The Security Deterioration in Central Sahel: Between Jihadist Offensive and Counterinsurgency Response

The year 2026 marks a new critical phase in the security crisis affecting the central Sahel, as Islamist armed groups intensify their operations across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Recent data compiled by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reveals the alarming extent of this deterioration: between January and December 2025, the region recorded 3,737 security incidents resulting in the deaths of 9,362 people. This trend has continued and even intensified during the first quarter of 2026, reflecting a profound reconfiguration of the regional security landscape.

The Tillabéri region in southwestern Niger became, in 2025, the deadliest area in the entire central Sahel according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). This border region, which suffers repeated assaults from the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), experienced over 50 civilian deaths during two major attacks that occurred at the beginning of 2026. The situation has deteriorated to the point that Nigerien authorities declared a "general mobilization" in December 2025, granting the armed forces extensive powers to requisition civilians and resources as part of counter-insurgency operations.

The territorial expansion of jihadist groups is one of the most concerning developments in recent times. The Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM, also known by its French acronym JNIM for Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, demonstrated its increased operational capacity in February 2026 by launching a series of coordinated attacks over an entire week in eastern and northern Burkina Faso. This offensive, remarkable for its geographical scope and tactical coordination, illustrates the growing mobility of the organization and its effective control over vast territories. The insurgents systematically targeted major roadways, paralyzing trade routes and isolating entire communities, including in urban areas that had previously been relatively spared.

The tactics employed by Islamist armed groups have significantly evolved, now incorporating the intensive use of drones, improvised explosive devices, landmines, and increasingly, rocket and mortar strikes. These methods contribute to an increasingly indiscriminate violence that multiplies civilian casualties and resembles war crimes according to human rights observers. Beyond direct attacks, insurgent groups have refined their siege strategies, blocking humanitarian aid to civilian populations and causing famine situations in certain localities. They also impose their own interpretation of Sharia in areas under their control, with particularly harsh discriminatory rules against women, while systematically destroying state infrastructure: schools, health centers, food reserves, and water points.

In the face of this threat, the armed forces of the three countries have intensified their counter-terrorism operations, but these campaigns have been marked by serious human rights violations. In Mali, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) now operate alongside the Russian Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group), and this cooperation has been associated with possible war crimes and crimes against humanity, including extrajudicial executions, indiscriminate airstrikes, sexual violence, looting, and acts of torture against civilians. Testimonies from Malian refugees in Mauritania, collected by humanitarian workers and journalists, report indiscriminate killings, abductions, and systematic violence perpetrated by the Africa Corps.

In Burkina Faso, the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), state-sponsored militias, have been involved in serious abuses committed along ethnic lines. These self-defense groups, intended to support regular forces, actually fuel intercommunal tensions and contribute to the climate of impunity prevailing in the region. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights continues to receive allegations of enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests in Burkina Faso, while the government announced at the end of January 2026 the dissolution of all political parties, a sign of an authoritarian hardening that hinders independent monitoring of violations.

The cross-border dimension of the crisis was also manifested by the arrest, on March 23, 2026, of several individuals suspected of belonging to a terrorist network linked to the GSIM in Guinea. This operation, carried out by Guinean security forces in the eastern part of the country, reflects the geographical expansion of the jihadist threat beyond the central Sahel stricto sensu, now affecting the coastal countries of West Africa. The GSIM, responsible for numerous deadly attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, is clearly seeking to extend its influence southward, exploiting porous border areas and the institutional weaknesses of states in the region.

In Mali, violence has recently spread to the southwest of the country, an area that had been relatively preserved until now. The regions of Timbuktu, Gao, Mopti, and Menaka continue to face recurrent attacks, abductions, and the forced collection of zakat by insurgents. In December 2025, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported a dramatic 155% increase compared to November in humanitarian access constraints related to the presence of improvised explosive devices, particularly in the regions of Ségou, Sikasso, and Timbuktu. The number of incidents of violence against humanitarian workers also doubled during the same period, further complicating the delivery of aid to populations in need.

Nigerien security forces have intensified their counter-insurgency operations, but the increasing use of drone strikes has resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians, actions that may constitute war crimes. In February 2026, EIGS militants crossed a symbolic threshold by launching an unprecedented and highly publicized attack on the international airport of the Nigerien capital, thus demonstrating their ability to strike at the very heart of power centers. This tactical audacity underscores the fragility of state control, even in areas that are theoretically the most secure.

The creation in September 2023 of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, all led by military juntas resulting from successive coups, marked a major strategic reorientation. The three countries formally left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2025 and launched a Unified AES Force in December of the same year, a joint security mechanism intended to coordinate their counter-terrorism efforts. This new regional architecture is accompanied by a diplomatic and military rapprochement with Russia and China, to the detriment of traditional Western partners.

The shrinking of civic space in the three countries poses a major obstacle to the independent documentation of violations and abuses. Journalists, human rights defenders, political opposition, and civil society face arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and even illegal forced military conscription. In February 2026, former Malian Prime Minister Moussa Mara was sentenced to two years in prison for "discrediting the state" after posting a message of solidarity on social media with political and civil society figures who were detained. This conviction illustrates the instrumentalization of the judicial system to silence any critical voice regarding the governance and security strategies of the juntas.

The announcement of the withdrawal from the International Criminal Court by the three AES countries further weakens the prospects for justice and reparations for victims of heinous crimes. While the ICC had issued an arrest warrant against Iyad Ag Ghaly, leader of the jihadist group Ansar Dine, for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and convicted Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz and Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi for similar crimes, impunity remains the norm for the vast majority of alleged violators.

UN experts warned in February 2026 that enforced disappearances in Mali could constitute crimes against humanity due to their frequency, organized nature, and the methods used. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights documented hundreds of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests, and enforced disappearances perpetrated by all parties to the conflict in 2025. This spiral of violence, fueled by both insurgent groups and government forces and their auxiliaries, creates a vicious cycle of retaliation, ethnicization of the conflict, and radicalization of communities.

The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate in proportion to the intensification of fighting. The deliberate economic blockades imposed by armed groups, particularly the control of strategic trade routes, undermine government authority while significantly worsening the living conditions of populations. These groups also attempt to present themselves as "protectors" of communities through grassroots efforts and preaching, thereby seeking to consolidate their influence and legitimize their presence. This strategy of winning hearts and minds, combined with the inability of states to provide basic services and ensure security, creates fertile ground for jihadist recruitment, particularly among marginalized youth and stigmatized pastoral communities.

In the face of this multidimensional crisis, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union established in September 2025 a "Task Force" intended to support Sahelian countries in the fight against terrorism and to address broader security, socio-economic, and humanitarian challenges. However, the effectiveness of this initiative remains to be demonstrated in a context where the military regimes in power limit international cooperation and reduce the maneuvering space for external actors.

The security deterioration in the central Sahel in 2026 is part of a continuum of violence that finds its roots in the armed conflict in northern Mali from 2012-2013. The structural vulnerabilities shared by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger – weak governance, limited state presence, porous borders, unresolved intercommunal tensions – have only worsened over the past decade. Although the military authorities in each country claim to pursue a security objective to protect civilian populations, the reality on the ground reflects a situation that continues to deteriorate and a state authority that is gradually weakening.

The expansion of areas under the control of Islamist armed groups, the intensification of human rights violations by all parties to the conflict, the shrinking of civic and humanitarian space, as well as the growing diplomatic isolation of the three AES countries paint a bleak picture for the months to come. Without a comprehensive approach that combines a security response respectful of international law, a political resolution of community grievances, improved governance, and socio-economic development, the central Sahel risks sinking further into a spiral of violence of which civilian populations will continue to be the primary victims.