The Sahel Facing the Terrorist Offensive: Between Escalation of Violence and Fragmented Military Response

The bold attack carried out on January 29, 2026, against the Dori Hamani International Airport in Niamey is the most striking illustration of the growing operational capacity of jihadist groups in the Sahel. Thirty fighters from the Sahel Province of the Islamic State mobilized armed drones, light weapons, and mortars to simultaneously assault the airport and Air Base 101, which not only hosts Nigerien military drone operations but also serves as the headquarters of the Sahel States Alliance (AES). This strike, although repelled after two hours of intense fighting during which all assailants were neutralized, reflects a concerning strategic escalation.

Analysts from African Security Analysis describe this operation as a notable operational escalation by the Islamic State in the Sahel. The objective far exceeds mere military confrontation: it aims to undermine state authority, test the response capability of security forces, and, above all, demonstrate that terrorist groups remain an active threat despite the intensification of counter-terrorism operations across the region.

Mali provides another eloquent example of this growing pressure. Since September 2025, the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) faction, affiliated with al-Qaeda, has implemented a sophisticated economic blockade by systematically intercepting fuel convoys from Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. In a particularly symbolic incident, twelve fuel tankers coming from Senegal were set on fire. This unconventional siege paralyzed the capital Bamako for three months, creating fuel shortages and significantly complicating daily life for residents.

The situation in Burkina Faso reveals an even more alarming degradation of territorial control. With over 500 attacks carried out by JNIM in the year 2025 alone, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, extremist groups now control up to 60% of the national territory, effectively encircling the capital Ouagadougou. Security forces and volunteer militias find themselves confined to restricted perimeters around their bases in the rural regions of the Center-North, East, and Sahel, where nighttime attacks on supply lines and the proliferation of improvised explosive devices have significantly reduced their mobility.

The mid-February attack on Titao tragically illustrates this dynamic. The assailants simultaneously struck a military camp, a market, and communication facilities, killing 80 soldiers and militia members as well as at least 20 civilians. Analysts note that these dynamics are likely to continue in the coming months, particularly in border areas with Mali and Niger.

In the face of this escalation, the regional response appears fragmented. At a meeting of the chiefs of staff of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Sierra Leone at the end of February, the decision was made to activate the ECOWAS Standby Force with an initial deployment goal of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026. This force, historically deployed successfully during civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has never faced ideologically organized jihadist groups of this caliber.

The main challenge lies in funding and coordination. Nigeria, which traditionally provided 75% of personnel and the bulk of funding for ECOWAS missions, is facing its own security and economic challenges. Its armed forces are mobilized on multiple fronts: jihadist groups in the northeast, criminal bandits in the northwest, and separatist movements in the south.

The rift between ECOWAS and the Sahel States Alliance represents an additional major obstacle. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso left ECOWAS in January 2025 after the regional bloc imposed sanctions to pressure them into organizing elections. These three countries have formed their own alliance and are developing a joint force of 6,000 men, with headquarters established in Niamey.

The AES has also made a strategic pivot by turning away from France, its historical ally that had deployed around 4,000 soldiers as part of Operation Barkhane. This French withdrawal created a security vacuum quickly filled by Russia, which has deployed around 2,000 fighters in the region, initially from the Wagner paramilitary group and now from the Africa Corps under Russian state control.

The scale of the terrorist threat is considerable. JNIM, formed in 2017 by the merger of four Malian armed groups, has between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters and operates in Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, and Nigeria. The Sahel Province of the Islamic State and ISWAP have approximately 400 and between 3,500 and 5,000 fighters, respectively. These groups demonstrate an increasing capacity to use sophisticated weaponry, including armed drones, and to coordinate complex operations across porous borders.

Beverly Ochieng, an analyst for Control Risks, emphasizes that beyond military challenges, a holistic approach including social interventions is crucial to counter the influence of these groups. Humanitarian data reveals the extent of the crisis: 4 million people are suffering from food insecurity in the region, over 8,000 schools are closed, and nearly 500 health centers are non-operational.

Despite some signs of improvement—the number of security incidents decreased by 11% in 2024 with 3,446 incidents compared to 4,195 in 2023—the overall trajectory remains concerning. The promises of AES leaders to defeat terrorism have not materialized. A senior lecturer at the University of Bamako notes that the Malian army is stretched thin by persistent attacks and defections to JNIM, with no clear response to the terrorist expansion.

The situation in the Sahel illustrates the limits of a purely militarized approach to insurgencies rooted in deep socio-economic grievances. Without an integrated strategy combining security, development, inclusive governance, and reconciliation, accompanied by effective regional coordination transcending current political divisions, the pressure on Sahelian capitals will only intensify.