Togo presents the AES as a security bulwark — the risky bet of the West African front

In New York, Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey described the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) as a security "bulwark" for its neighbors. The statement, reported by France 24 on September 23, 2026, is not just a diplomatic gesture. It reflects a now-acknowledged reading in Lomé: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are no longer merely states in rupture with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but a military glacis whose stability directly conditions that of Togo.

On the ground, however, this bulwark is breached. Jihadist groups do not respect administrative borders or institutional architectures. They follow paths, markets, transhumance corridors, and roads where the presence of the state disappears. A political statement does not close any of these gaps.

A political solidarity that comes from the south

Togo's choice is consistent with its geography. Lomé is several hundred kilometers away from the combat zones in northern Burkina Faso, but the routes connecting Burkina to the ports of the Gulf of Guinea pass through regions where public authority is lighter. A jihadist offensive does not need to take a capital to produce a strategic effect: it is enough to tax transporters, threaten local leaders, and make a road impassable.

By presenting the AES as a bulwark, Mr. Dussey also provides diplomatic cover for cooperation with regimes that ECOWAS has long treated as provisional interlocutors. Articles from Malijet and Togolese media echoed the same idea on September 23 and 24: supporting the AES would help contain violence rather than waiting for it at the borders. This is a logic of strategic depth, not an ideological adherence to the trajectory of the juntas.

The problem is not the map, but control

An alliance can coordinate staff. It does not automatically control villages. AES forces continue to face a lack of human intelligence, considerable logistical distances, and the difficulty of holding positions after a sweep operation. The JNIM, or Group for Support of Islam and Muslims, precisely exploits this gap: it avoids frontal combat when it can, then returns to the roads and communities as soon as the columns withdraw.

In northern Togo, the decisive factor will therefore be permanence. A patrol that reaches a locality in four hours does not create a controlled area if it leaves the same evening. Intelligence relays, posts capable of receiving reinforcements, roads passable during the rainy season, and a command chain that does not turn every incident into a diplomatic crisis are needed. From experience, it is this logistical banality that decides whether a border holds.

The reported security exchanges in Zinder and the UN discussions around the Sahel show that neighboring states are seeking to rebuild prevention mechanisms. But prevention, alert, and armed response are three different functions. A regional meeting can improve the flow of information; it does not replace a unit capable of intervening in time.

The Togolese bet in the face of ECOWAS

Togo is thus attempting a third way. It does not join the AES but refuses to treat it as an enemy bloc. This position may reduce the risks of closing military channels and facilitate local contacts. It also carries a cost: by legitimizing the AES as a bulwark, Lomé risks being associated with the security outcomes of governments whose records remain difficult to verify.

Prudence is essential. The statements from the juntas, jihadist claims, and operation figures are not always independently confirmed. There is still a lack of a reliable picture of the actual coordination between Malian, Burkinabe, and Nigerien forces. The architecture exists on paper; its command procedures and ability to share intelligence in a timely manner remain uncertain.

For ECOWAS, the debate should therefore move away from slogans. Punishing or applauding the AES does not protect a road. The concrete question is whether cooperation mechanisms can function despite the political rupture, particularly for cross-border alerts, population movements, and the protection of trade corridors to Togo, Benin, and Ghana.

The next breach will likely be local

The declaration from New York is important because it reveals a regional evolution: several neighbors no longer want to wait for a solution from Abuja, Paris, or Brussels. They seek to deal with the military reality of the Sahel, even when this reality is produced by contested juntas.

But a bulwark is not measured by its rhetoric. It is measured by the time needed to reinforce an isolated post, the ability to secure a market, and the number of kilometers of road actually monitored. If Togo wants the AES to protect its northern flank, it will need to obtain more than just rhetorical solidarity: a shared alert, common procedures, and a persistent ground presence. The next attack will not announce its arrival in New York. It will seek a village, a path, and a night without patrols.

Sources

• France 24, interview with Robert Dussey on the role of the AES as a security "bulwark," September 23, 2026.
• Malijet, reporting on Togolese diplomatic statements supporting AES countries, September 24, 2026.
• Le Sahel, exchanges of the Zinder Regional Security Council with a DCAF mission, September 26, 2026.
• Al Jazeera, regional coverage of African security tensions, September 24–25, 2026.