The Nordic Choice Indicates the Tectonic Shifts in the East Asian Defense Industry

On January 30, the Norwegian Defense Material Agency signed a procurement contract with South Korea's Hanwha Aerospace for the Chunmoo multiple launch rocket system, valued at 1.9 billion Norwegian kroner (approximately 200 billion yen). This contract includes 16 launchers, precision-guided munitions, and training and logistics support, with deliveries set to begin in 2028. While this decision may superficially appear to be just a single arms deal, the strategic implications behind it serve as a significant warning for Japan's defense industry.

The primary reason Oslo ultimately chose Chunmoo was simply "delivery time." Since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, demand for the U.S.-made HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) has surged, and delivery schedules to NATO member countries are booked for several years ahead. Even priority customers like Poland are facing delays, while Hanwha presented a clear delivery plan and phased deployment schedule. The Norwegian government's procurement statement is succinct: "The Chunmoo system was the only proposal that met all requirements in the competition."

However, what is noteworthy here is not the price or performance. The fundamental reason Chunmoo has been accepted in the European market lies in its "modular design philosophy." While HIMARS is optimized for the U.S. military standard 227mm MLRS rocket family and ATACMS, PrSM tactical missiles, Chunmoo was designed from the outset to accommodate multiple calibers. A single K239 platform can launch 239mm unguided rockets, 239mm precision-guided munitions, and 600mm-class tactical ballistic missiles.

The performance of GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System) and CGR-080 guided rockets at a range of 80km is nearly equivalent, but Chunmoo's true value lies in its operational flexibility. It can perform missions that would typically require multiple systems—from area suppression to precision strikes, and deep firepower extending up to 290km—using a single platform. This was a decisive attraction for European countries facing budget constraints and personnel reductions.

South Korea's defense equipment exports are no longer isolated success stories. In October 2022, Poland ordered 288 Chunmoo systems (Homar-K program) and began deployment in 2023. By the end of 2025, a local production contract for CGR-080 guided rockets (valued at $4 billion) was signed. According to officials from Poland and Norway, this production line is aimed not only at supplying the two countries but also other European users. The triangular supply chain of South Korean design, Polish manufacturing, and Nordic end-users is a strategy to reduce dependence on U.S. production capabilities while securing key components within Europe.

This development recalls the trajectory of the K9 self-propelled howitzer, which has already spread throughout Northern and Eastern Europe. The K9 has become the backbone of artillery units in Poland, Norway, Finland, and the Baltic states. Chunmoo is being positioned as its long-range counterpart.

In contrast, what is the situation in Japan? Although Japan abolished the Three Principles on Arms Exports in 2014 and established the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment, exports of finished products are limited to five categories, and actual export achievements are extremely scarce. In 2025, permanent exports of non-lethal equipment will be permitted, and further regulatory relaxation is being considered for 2026, but these moves are too slow.

The fundamental issue facing Japan's defense industry is not just the strictness of regulations. The biggest barrier is the "design philosophy that does not assume export." Destroyers and submarines developed for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force are optimized for the Self-Defense Forces' operational concepts, requiring significant modifications for repurposing to other countries. The failure to export Soryu-class submarines to Australia symbolizes this structural flaw. In contrast, South Korea has incorporated "export potential" into the design phase from the beginning. The success of the K9 and Chunmoo is a result of this strategic foresight.

Norway's decision also has another geopolitical context. In addition to Russia's militarization of the Arctic, the proposal for the U.S. to strengthen its control over Greenland, raised again by former President Trump, has evoked concerns among Nordic countries that "even allies can become strategic variables." Relying entirely on the production schedules and political intentions of other countries for one's own defense capabilities is now recognized as a risk.

The lesson Japan should learn from South Korea is clear. Defense equipment exports are not merely an industrial promotion strategy. They are a diplomatic tool to enhance the capabilities of allies and expand one's own strategic influence. While Japan's historical context of avoiding militarization within the framework of "defensive defense" should be respected, it is also true that as a result, its defense industrial base has weakened, and its technological superiority is diminishing.

However, I would like to raise one question here. Is the South Korean model truly sustainable in the long term? South Korea's defense equipment exports heavily depend on the "special demand" created by the Ukraine war. If European countries rebuild their domestic production capabilities over the next decade and the U.S. expands its HIMARS production line, the competitive advantage of South Korean systems may rapidly diminish. Furthermore, South Korea will face the challenge of balancing its domestic defense needs with export demands, a dilemma Japan has yet to experience.

For Japan, the real challenge is not to imitate South Korea. Rather, it is how to strategically leverage its unique technological advantages—superior submarine stealth technology, advanced sensor integration capabilities, and precision machining technology. Norway's choice indicates that the defense industrial landscape in East Asia is being rewritten. Whether Japan can adapt to this change will depend on policy decisions made in the coming years.