The Strait of Hormuz Standoff: Dual Blockades and the Constitutional Clock Ticking on the Iran War

Fifty-six days into the US-Israel military campaign against Iran, the conflict has entered what may prove to be its most consequential phase—not on the battlefield, but in the Strait of Hormuz and the halls of the United States Congress. Two intersecting crises now define the trajectory of this war: a mutual naval blockade of the world's most critical oil chokepoint, and a constitutional deadline that could force the first real congressional reckoning over America's role in the conflict.

The situation in the Strait of Hormuz has evolved into an unprecedented dual blockade scenario that has no modern historical parallel. On April 13, the United States initiated a naval blockade of Iranian ports, firing on and seizing an Iranian-flagged tanker near the strait and redirecting ships carrying cargo to or from Iran in open waters. Iran's armed forces immediately condemned the action as tantamount to piracy. Tehran's response was swift and escalatory: it closed the Strait of Hormuz to all foreign shipping and began capturing several foreign-flagged vessels, transforming what had been a partial restriction into a total shutdown of the waterway through which roughly twenty percent of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas supplies once flowed.

The economic consequences have been severe and accelerating. Global oil prices have surged above $106 per barrel as of April 24, and analysts see no near-term resolution that would restore the free flow of energy supplies. President Trump claimed on Truth Social that Iran is "collapsing financially," losing $500 million a day, with military and police forces complaining about unpaid wages. Yet the data paints a more complicated picture. According to the trade intelligence firm Kpler, Iran exported 1.84 million barrels per day of crude oil in March and has shipped 1.71 million barrels per day thus far in April, figures that actually exceed the 2025 daily average of 1.68 million barrels. Between March 15 and April 14, Iran exported approximately 55.22 million barrels of oil. With Iranian crude prices across its three major variants—Iranian Light, Iranian Heavy, and Forozan Blend—consistently above $90 per barrel and frequently surpassing $100, Tehran has earned at least $4.97 billion from oil exports in the past month alone. The high price environment created by the very crisis the United States helped instigate has, paradoxically, partially insulated Iran's revenue stream.

Iran's First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref articulated the country's strategic logic on April 19, declaring that "the security of the Strait of Hormuz is not free" and that "one cannot restrict Iran's oil exports while expecting free security for others." This framing positions the strait closure not merely as a retaliatory measure but as a calculated leverage point, linking the waterway's reopening to a guaranteed end to both economic and military pressure on Iran and its allies. Parliamentary speaker and lead ceasefire negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reinforced this position on April 24, stating that a full ceasefire can only work if the US naval blockade is lifted first.

The leadership in Tehran has also moved to present a unified front against what it perceives as American attempts to exploit internal divisions. President Masoud Pezeshkian, parliamentary speaker Ghalibaf, and judiciary head Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei have all issued coordinated statements rejecting Trump's assertions of rifts within Iran's governing structure. Analyst Hassan Ahmadian has gone further, arguing that the US push in the Strait of Hormuz is less about economic siege than about repositioning forces for a possible new round of direct military conflict—a reading that, if accurate, suggests the blockade may be a prelude rather than an alternative to escalation.

Meanwhile, the arrival of the USS George H.W. Bush aircraft carrier in the Middle East adds another layer of military pressure. Trump has vowed to destroy any vessel laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz, signaling that the United States is prepared to use lethal force to enforce its blockade while demanding Iran reopen the waterway it itself has closed. The result is a tinderbox in which two adversarial naval forces are operating in close proximity under explicit threats of violence, with commercial shipping caught in between.

On the diplomatic front, Trump announced a three-week extension of the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon following White House talks with Israeli and Lebanese envoys on April 23. He stated he "could make a deal right now" with Iran but is willing to wait for an "everlasting" agreement. Yet this patience has limits that extend beyond his own rhetoric. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 imposes a 60-day deadline on presidential military deployments without congressional authorization, and that deadline falls on May 1—just one week away.

The constitutional question is far from academic. Four bipartisan attempts in the US Senate to curb Trump's authority under the War Powers Resolution have already failed, the most recent on April 15 when a resolution was defeated 52-47 along largely party lines. Democrat Senator Chris Murphy noted the extraordinary nature of Senate Republicans declining oversight of a war costing billions of dollars every week. But cracks may be appearing in Republican unity. Senator John Curtis has publicly written that while he supports the president's actions in defense of American lives and interests, he will not support ongoing military action beyond the 60-day window without congressional approval—a position that, if held by enough Republicans, could force a genuine legislative debate.

Maryam Jamshidi, an associate professor of law at Colorado Law School, has outlined the legal mechanics: Trump could seek a single 30-day extension by certifying in writing that continued force results from "unavoidable military necessity," pushing the ultimate deadline to late June. Beyond 90 days, however, the law requires termination of the deployment unless Congress has declared war or authorized continued action. Yet as Jamshidi acknowledges, there is no clear enforcement mechanism, and past presidents have simply refused to comply, claiming the termination requirement is unconstitutional.

Former US ambassador to Bahrain Adam Ereli has offered a sobering assessment of the strategic equilibrium, warning that Iran is prepared for sanctions and can store or sell oil through alternative means, and that the pressure campaign could outlast both Trump's patience and US public support. The collision between foreign policy objectives and domestic political realities, he suggests, may ultimately favor Tehran's capacity for endurance over Washington's appetite for sustained conflict.

Pope Leo XIV has condemned the killing of protesters in Iran and called for restraint, while US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has confirmed Iran's national football team will not be barred from the upcoming World Cup—small diplomatic signals that suggest neither side is fully committed to total confrontation. But with oil above $106 per barrel, two blockades choking the Gulf, a carrier strike group on station, and the constitutional clock ticking toward May 1, the margin for diplomatic maneuvering is narrowing by the day.