Type 075 Hubei Ship Conducts All-Element Training in the South China Sea, PLA Amphibious Assault Ship Shifts from Platform Display to System Integration

On July 23, the China Military Network released a short video featuring the Navy's Hubei Ship, hull number 34. The video contains limited information, but there are several details worth examining: the location points to the South China Sea, and the training is referred to as all-element multi-subject training, which includes shipborne helicopter takeoffs and landings, air-cushion landing craft dock operations, emergency response, and firefighting training for helicopters. In simple terms, this is not just a visually appealing appearance, but rather the Type 075 amphibious assault ship beginning to integrate the ship, craft, aircraft, personnel, and damage control processes into a single operational framework.

Why the Hubei Ship's Hull Number is Noteworthy

Public information generally suggests that the Type 075 has a full-load displacement of about 35,000 to 40,000 tons, a length of approximately 232 meters, and can carry helicopters, air-cushion landing craft, armored vehicles, and landing troops. Ships such as Hainan, Guangxi, and Anhui have successively entered service, and the Hubei Ship's hull number 34 indicates that the PLA's amphibious assault ship force has transitioned from single-ship trials to multi-ship rotation training. What concerns me more is not the addition of another large ship, but whether the fourth ship can quickly replicate the processes accumulated by the first three ships.

This Training Truly Tests Coordination

The subjects listed in the China Military Network article may seem ordinary, but they precisely hit the most challenging aspects of amphibious assault ships. Shipborne helicopter takeoffs and landings test flight deck scheduling and sea condition adaptability; air-cushion landing craft entering and exiting the dock test ballast, ventilation, communication, and deck command; emergency response and firefighting training indicate that the Navy is not only focused on delivery capabilities but is also addressing survivability shortcomings.

• Helicopter takeoffs and landings: Determine the efficiency of vertical landings and casualty evacuations.
• Air-cushion craft dock operations: Determine whether heavy equipment can quickly leave the ship and land.
• Firefighting and damage control: Determine whether a large-deck ship can continue to execute missions after encountering accidents or combat damage.

This combination is very engineering-oriented. Amphibious assault ships do not primarily compete in radar, missiles, and anti-submarine capabilities like destroyers, nor do they focus on the number of sorties of carrier-based aircraft like aircraft carriers. They are more like a mobile dock, with the challenge being to operate multiple production lines simultaneously without blocking each other. Helicopters take off and land above, air-cushion craft enter and exit below, and vehicles and personnel are coordinated in the middle; any delay in one link will reduce the overall efficiency of the ship.

The Significance of Training in the South China Sea

The official report did not specify the exact maritime area and participating forces, so it should not be overly interpreted as targeting a specific direction. However, the value of the South China Sea lies in its sea conditions, distances, and reef environments, which are relatively suitable for testing the real operational capabilities of the Type 075. Compared to near-shore exercises, training in the South China Sea is closer to comprehensive support in the open sea: onboard aviation fuel, ammunition, fresh water, medical supplies, and maintenance must all keep pace. This figure may not seem prominent, but it actually relies on the support of the logistics fleet and base system.

From the perspective of military balance in the Western Pacific, the significance of the Type 075 is not that of a traditional assault landing ship. It provides a mobile aviation and landing node that can combine helicopters, drones, landing craft, and Marine Corps forces to exert pressure in scenarios such as islands, ports, overseas evacuations, or low-intensity conflicts. The real issue is whether China's existing shipborne helicopters and future shipborne drones can match the deck scale of the Type 075. If the number of aircraft, maintenance capabilities, and command chain cannot keep up, the large ship will become an expensive transport vessel.

Shortcomings That Cannot Be Ignored

I believe the positive signal released by the official video is that process training is beginning to be refined; the less optimistic aspect is that publicly available information still does not show complete evidence of high-intensity continuous operations, command and control in complex electromagnetic environments, and multi-ship coordinated landings. The construction speed of the Type 075 platform indicates that Chinese shipyards have resolved the assembly issues of large-deck ships, but amphibious combat capability is ultimately determined not by dock production capacity, but by the collective proficiency of pilots, crew members, Marines, and support forces.

The China Military Network stated that the purpose of the Hubei Ship's training is to enhance its ability to perform combat missions in complex sea conditions, focusing on shipborne helicopter takeoffs and landings, air-cushion landing craft dock operations, and emergency response.

The next step worth watching is whether the Hubei Ship will appear alongside other Type 075 ships, Type 071 dock landing ships, comprehensive supply ships, and shore-based aviation forces. If it is just a single ship practicing alone, it indicates that it is still laying the foundation; if it begins to form multi-ship groups, that would indicate that the PLA's amphibious forces have truly entered a stage of systematic use.