The Russian defense industry is losing quality in 2026 — the Soviet stockpile is still holding the war

Production is increasing, but military power is not necessarily

The most inconvenient figure for Russian propaganda today is not the volume of production, but the gap between the quantity produced and the quality restored. Four years after the start of the full-scale invasion, the Russian defense industry continues to produce equipment, ammunition, and drones, but it increasingly operates on a principle that Soviet planners called "mass production": more units, less resource for each. A study by the Center for European Policy Analysis from November 10, 2026, describes this as managed degradation. The formula is accurate, although the word "managed" creates a dangerous illusion of control.

So far, Moscow is not losing the industrial race in the simple sense. Factories have been switched to a prolonged mode of increased load, repair enterprises are working with equipment taken out of storage, and the drone sector has become the most flexible part of the defense industry. However, this resilience is bought at the expense of depleting Soviet heritage and wearing out the production base itself. Russia is not so much reproducing its former army as gradually replacing it with a cheaper and less durable system.

Three limitations of the Russian military industry

CEPA identifies three interconnected problems. The first is the depletion of stocks: armored vehicles and artillery systems that have been in storage for decades require increasingly deep repairs, and usable hulls are running out. The second is combat attrition: new products are not always produced faster than they are consumed on the front. The third is production bottlenecks. This refers to machines, special steels, military metallurgy, chemical components for explosives, microelectronics, and semiconductors.

Sanctions have not stopped the Russian defense industry, and it would be unreasonable to claim otherwise. Through import substitution, parallel imports, and supplies from friendly countries, Moscow is closing part of the deficit. But closing the deficit does not mean returning to the previous technological trajectory. A component may be available, but its quality, lifespan, and compatibility with the serial system are often worse. As a result, an officially new machine sometimes turns out to be a major overhaul of an old one, supplemented with a few modern modules.

Drones have become an exception and at the same time a trap

The most convincing success of Russia is the scaling of drones. Reconnaissance drones, FPV devices, loitering munitions, and large strike UAVs have become a central element of the military economy. They are easier to assemble in a distributed manner, faster to improve, and simpler to adapt to front-line requirements than a tank or a combat aircraft. This is why Russia's "drone-ization" of the defense industry appears not only forced but also rational.

However, the drone does not eliminate the industrial problem; it shifts it to another area. The increase in production requires engines, optics, secure communications, navigation modules, and computing electronics. Moreover, the adversary quickly changes countermeasures. According to DW on November 11, Ukrainian forces, which previously claimed to intercept about 90 percent of Russian drones, faced a drop in this figure to about 60 percent after the emergence of new jet devices. This does not prove the complete superiority of Russian technology, but it shows that adaptation is occurring on both sides of the front, and the industrial cycle is measured not in years but in weeks.

Why strikes on factories are more important than capturing warehouses

Publications from the National Security Journal and Reuters about the expansion of strikes on Russian military infrastructure indicate a change in Ukrainian logic. The targets are not only finished missiles or warehouses but also enterprises, energy nodes, and chains without which production is impossible. On November 10, Reuters reported new nighttime warnings about drones in the Baltic states and Finland amid the exchange of strikes between Russia and Ukraine. Even if the immediate damage from individual raids is limited, the very geography of the threat expands the cost of the Russian air campaign.

For the defense industry, this is fundamentally important. Destroying one batch of ammunition provides a tactical effect. Disrupting the operation of a rare machine, testing ground, or supply of special steel creates a delay that cannot be compensated for simply by ordering an increase in shifts. In the Soviet system, there was an excess of duplicating capacities; modern Russia inherited large factories but did not always preserve the production ecosystem around them.

Strategic forecast

The Russian industry is capable of sustaining the war in the medium term, especially if the Kremlin continues to prioritize quantity, drones, and missile weapons. However, heavy equipment, aviation, and complex air defense systems will face a gap between the rate of losses and the rate of qualitative replenishment. This gap will not necessarily manifest itself as a sudden collapse. It is much more likely to result in a slow decline in reliability, an increase in repair cycles, and a growing dependence on external suppliers.

The historical parallel with the 1990s is only partially relevant here. Back then, the Russian army was losing funding; now it is receiving money but spending it in a mode that wears out the production base. Money allows for maintaining the appearance of resilience longer, but it does not automatically create engineers, machines, and technological chains.

The Russian defense industry will survive in 2026, but its ability to produce mass products will increasingly be paid for with qualitative degradation. If the war continues at its current intensity, the limit will first manifest not in empty workshops but in the growing number of systems that formally exist but require repairs before they can reach the front.

Sources

• Center for European Policy Analysis, “Managing Russia’s Military-Industrial Degradation,” November 10, 2026.
• DW News, article on reactive Russian drones and declining interception efficiency, November 11, 2026.
• Reuters, article on nighttime warnings about drones in the Baltic states and Finland, November 10, 2026.
• National Security Journal, analysis of Ukrainian strategy for strikes on Russian military industry, November 2026.