Victory Report Amid Retreat — Krivoruchko, Starlink, and the Information War at the Height of Geneva

“Starlink has been down for two weeks, but this has not affected the intensity and effectiveness of our troops' unmanned systems.” These words from Deputy Defense Minister Alexey Krivoruchko, spoken to state television on February 17, 2026, would sound convincing—if it weren't for the 201 square kilometers reclaimed by the Ukrainian army in the preceding five days. The discrepancy between the official statement and objective control data is so obvious that it demands an explanation in itself.

Numbers That Krivoruchko Preferred Not to Mention

According to an analysis by AFP based on data from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), between February 12 and 16, Ukrainian forces made the largest territorial breakthrough since 2023—precisely during the period when, as Krivoruchko himself admitted, Starlink terminals were not operational for Russian troops. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mikhail Fedorov described the effect of the shutdown as “significant.” ISW explicitly stated in its analysis that Ukrainian counterattacks “likely took advantage of the recent Starlink outage for Russian forces, which, according to Russian military bloggers, caused communication and command issues on the battlefield.”

This reference to military bloggers is crucial. Krivoruchko appealed to “objective control data on enemy losses,” without providing specific figures. Russian military bloggers—by no means official representatives or sympathizers of Kyiv—described command and control (C2) disruptions at the tactical level in the early days following the shutdown. Here we are dealing not just with a contradiction between the Russian Ministry of Defense and Western sources: the discrepancy exists within the Russian military ecosystem itself.

The Functional Logic of the Statement

By asking the question “Is Krivoruchko lying?”, we risk missing a more interesting question—“Why now?” The statement was made on February 17, at the height of the first day of trilateral negotiations in Geneva between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. According to Russian news agencies, the first day of negotiations was “very tense” and lasted six hours in various bilateral and trilateral formats. On the second day, February 18, the meeting lasted only about two hours.

In this context, Krivoruchko's statement serves three functions. The first is diplomatic: Moscow signals to the American side that the sanctions toolkit (including pressure on SpaceX) is ineffective and not a lever of influence. The second is domestic political: the Russian audience receives a narrative of military steadfastness at a moment when the front line has receded. The third is negotiation-related: if Starlink did not affect Russian UAVs, then the Ukrainian side has no grounds to demand its complete shutdown as a condition of the agreement.

Soviet Topology of Denial

For those who have studied the Soviet military doctrine of information support for combat operations, this is all deeply familiar. The principle of “objective control,” to which Krivoruchko refers, existed in the lexicon of Soviet staff documents. Its fundamental application was not to establish the truth but to provide an officially legitimate digital basis for any desired conclusion. In real-time conditions and with open sources (OSINT), this technique has degenerated into a caricature: official “objective control data” now systematically diverges from geolocated videos, Sentinel-1 imagery, and ISW analytics—and is disproven within hours.

A comparable situation arose in the last months of the Afghan war, when Soviet staff reports consistently recorded successes while coffins were leaving the country. The difference is that in 1989 there was no Twitter, ISW, or cameras on every soldier's phone.

What Is Actually Happening with UAVs After the Starlink Shutdown

Here it is appropriate to delineate two levels. The first is tactical: small FPV operators indeed do not depend on Starlink; they use their own line-of-sight radio channels. When it comes to drone attacks at the squad/platoon level, Krivoruchko is technically not lying. The second is operational: route planning, coordination between units, navigation of loitering munitions like the “Lancet” over distances of 30–80 km—all of this relies on data transmission systems, including illegally purchased Starlink terminals. The loss of this level of communication creates what was referred to in Soviet military theory as “operational-level command disruption”—which explains the breakthrough recorded by ISW.

Krivoruchko's assertion, strictly speaking, applies to one of the two levels but is presented as if it pertains to both simultaneously. This is a technically sophisticated but essentially manipulative operation with data—a classic of Russian official military rhetoric.

Geneva and the Stakes of the Information War

The negotiations in Geneva concluded with Russian chief negotiator Vladimir Medinsky characterizing them as “difficult but businesslike.” Zelensky pointed to progress on the military track amid difficulties on the political one. The next round is expected “soon,” according to Medinsky. Against this backdrop, Krivoruchko's statement about Starlink takes on a clear reading: Moscow is positioning itself as negotiating from a position of strength, rather than forced adaptation.

The problem with this position is that it undermines trust in any future statements from the Russian military department—including those that may be needed for verifying a ceasefire agreement. If official “objective control data” diverges from geolocated evidence today, on what will monitoring be based tomorrow?

The Russian defense industry and military machine will undoubtedly adapt to the loss of Starlink—the only question is how many square kilometers this will cost during the transition period. Moscow will not officially acknowledge this—at least not while negotiations are ongoing, as such an acknowledgment would mean weakening its position.