Why Britain needs a maritime-first defense strategy

President Donald Trump’s attitude and policies towards NATO have caused much consternation and concern, and will almost certainly continue to do so over the remaining two years of his presidency. Yet the attention on Trump’s disruption (which reflects a long-running bipartisan desire in American political circles to rebalance the burden between America and Europe) misses the opportunities hidden therein for member states and the alliance as a whole. 

It won’t be smooth or painless, but Trump’s push for the so-called NATO 3.0 contains an opportunity for countries such as the United Kingdom to reconsider their approach to defense, particularly on the seas. 

In my paper “Reclaiming the Waves,” written for the Prosperity Institute in London, I outline a “maritime-first” (but not only) approach for the UK. This approach borrows from the nineteenth and twentieth century strategy of Sir Julian Corbett, albeit updated for the modern world, focused on using naval power to control the critical sea lines of communication vital for trade. 

While the sun is long set on empire and the likelihood of a single power dominating the continent is currently remote, the underlying principles remain valid. My updated maritime strategy follows a similar train of logic, taking advantage of the changes underway within the European pillar of NATO.

That Britain should pursue a maritime-first approach to defense is based on an assessment of three factors: British national interests, present British capabilities and resource limitations and the current trajectory of the European pillar within NATO, which represents the opportunity of NATO 3.0. While the United Kingdom has interests in the Indo-Pacific, it lacks the resources and capabilities to sustain a presence in both the region and prioritize the Euro-Atlantic, necessitating prioritization for the latter over the former. 

Concurrently, under NATO 3.0, the United States wants to shift the conventional burden from the US to the European members of the alliance. Despite the results of the midterm elections, these trendlines will only moderate, not definitively change as they pre-dated Trump. 

Over the last two years, European governments have responded to both the signal and the noise of the Trump presidency on defense spending and NATO. Trump’s fire and fury at Denmark over Greenland, open hostility to countries like Norway, pressure on Ukraine and pursuit of improved relations with Russia have accelerated the European desire for greater defense autonomy — something the White House has encouraged to an extent, although officials have also expressed frustration with the idea that European nations would want to wean off of American weapons.  

Poland aims to double the size of its armed forces. Germany, in its “Responsibility for Europe” military concept, seeks to build the strongest army on the continent by 2039. Inter-European defense cooperation is skyrocketing with countries signing political declarations of cooperation and inking deals to strengthen the continent’s defense industrial base. Most notably and significantly, at the 2025 Hague NATO Summit, the member states (aside from Spain) agreed to increase core defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP and military-related expenditures to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2035.

Rethinking British National Defense

The increased spending and ambitions of European governments to expand the size of their armed forces does, of course, face political and fiscal headwinds. Yet the direction of travel is clear: Europe is doing more and will do more in the future. This creates an opportunity to rethink how individual countries consider their defense strategies. 

In the case of the United Kingdom, I argue that the British armed forces should focus more on the maritime and associated domains, developing credible naval, air and space power to pursue its own interests and develop and deliver deterrent effects on the continent. Such an approach would take advantage of the continental changes happening today. 

London must first secure the area around its unique strategic geography — it is an island-nation and that will never change. Through these waters flow the United Kingdom’s lifeblood: more than 40 percent of its energy is imported, over 99 percent of its data flow through 60 subsea cables and some 95 percent of its imports and exports move via the sea. Russia has already shown a willingness to target subsea infrastructure, and just this month sailed an intelligence collection ship through British waters. There is little to suggest it will not do so again in the future. This requires greater investments in and sustainment of naval and air power in these critical waterways, as well as infrastructure resilience. 

To achieve an updated Corbettian concept of “command of the sea” to a broader understanding of “area control” and “area denial,” which includes air, surface and subsurface and space domains, the United Kingdom will need to invest in expanding and modernizing its navy. 

This must consist of primarily crewed vessels, augmented by uncrewed systems, integrated via an emergent digital kill web connecting terrestrial and space-based sensors and effectors, such as the Nyan attack drone — recently tested from the HMS Queen Elizabeth. The proposed Common Combat Vessels (CCVs), a replacement for the Type 45, and the construction of the Type 26 anti-submarine warfare frigate with Norway are illustrative of these types of necessary investments and programs. In the submarine domain, the SSN-AUKUS — albeit over a decade away — will replace the Astute-class of SSNs. Such investments will also see the UK better able to protect the vital reinforcement line from the United States, vital for victory in the Second World War and to defense and deterrence in the Cold War, but the safety of which is now in doubt. 

The United Kingdom’s leadership of the $50 billion European deep precision strike program will markedly enhance both Great Britain’s but also NATO’s ability to hit targets out to 300 kilometers and beyond from both maritime and ground platforms. Such capabilities, in concert with evolving deep strike assets — in which the United Kingdom is already investing — mean that Great Britain can deliver deterrent effects much further into the continent and further from shore. Home protection is necessary, but the idea of a “Britannia Shield” is less so. Moreover, prioritizing investments in these areas will have a material benefit for the British economy: higher tech, greater innovation and serving as a competitive advantage. 

Maritime-first, does not, of course, mean maritime-only. The British Army would, in turn, take advantage of NATO 3.0 and focus its energies and resources on developing a credible, sustainable and fully-resourced heavy division capable of meeting British commitments to NATO. It would then, having developed this division, turn to resourcing a second deployable division. 

German and Polish ambitions, even if not fully met, mean a much stronger European land force, to which a small British contingent offers less overall, than a comprehensive maritime portfolio. One division is ultimately insufficient for British interests, but spreading resources over incomplete and incapable orders of battle — as at present — undermines credibility with allies and adversaries alike. Indeed, in conversations with the UK’s Joint Expeditionary Force partners, concerns were raised about London’s ability to meet its obligations and commitments. 

Collectively, the maritime-first approach I outline argues for the development of British enabling capabilities such as integrated air and missile defense and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting, to support core national interests but also to serve as a backstop to America’s backstop within NATO. This moment of burden-shifting therefore offers an opportunity for countries, like the United Kingdom, to reconsider their own defense priorities and investments, and craft a new defense pillar around which to build Service-specific strategies. 

NATO is changing, but this change represents an opportunity on which London, and others, should seize to strengthen their own core national defense interests and the overall alliance. 

Joshua C. Huminski is the Senior Vice President for National Security & Intelligence at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, a George Mason University National Security Institute Senior Fellow, and an International Fellow with the London-based Council on Geostrategy. He is currently writing a book on the future of European defense. He can be found on Twitter @joshuachuminski.