The Unified Force of the G5 Sahel Against the Jihadist Insurrection: Between Asserted Sovereignty and Security Escalation in the Sahel

Since March 5, 2026, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) composed of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger officially has a unified military force intended to combat the jihadist insurgency that has ravaged the region for over a decade. This announcement, which came a few weeks after the collective withdrawal of these three countries from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2025, marks a decisive step in the security and political reconfiguration of sub-Saharan Africa. However, behind the sovereignist display of the juntas in power in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey, the operational challenges remain considerable.

The creation of this unified force responds to both political and military logic. By leaving ECOWAS and rejecting the security structures inherited from the G5 Sahel era, financed and supervised by the West, the three military regimes sought to free themselves from any external tutelage. The recourse to the Africa Corps, an organization inherited from the Wagner paramilitary group now placed under the direct control of the Russian state, illustrates this strategy of substitution. Approximately 2,000 Russian fighters are currently deployed on AES territory, primarily in Mali and Burkina Faso, where they support the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) in counter-insurgency operations whose methods are regularly condemned by human rights defense organizations.

Operationally, the security situation remains critical. In February 2026, the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM or JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, launched a series of coordinated attacks over a week across eastern and northern Burkina Faso, demonstrating a capacity for projection and tactical mobility that challenges government forces. These offensives targeted both military positions and civilian localities, exacerbating the already massive population displacement. Simultaneously, in January 2026, the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISSP) claimed a bold attack on the international airbase in Niamey, the capital of Niger, highlighting the ability of Daesh-affiliated groups to strike strategic targets in urban areas. These two events illustrate the persistence of a bipolar front, JNIM in the northwest, ISSP in the east, which neither the Russian presence nor the operations of national forces have managed to contain sustainably.

The strategy of the AES unified force relies on an intensive kinetic approach, often referred to as a scorched earth tactic by independent observers. While this method can produce short-term tactical results, it comes with a high humanitarian and political cost. The Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect (Global R2P) has documented summary executions, indiscriminate airstrikes, and acts of sexual violence attributed to the FAMa and the Africa Corps, which may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), state-supported self-defense militias, have also been involved in ethnically motivated violence. These abuses fuel a cycle of resentment and radicalization that contradicts the stated strategic objectives.

In the face of this dynamic, ECOWAS is attempting to rebuild its security credibility. During a meeting of chiefs of staff in Freetown, Sierra Leone, members of the bloc decided to activate the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). An initial contingent of 2,000 soldiers is expected to be mobilized by the end of 2026, with the mission of securing border areas and halting the expansion of armed groups into coastal states. Togo, Benin, and Ghana, which are experiencing increasing jihadist incursions in their northern regions, are the main expected beneficiaries of this arrangement. Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama, who returned to power in early 2025, is making diplomatic overtures towards the Sahelian juntas, hoping to play a mediating role while reassuring his Western partners.

The increasing use of drones by armed groups is one of the most concerning tactical developments. According to an investigation published by Al Jazeera in February 2026, factions linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are using inexpensive devices, including modified commercial drones for grenade dropping, which give them surveillance and asymmetric strike capabilities against conventional armies that are poorly prepared for this threat. This evolution forces government forces to invest in anti-drone detection and neutralization systems, a costly technology that neither Mali, Burkina Faso, nor Niger possesses in sufficient quantities.

In the longer term, the central question remains that of civilian governance in liberated or secured areas. The experience of MINUSMA in Mali, a UN force dissolved after the withdrawal ordered by Bamako in 2023, showed the limits of a purely military approach without grounding in local social and ethnic realities. Analysts from Control Risks, such as Beverly Ochieng based in Dakar, emphasize that any effective strategy must integrate components of development, community mediation, and efforts to combat the recruitment networks of armed groups. Without this, sporadic military successes risk being ephemeral.

The creation of the AES unified force undeniably marks a turning point in the Sahelian security architecture. It crystallizes the break with the Western-supported regional order and the emergence of a sovereignist pole led by juntas that have learned how to instrumentalize anti-French sentiment to maintain power. However, the actual military effectiveness of this arrangement remains to be demonstrated in the face of an insurgency that has survived ten years of French, American, and UN operations. The coming months will be decisive: if the coordinated attacks by JNIM and ISSP continue at this pace, the question will no longer be whether the AES can win its war, but whether it can avoid losing another one, that of legitimacy in the eyes of civilian populations exhausted by violence, hunger, and forced displacement.