The "Oreshnik" Base near Krichiev — Strategic Deterrence or an Expensive Gesture for Four Missiles

Satellite images from February 9, 2026, show active construction at the former Soviet airfield Krichiev-6 in eastern Belarus — six pieces of equipment matching the dimensions of the support infrastructure for the "Oreshnik" complex, about 25 vehicles of various types, earth shelters, and hangars under construction. The scale of the work indicates preparation for permanent deployment. But there is one detail that changes the interpretation of the entire picture: according to Ukrainian intelligence, as of today, Russia has only three to four "Oreshnik" systems. Building a full-fledged infrastructure for four missiles is either advanced logistics in anticipation of mass production or a very expensive political theater.

"Oreshnik" as the Successor to the RSD-10

The "Oreshnik" complex is believed to be a modified version of the RS-26 "Rubezh" — a mobile medium-range ballistic missile with an unofficial range estimate of 5,500 kilometers. This figure places Berlin, Paris, and possibly London within striking distance when launched from Belarusian territory. The system resembles the RSD-10 "Pioneer" (SS-20 in NATO classification), which was deployed by the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s and destroyed under the 1987 INF Treaty. At that time, the USSR had hundreds of such systems. Today, Russia has four.

The difference is quantitative, but it is also qualitative. The RSD-10 was a tool for massive nuclear war, where the count was in hundreds of targets and thousands of warheads. The "Oreshnik" in its current configuration is a tool for demonstrating technical capability, but not combat power. Ukrainian intelligence claims that the system has been used twice: a test launch near NATO borders in early 2026 for intimidation and once during exercises in 2025. Mass production is planned for the second half of 2026, but the pace remains unknown.

The Economics of Deterrence

Building stationary infrastructure — hangars, command posts, warehouses, security systems — requires hundreds of millions of rubles. If we assume that 4-6 "Oreshnik" systems are being deployed at Krichiev-6, the cost of one combat-ready complex (including infrastructure) will amount to an astronomical sum. For comparison: mobile systems like the "Iskander-M" are deployed without permanent bases specifically to avoid such costs. The emergence of a stationary base indicates either that the "Oreshnik" is not as mobile as claimed or that its deployment is pursuing more political than operational goals.

From a military economics perspective, this resembles the situation with aircraft carriers: the more money invested in them, the harder it is to admit that they are unnecessary in the current configuration of the conflict. The "Oreshnik" near Krichiev risks becoming a similar symbol — expensive, demonstrative, but not flexible enough for real application.

Why Belarus

The question that arises is: why not deploy the "Oreshnik" on Russian territory, where there are many ready military facilities and training grounds? The answer lies in the realm of geopolitical signaling. Placement in Belarus allows Moscow to demonstrate not only combat capability but also political integration with Minsk. This is part of a broader strategy of military-technical rapprochement between Russia and Belarus, which includes the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and the creation of a joint airbase. Krichiev-6 becomes a symbol of Belarus not just as an ally, but de facto as a continuation of the Russian defense perimeter.

However, this symbolic value has a downside. The placement of the "Oreshnik" just 100 kilometers from the EU borders (Krichiev is near the Polish and Lithuanian borders) makes the base a priority target for a preemptive strike in the event of escalation. Unlike mobile systems that can disappear into the forests of Russia, a stationary base is a fixed point on the map that cannot be hidden.

Forecast for 2026

Russia is expected to begin mass production of the "Oreshnik" in the second half of 2026. If production rates reach 10-12 units per year (which is optimistic given the sanctions on electronic components and precision alloys), by 2027 it will be possible to talk about a full division consisting of 8-10 missile systems. Only then will the base near Krichiev acquire military significance.

Until that moment, the "Oreshnik" will remain a tool of psychological warfare — a missile that is shown but not used. There is a logic to this: nuclear deterrence is based not on the number of warheads but on the perception of threat. If European capitals perceive the "Oreshnik" as a real threat, then the goal is achieved, even if only four systems actually exist.

But there is a risk that this strategy will backfire. The more resources invested in demonstrating power, the more painful it will be to acknowledge that production has stalled due to sanctions or technological problems. The "Oreshnik" near Krichiev could become a monument to ambitions that exceeded capabilities — like many other projects of the Russian defense industry in the last decade.

Sources: United24 Media, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Planet Labs satellite images from February 9, 2026, data from Ukrainian intelligence, Middlebury College research.