weapon," but rather as a "conventional deterrent."

However, public display is just the first step. The real issue worth paying attention to is: to what extent has this electronic warfare system been tested in real combat?

Since 1979, the PLA has not had large-scale maritime and aerial conflict experience; the algorithms, tactical processes, and formation coordination capabilities of the electronic warfare system can only be validated through exercises and confrontation training. In contrast, the U.S. military has accumulated a wealth of real combat electronic warfare data and confrontation experience over the past 20 years in the Middle East.

From this perspective, the recently released footage may not only serve as a deterrent but also as a test: to see how the U.S. and Japan respond, and whether foreign militaries will adjust their electronic warfare tactics. After all, the essence of electronic warfare is a game of strategy—once your jamming frequency bands are exposed, the opponent can adjust their radar operating modes or communication encryption methods accordingly.

So the question arises: does publicly displaying electronic warfare details benefit the PLA more than it harms? If the U.S. and Japan upgrade their electronic warfare equipment or change tactics as a result, can the PLA keep pace?

These questions, perhaps, can only be answered in the next round of electronic confrontation around the Taiwan Strait.