The Sahel at a Crossroads: Alliance of Sahel States and ECOWAS Facing the Growing Jihadist Threat

The Sahel region is undergoing a profound transformation marked by the rise of two competing regional security architectures, even as armed terrorist groups intensify their operations across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Developments in recent weeks reveal an accelerated fragmentation of the West African security landscape, with major implications for regional stability.

On February 26, 2026, the Burkinabe capital Ouagadougou hosted a decisive ministerial meeting of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), marking an important milestone in the consolidation of this confederation born from the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Delegations from the three countries finalized and validated the roadmap for the second year of the Alliance, a strategic document that will be submitted to the Council of Heads of State for formal adoption.

This meeting took place in a particularly tense security context. The ministers firmly condemned what they termed recent attempts at destabilization, notably citing a foiled plot in Burkina Faso on January 3, 2026, and the attack on Air Base 101 and the international airport of Niamey in Niger. This latter offensive, claimed by the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISSP) at the end of January, represents an unprecedented escalation in the tactics of jihadist groups, which no longer hesitate to strike strategic installations in urban areas.

The AES, which is working to operationalize a unified force of 6,000 men, embodies the will of these three military-led states to forge a credible alternative to traditional regional mechanisms. This initiative directly echoes the perceived failure of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which has never succeeded in curbing jihadist expansion despite considerable international support. The three countries have broken with France, their former colonial ally that had deployed around 4,000 soldiers in the region, in favor of a partnership with Russia. Approximately 2,000 Russian fighters, initially from the Wagner paramilitary group and then from the Africa Corps under Moscow's state control, are now deployed on the territory of the Alliance.

In the face of this geopolitical reconfiguration, ECOWAS announced in early March 2026 the activation of its Standby Force (ESF) to combat cross-border armed groups. During a meeting of military chiefs of staff in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the regional bloc decided to mobilize an initial force of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026, with the goal of deploying a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 personnel announced in September 2025. This decision marks the first time that the ESF, historically deployed against political rebellions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Gambia, will confront ideological armed groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

However, this deployment faces considerable challenges. Nigeria, which has traditionally provided 75% of the personnel and funding for ECOWAS missions, is going through a difficult economic period marked by high inflation since 2023. Moreover, Nigerian forces are already heavily engaged on several domestic fronts: jihadist groups in the northeast, criminal gangs in the northwest, and separatist groups in the south. Analysts believe that funding could come from the United States, which has been closely collaborating with Nigeria on security issues since December 2025, or from France, which is strengthening its ties with Abuja.

The security situation on the ground continues to deteriorate at an alarming rate. Between January and August 2025, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recorded 2,976 security incidents resulting in 7,900 deaths in the central Sahel region. In February 2026, the group Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the main faction affiliated with al-Qaeda in West Africa, launched a series of coordinated attacks over a week across eastern and northern Burkina Faso, demonstrating increased operational capacity and mobility over vast territorial expanses.

In Mali, JNIM has maintained a blockade on fuel supply routes to the capital Bamako since September 2025, paralyzing mobility and essential services. This siege tactic illustrates the strategic evolution of armed groups, which seek to control trade routes and isolate urban centers to undermine government authority. In the Tillabéri region in southwestern Niger, which became the deadliest area in the central Sahel in 2025 according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), suspected militants killed more than 50 civilians in two major attacks in early 2026.

State security forces are also involved in serious human rights violations. The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and the Russian Africa Corps have been accused by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of possible war crimes and crimes against humanity, including extrajudicial killings, indiscriminate airstrikes, sexual violence, looting, and torture against civilians. In Burkina Faso, the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), state-sponsored militias, have been implicated in serious crimes along ethnic lines, exacerbating intercommunal tensions.

The increase in airstrikes and drone attacks, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and rocket and mortar fire reflects a shift in the combat tactics employed by JNIM and ISSP, contributing to indiscriminate violence, civilian damage, and likely war crimes. Armed groups deliberately use sieges, threats, kidnappings, IEDs, drones, and landmines as warfare tactics to control supply routes and expand their areas of influence. In besieged areas, they block humanitarian aid, provoke famine, impose forced taxes, and strategically destroy civilian infrastructure, including places of worship, health centers, food reserves, and water services.

Civic and political space is shrinking in the three AES countries, with arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and repression of journalists, human rights defenders, and political opponents. At the end of January 2026, the Burkinabe government announced measures to dissolve all political parties. In Mali, former Prime Minister Moussa Mara was sentenced in February 2026 to two years in prison for "discrediting the state" following a social media post expressing solidarity with detained political and civil society figures.

The announcements of withdrawal from the International Criminal Court by the three AES countries further weaken avenues for justice and redress for victims of heinous crimes. Widespread impunity for past and current violations fuels a cycle of violence and undermines public trust in security institutions.

Coordination between the AES and ECOWAS remains highly problematic. The three Sahelian countries have firmly rejected attempts at mediation from the regional bloc, notably by Senegal, which maintains friendly relations. The AES wants to prove that it can compete with ECOWAS by effectively combating armed groups, a central argument in its criticism that ECOWAS has focused excessively on political and electoral issues at the expense of counter-terrorism efforts.

Nevertheless, analysts like Beverly Ochieng from Control Risks suggest that long-term collaboration could emerge if ECOWAS continues to prioritize the fight against armed groups and cultivate ties through states like Senegal, Ghana, and Togo. Intelligence sharing, joint monitoring, and coordinated missions could become feasible.

The landscape of armed groups remains fragmented but expanding. JNIM, formed in 2017 by the merger of four Malian factions, has between 5,000 and 6,000 members and operates in Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, and Nigeria. The Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISSP), established in 2015, primarily operates in Niger and Mali and is believed to have over 400 fighters. Boko Haram, weakened since the death of its leader Abubakar Shekau in 2021, still has around 1,500 fighters. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splinter group from Boko Haram, is estimated to have 3,500 to 5,000 fighters. Ansaru, another al-Qaeda-linked faction with 2,000 to 3,000 members, and Lakurawa, a new group of about 1,000 fighters operating at the Niger-Nigeria border, complete this complex picture.

In the face of this multifaceted threat, a purely military approach proves insufficient. Armed groups manage to recruit by exploiting local grievances, providing basic services in rural areas neglected by the state, distributing fertilizers, building mosques, or promising security. Targeted social interventions in these areas, combined with improvements in governance, land management, and political settlements, are necessary to sustainably reduce the risks of atrocities.

The Sahel thus finds itself at a critical crossroads. On one side, two competing security architectures are trying to establish themselves as a solution to an ever-worsening crisis. On the other, increasingly sophisticated armed groups exploit the gaps of fragmented governance and a divided regional response. Without increased coordination, accountability of state actors for human rights violations, and a holistic strategy integrating development and security, the region risks descending into even deeper violence, with devastating consequences for civilian populations who are already paying the heaviest price for this endless war.