Kaliningrad is more than the Suwałki Gap, and NATO cannot ignore it

For years, Western discussion of Kaliningrad has focused on the Suwałki Gap, the roughly 100-kilometer corridor between Poland and Lithuania that separates the exclave from Belarus. In a conflict scenario, this corridor could theoretically be cut by Russian forces operating simultaneously from Kaliningrad and Western Belarus, isolating the Baltic states from the rest of NATO. 

While this scenario remains relevant to the defense of the Eastern Flank, its dominance in the discourse is masking Kaliningrad’s much broader significance as a platform threatening not just the Baltics, but Western Europe as a whole. The assumption that a war with Russia would primarily affect Eastern EU states belongs to an earlier era. Kaliningrad gives Russia the ability to project that threat deep into western Europe, placing capitals, critical infrastructure and civilian targets far from the eastern frontier at risk.

Ukraine has shown that modern conflict is fought not only at the contact line, but across large geographic areas through drone, ballistic missile and long-range strike barrages fired into civilian infrastructure. Kyiv has endured sustained missile and drone attacks despite being roughly as far from Russia as much of Western Europe is from Kaliningrad. In an age of long-range precision weapons and mobile drones, strategic depth is becoming a relic. Kaliningrad is a reminder that Europe’s security can no longer be divided neatly between frontline states and everyone else.

As a result, European leaders should simultaneously raise public awareness of the threat posed by the Russian exclave and try to convince Moscow that reducing the military buildup there is in Russia’s best interest. 

The ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ hosts an impressive war machine. The exclave includes Iskander missile systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads, S-400 batteries and other coastal missile systems whose range reaches well beyond Poland and Lithuania, putting targets in Germany within reach. Some assessments suggest potential range extension using the Baltic Fleet, and Russian exercises and transport (like the major Russian–Belarusian strategic military exercise “Zapad” in September 2025) can shroud intentions. The dual-use nature of certain systems means NATO is less able to distinguish conventional from nuclear loadout in advance – this forces worst-case planning around every Russian deployment or “exercise.” 

Moreover, Russia’s Baltic Fleet, also housed in the exclave, combines conventional and nuclear-capable missile forces with existing malign maritime initiatives — including the shadow fleet of Russian ships aimed at circumnavigating Western sanctions. These malign activities are not just about commercial traffic; American intelligence reportedly warned that Gerbera-type attack drones could be put aboard commercial ships, threatening sensitive NATO territory across Europe and the United States. Moreover, the disruption of undersea infrastructure like cables and pipelines has been affecting Western European energy and data connectivity for years. 

How To Respond

Steps have been made to respond to the long-range threat to Europe, but as European leaders cohere around increased defense spending and work to create greater military ties across the continent, they should seek to clearly message around Kaliningrad. 

When discussing the exclave, leaders need to explicitly communicate the threat to Central Europe, not only the Eastern flank. They need to explain how Kaliningrad is one of many vectors of a wider alliance-wide threat posed by the Russian Federation, both in NATO planning documents and public messaging about worst-case scenarios. 

But that messaging needs to go back to Moscow as well, with a clear, consistent voice warning that what makes Kaliningrad a threat to Europe also means it will be target number one, met with overwhelming force at the start of any conflict. 

At the Warsaw Security Forum on October 12, SACEUR Gen. Alexus Grynkewich presented the public version of the alliance’s newly declassified version of the theory of victory: block an attack, blunt its advance and, if necessary, break not only the attacking force but everything that supports, sustains, or controls it. From Moscow, this means Kaliningrad’s missile brigades, air defenses and Baltic Fleet would be among the first targets in any war, which makes the exclave as much a liability as an asset. 

Russia’s military machine is depleted from its invasion of Ukraine, and replacing the assets it has in Kaliningrad would not be easy. That exposure is the basis for a bargain: should future negotiations for peace in Ukraine occur, it is essential that any resulting framework also address arms reductions and increased transparency in Kaliningrad. 

Reductions worth putting on the table are specific and would be basic trust-building measures for Western military planners in the event of cessation of hostilities. Ideally, these confidence-building measures should be a precursor to demilitarization of Kaliningrad as part of a more comprehensive European-wide security architecture. 

In the short term, goals for the negotiation could include the removal of specific warheads from storage in the exclave, a cap on dual-capable Iskander launchers, a ban on ground-launched missiles with ranges above 500 kilometers and limits on snap exercises along the Polish and Lithuanian borders. 

Perhaps the most realistic outcome of negotiations would be pushing for a return of transparency measures that went away when the Open Skies Treaty was officially ended in 2021. Ideally, there would be inspections available beyond those of the 2011 Vienna Document, but a return to an Open Skies-esque flyover option would at least provide some measure of surveillance. 

It would not be perfect, but a Kaliningrad that is less armed and more visible would serve both sides better than one primed to be the first target in a war neither claims to want. Failing to address these concerns would leave a permanent forward operating base for coercion against NATO in the future. 

Zak Schneider is a visiting fellow at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation in Warsaw, where he researches Euro-Atlantic security. He holds an MA from Georgetown University’s Department of Government and previously worked in Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative.