Green Pine matters less as a radar than as the timing spine of an entire architecture. Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 are only as good as the track quality handed to them, and the radar's job — detect a boosting ballistic missile at several hundred kilometres, hold the track through separation and decoy release, and hand the interceptor a solution accurate to a few metres — is what converts a fast interceptor into a credible defence. That places the radar, not the missile, at the centre of Israel's upper-tier layer, and explains why each Arrow export package has been sold as a radar-plus-interceptor chain rather than as missiles alone.
The 2024 and 2025 exchanges with Iran provided the first sustained state-on-state test of that chain. Israel's reported intercept rate of roughly 86% during the June 2025 twelve-day exchange suggests the sensor and battle-management side held up under salvo conditions that earlier tests never approximated. It also exposed the limits of the concept: sensors that track everything do not solve an interceptor-inventory problem, and Israel's post-war decision to accelerate Arrow production indicates that magazine depth, not detection, is the binding constraint against large simultaneous salvoes and decoy-laden re-entry.
Export-wise, Green Pine has become one of Israel's most consequential technology transfers. India's Swordfish radar is an acknowledged derivative and seeded an indigenous BMD programme; South Korea's Block-B and Block-C sets underpin its Korea Air and Missile Defense early-warning picture; and the Holzdorf deployment makes it the first non-US strategic BMD sensor fielded in NATO Europe. That combination — combat-referenced performance plus a mature export chain — gives ELTA a position in long-range ballistic-missile tracking that few non-American suppliers currently hold.
