The People's Liberation Army in Turmoil: The Fall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli and the Hidden Concerns of China's Military Modernization

On January 20, 2026, an extremely unusual event occurred within the Chinese military. Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, head of joint operations command, were absent from a study seminar on the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Under China's strict political system, the absence of such high-ranking generals immediately sparked widespread speculation. Just four days later, the Chinese Ministry of Defense confirmed that these two top PLA generals were under investigation for suspected disciplinary violations and illegal activities. This sudden event not only shook the internal structure of the Chinese military but also raised profound doubts about China's military modernization process and actual combat capabilities.

The downfall of Zhang Youxia is of symbolic significance. As the first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, he is the highest military commander in China after Xi Jinping and the only representative of the military in the Politburo of the Central Committee. Notably, Zhang Youxia belongs to the "red aristocracy" class and is a childhood friend of Xi Jinping; their families served in the same unit, and their familial ties are close. Liu Zhenli serves as a member of the Central Military Commission, responsible for joint operations, troop movements, and military intelligence. Both generals are among the few senior officers in the PLA with combat experience, having participated in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979.

The speed of this investigation is shocking. Typically, it takes months for high-ranking officials to go from being missing to officially being announced as under disciplinary review. However, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli went from being absent from an event to being publicly investigated in just four days. This unusual speed seems to indicate that the central leadership aims to take preemptive action to prevent potential turmoil within the military.

According to an in-depth analysis by *Foreign Policy* magazine, the most credible explanation for this purge is that it stems from Xi Jinping's comprehensive investigation into the PLA's readiness and corruption issues following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This investigation revealed two major problems: rampant corruption within the Rocket Force and a broader system of corruption related to promotions and personnel selection. These issues clearly shocked Xi Jinping, who had believed that the anti-corruption campaign of the mid-2010s had already cleaned up the military.

Corruption is not only a reform issue but also a national security threat. Reports indicate that the CIA paid "promotion fees" to its informants within the Chinese military from 2007 to 2012—these necessary bribes allowed officers to advance within the military system until they were discovered by Chinese intelligence in 2012. Official comments on this purge emphasize the deeply rooted corruption problem and the necessity of the Party's absolute leadership over the military, further supporting this explanation.

Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, at least 110 of the highest-ranking PLA officers have been dismissed, prosecuted, or even imprisoned. The Rocket Force—responsible for China's nuclear deterrence and long-range strike capabilities—has been particularly hard hit, with several commanders and political commissars removed from their positions. The so-called "missile watering" scandal, disclosed by media such as *The New York Times*, although difficult to verify, illustrates the potential impact of corruption on the quality of weaponry and the military's combat capabilities.

If the corruption allegations against these officers are true, then the quality of the weapons and equipment procured by the PLA and its overall readiness are seriously called into question. On the other hand, if some allegations are fabricated, Xi Jinping's purge of those capable of challenging his authority could have a demoralizing effect on the PLA—commanders may feel uncertain about their job security. In either case, a large-scale purge of high-ranking generals will weaken the combat readiness and operational effectiveness of the Chinese military.

Historical experience shows that large-scale military purges can leave armies unprepared for war. Stalin's Great Purge of the Red Army before World War II serves as a cautionary tale. Although Zhang Youxia is not a military genius, he is a competent administrator and politician. More importantly, he is one of the few members of the PLA with combat experience, possibly the last active-duty officer with battlefield command experience from China's last war—the 1979 invasion of Vietnam.

This loss of talent is substantial, but the larger issue lies in the cultural atmosphere that the purge is creating within the military. Under Xi Jinping's rule, mediocrity and incompetence are continually promoted within Chinese state institutions, while talented and opinionated individuals either face career obstacles or flee to the private sector. The anti-corruption investigations have exacerbated this trend, as in a system where everyone is implicated, the only way to protect oneself is to attack others for disloyalty.

The CIA's recent recruitment activities targeting Chinese military personnel seem to be taking advantage of this chaotic situation. Its recruitment promotional video, "Saving the Future," focuses on a hypothetical Chinese officer disillusioned with leaders who prioritize personal interests over national interests, directly appealing to military personnel affected by the purge.

The implications for the Taiwan issue warrant close attention. These developments effectively reduce the likelihood of Chinese military adventurism, including the risk of invading Taiwan. For Xi Jinping to trust the PLA, he not only needs to completely replace personnel but also must be assured that the logistical issues caused by corruption have been genuinely resolved. While the weakening of the officer corps may produce "yes-men," there are currently no signs that Xi Jinping is descending into the delusional nationalism that characterized Putin before the invasion of Ukraine. Xi's rhetoric about "unstoppable reunification" is fundamentally consistent with similar statements made by his predecessors over the decades.

For Xi Jinping himself, purging his appointed loyalists damages his credibility but also reflects his power. However, in the long run, he has been viewed by many Chinese as a failed leader. The "zero-COVID" policy, the collapse of the real estate sector, economic stagnation, and growing social discontent are issues that will trouble him for the foreseeable future.

After Zhang Youxia's downfall, no officer can feel secure—especially if the investigation into the promotion system continues, as nearly all those promoted under the dismissed leaders will be implicated. As exiled Chinese analyst Deng Yuwen pointed out, by breaking the unspoken rules within the Party about who can be targeted, Xi Jinping has created a more dysfunctional system. He may also have set the stage for future coups. However, widespread fear, mutual distrust, and pervasive electronic surveillance make the necessary coordination extremely difficult. Any serious action may require Xi to show obvious signs of weakness, such as severe illness.

At present, Xi Jinping remains China's only strongman. But this unprecedented military purge reveals a profound paradox: in his efforts to consolidate absolute control over the military, Xi may be weakening the PLA's combat capabilities. When such serious systemic issues are hidden beneath the surface of the Chinese military's modernization, the PLA is likely still a long way from truly becoming a "fighting force that can win battles."