The Sahel Facing Jihadist Escalation: Between Strategic Realignments and Operational Challenges

The offensive launched by the Islamic State in the Sahel against the Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey on January 29 marked a turning point in the regional security dynamics. This unprecedented nighttime attack, involving 30 IS-Sahel fighters equipped with armed drones, small arms, and mortars, simultaneously targeted civilian facilities and Air Base 101, the headquarters of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Although the assault resulted in the elimination or capture of all attackers after two hours of fighting, the operation nonetheless achieved its strategic objective: to demonstrate the capability of armed groups to strike at the heart of Sahelian capitals despite the intensification of counter-terrorism operations.

This operational escalation occurs within a deeply reconfigured regional context. Since their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2023, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have formed the AES, a mutual defense and economic integration alliance intended to strengthen their resilience against the jihadist threat. However, the results on the ground remain mixed. In Mali, the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) group, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, imposed a blockade on fuel convoys from Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal between September 2025 and early 2026, paralyzing the economy of Bamako and sowing doubt among the population regarding the authorities' ability to ensure security. The unexplained end of the blockade has not erased its psychological impact, as evidenced by Aissata, a vendor in Bamako, who confides to The Africa Report: "And tomorrow? What will happen if the blockade returns or if the terrorist group decides to attack the market or any infrastructure in the city?"

In Burkina Faso, the situation is even more critical. JNIM conducted over 500 attacks in 2025, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, and now controls approximately 60% of the national territory. Armed groups have virtually encircled the capital Ouagadougou, confining security forces and volunteer militias to a restricted perimeter around their bases in the Central-North, East, and Sahel regions. Nighttime attacks on supply lines and the systematic use of improvised explosive devices have paralyzed the mobility of government forces. The attack in Titao in mid-February, which claimed the lives of 80 soldiers and militia members as well as at least 20 civilians, illustrates the persistent vulnerability of military positions. The attackers simultaneously targeted a military camp, a market, and local communication infrastructure, demonstrating sophisticated operational planning. Analysts from African Security Analysis estimate that "these dynamics are likely to continue in the coming months, particularly in border areas with Mali and Niger, where the presence and mobility of armed groups remain structurally entrenched and show no signs of slowing down."

In the face of this deterioration, the military juntas that have taken power in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso find themselves in a paradoxical position. They justified their coups by the inability of their democratic predecessors to stem the terrorist threat. However, three years after the first coups, the security situation has not only deteriorated, but the very legitimacy of these regimes is being called into question. According to a teacher at the University of Legal and Political Sciences in Bamako, who requested anonymity for fear of reprisals, "the Malian army is exhausted by the persistent terrorist attacks and defections to JNIM. The junta does not seem to have a response to the terrorist expansion, nor do its counterparts in Niger and Burkina Faso."

In this context, the diplomatic rapprochement between Washington and Bamako takes on a major strategic dimension. After years of tensions marked by the imposition of U.S. sanctions against several Malian officials for their alleged ties to Russian mercenaries, the United States lifted these restrictions in February 2026, paving the way for an agreement on the resumption of drone surveillance flights over Malian territory. This initiative aims to rebuild Washington's regional counter-terrorism intelligence network, which has been weakened since the expulsion of U.S. troops from Niger in 2024 following a diplomatic dispute. The drone base in Agadez, built at great expense, was intended to serve as a pivot for monitoring the entire Sahel.

The agreement currently under negotiation would allow the United States to resume aerial intelligence operations aimed at monitoring jihadist networks linked to Al-Qaeda that have spread across the Sahel. An immediate objective is the location of an American pilot kidnapped in Niger while working for Christian missionaries. U.S. authorities believe he is being held in Mali by JNIM. The visit of the U.S. envoy for Africa, Nick Checker, to Bamako last month was welcomed by Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop, who expressed a desire for a relationship based on "mutual respect and non-interference."

This development reflects a recalibration of U.S. policy toward the Sahel. After exerting strong pressure for rapid democratic transitions, Washington has realized that this approach fueled tensions with local governments and favored their rapprochement with Moscow. Catherine Nzuki from the Center for Strategic and International Studies emphasizes that Washington's criticisms were often perceived in the region as paternalistic. The return to pragmatic security cooperation, despite reservations about the nature of the regimes in place, reflects the recognition that the expansion of extremist groups represents a common threat that transcends political differences.

However, security analysts remain skeptical about the effectiveness of a purely military approach. Despite their ability to control vast rural territories, terrorist groups lack the manpower and firepower necessary to conquer capitals, according to Djiby Sow and Hassan Koné from the Institute for Strategic Studies in South Africa. The real threat lies in their ability to gradually erode state authority, paralyze the economy, and undermine public trust in its institutions. Spectacular attacks like the one in Niamey aim precisely at this objective: to test the responsiveness of security forces and demonstrate that the state cannot guarantee the safety of its citizens, even in centers of power.

In light of this reality, the question of governance and economic development remains central. Institutional failures, economic inequalities, and regional contagion effects are the true roots of the insurgency. Without an integrated strategy combining security, development, and political reforms, military gains will remain ephemeral. The proliferation of regional cooperation structures—from the AES to the Multinational Joint Force, as well as partnerships with the United States, France, and Russia—reflects the search for a viable solution. But the failure of the G5 Sahel and the current blockage of multilateral mechanisms on essential issues such as cross-border pursuit rights, joint military operations, intelligence sharing, and the fight against illicit financial flows illustrate the difficulty of translating political will into concrete operational results. The Sahel remains, for now, the most active theater of terrorist violence in the world.