Zhu Rihe Training Base Suspends Exercises: Deep Insights into PLA Readiness Adjustments After the Zhang Youxia Case

On January 24, 2026, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, a member of the Military Commission, were officially announced to have fallen from grace, triggering a chain reaction within the People's Liberation Army (PLA). According to reliable sources, during the investigation of Zhang Youxia, the PLA's most advanced Zhurihe Joint Training Base suspended its exercise activities for about a month. This unusual phenomenon not only reflects the direct impact of high-level personnel upheaval on the military training system but also reveals the deep institutional challenges faced by the PLA in its modernization transformation.

The Zhurihe Training Base, located between the Sunite Right Banner of Xilin Gol League and the Siziwang Banner of Ulanqab City in Inner Mongolia, covers an area of over 1,000 square kilometers and is the largest and most advanced comprehensive army training ground in Asia. Since the Central Military Commission decided in 1997 to expand the original armored training ground of the Beijing Military Region into the largest contract tactical training base for the entire military, Zhurihe has been the core platform for the PLA's combat training. In 2011, the Central Military Commission further designated it as the only army contract combat test site for the entire military, and after the military reform in 2016, it was placed under the management of the army. This base not only has top-notch training facilities and equipment but is also renowned for its specialized "Blue Army" units—by the end of September 2015, the Zhurihe Blue Army Brigade had achieved a record of 31 wins and 2 losses in 33 live combat exercises against combined arms divisions (brigades) from the seven military regions and marine corps brigades, earning the title of "China's First Blue Army Brigade."

Mr. Wang, a scholar who has long followed military dynamics, revealed to the media that rumors about the investigation of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli had been circulating for nearly two months after their absence from the opening ceremony of a provincial and ministerial-level cadre seminar on January 20. Sources in Inner Mongolia confirmed that the Zhurihe Training Base indeed stopped its exercise activities for about a month during this period, for reasons unknown. Mr. Wang analyzed, "Large-scale exercises at Zhurihe usually require coordination among multiple military branches and must be reported to the Central Military Commission's General Office for record. Some exercises also require higher-level approval. If there are personnel changes at the Military Commission level, subordinate units often slow down their pace, preferring to do less rather than risk making mistakes."

This explanation has profound institutional logic. The PLA's command system is highly centralized, and the decision-making chain for major military activities extends from grassroots troops all the way to the Military Commission level. When the highest military leadership institution experiences personnel upheaval, the entire system's operation is inevitably affected. In October 2025, CCTV reported that a brigade of the 82nd Group Army conducted live combat exercises at Zhurihe; in early November, the "White Tiger Company" of the 78th Group Army carried out live combat training at the base. However, from December 2025 to February 2026, there were no further reports of live combat exercises at Zhurihe, and this blank period coincides precisely with the timing of the Zhang Youxia case.

The relationship between Zhang Youxia and Zhurihe can be traced back to December 2005 to September 2007, when he served as the Deputy Commander of the Beijing Military Region for nearly two years. On December 2, 2025, Zhang Jixiang, who had previously served as the Deputy Commander of the Zhurihe Base, published an article titled "Dreaming Back to Zhurihe: Zhang Youxia Commands, 'Multidimensional Reconnaissance Platform' Lights Up the Training Ground!" on the WeChat public account "Huashan Tianjian," detailing Zhang Youxia's experience of "long-term rooting at the Zhurihe base, personally guiding training on the front lines, and mastering every detail of the exercises." The article stated that Zhang Youxia was the first to propose the concept of integrating Zhurihe exercise data, leading the development and application of data systems for live combat exercises such as the "Multidimensional Reconnaissance Platform," and also served as the chief director for the acceptance exercises of this platform. These technological innovations laid the foundation for Zhurihe to later become a benchmark for the entire military's informationized training.

However, this model of deeply binding individuals to important military facilities also exposes vulnerabilities when an anti-corruption storm arises. When a senior general who has long led the construction of a key military facility falls from grace, does the operation of that facility need to be scrutinized? Does the related personnel network need to be cleaned up? The answers to these questions directly relate to whether combat readiness training can proceed normally. The suspension of exercises at the Zhurihe base likely reflects the military's cautious attitude in handling such issues—preferring to temporarily slow down rather than risk making mistakes before thoroughly clarifying the influence and potential problems of the former leadership.

It is noteworthy that while Zhurihe fell silent, the modernization process of other PLA units did not come to a halt. On February 22, a brigade under the 73rd Group Army conducted comprehensive chemical defense training exercises in southern Fujian, focusing on testing the troops' chemical reconnaissance and precise decontamination capabilities under complex conditions. During the exercise, officers and soldiers operated robotic dogs for rapid reconnaissance in areas with unknown contamination sources, fully demonstrating the combat effectiveness of new unmanned platforms. This four-legged robot can autonomously navigate complex terrain and carry chemical detectors for reconnaissance in hazardous areas, improving reconnaissance efficiency while reducing the risk of personnel casualties.

The application of robotic dogs in the PLA's chemical defense training represents the latest trend in the development of unmanned systems within the PLA. In recent years, from aerial drones to ground unmanned combat vehicles, and now to four-legged robots, the PLA has been systematically integrating unmanned platforms into the operational systems of various military branches. This technology-driven modernization process stands in stark contrast to the traditional live combat training model represented by the Zhurihe base—the former can advance under relatively independent conditions relying on technological innovation and equipment updates, while the latter is highly dependent on large-scale coordination and high-level decision-making, making it susceptible to disruption when organizational structures fluctuate.

From a broader perspective, the Zhurihe incident reveals a key contradiction in the PLA's modernization process: on one hand, the military needs to ensure political reliability and operational consistency through a highly centralized command system; on the other hand, this centralized structure is prone to systemic delays when facing high-level personnel changes. On October 1, 2025, Japan's Sankei Shimbun cited satellite images released by a Japanese think tank, reporting that in addition to the previously constructed simulated buildings of Taiwan's "Presidential Office" and "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," the Zhurihe base also added a simulated "Judicial Yuan" building connected to the "Presidential Office" via an underground tunnel. This layout for "decapitation strikes" against Taiwan's decision-making center has been interpreted as an escalation of military threats against Taiwan. However, when such a strategically significant training base is suspended due to personnel changes, its impact on overall combat readiness cannot be underestimated.

Historical experience shows that a military's combat effectiveness depends not only on weaponry and training levels but also on a stable and efficient organizational operation mechanism. In the lead-up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, frequent high-level personnel changes and factional struggles severely weakened the cohesion and execution capabilities of the Soviet military. Although the Chinese military has demonstrated a strong self-purification ability during anti-corruption and rectification efforts, how to ensure that combat readiness training is not disrupted while maintaining political purity remains a topic that requires continuous exploration.

Currently, the PLA is at a critical juncture in transitioning from a quantity-based model to a quality and efficiency-based model, with daunting tasks in military training reform, joint operational system construction, and the cultivation of new combat forces. In this context, how to establish a more resilient training mechanism to avoid disruptions to the normal operation of the entire system due to the corruption issues of individual high-ranking generals is an important issue facing military reform. The brief silence of the Zhurihe base may just be an interlude, but the institutional issues it reflects deserve in-depth consideration. The PLA needs to find a better balance between strengthening political supervision and ensuring combat readiness training, ensuring that it can maintain a high level of combat readiness under any circumstances. Only in this way can it truly achieve the strategic goal of building a world-class military.