Leopard 2 and IRIS-T 2026 under Russian Threat — Europe's Defense Industry Becomes a NATO Test

A Threat with Strategic Intent

On September 30, 2026, Russia designated European defense companies producing weapons for Ukraine as potential military targets. Maria Zakharova from the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that those who believe such facilities are safe are mistaken. The following day, EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius warned, according to Politico Europe, that a Russian attack on a European arms factory would trigger a military response from NATO. These two statements mark more than just another escalation threat. They test whether Europe can politically and militarily defend its industrial support for Ukraine.

The wording from Moscow remains a threat, not an announced operation. Nevertheless, it is strategically relevant because Russia is addressing not only Ukrainian armed forces but also the European production chain. Leopard 2 spare parts, IRIS-T missiles, artillery ammunition, and drone systems are produced in a cross-border network of factories, suppliers, and logistics centers. The line between "support for Ukraine" and European defense production is thus practically erased.

The Article 5 Test Begins Before the First Strike

Kubilius' statement is politically understandable but not automatically legal. Article 5 of the NATO treaty obligates allies to support an attacked member but allows them discretion in choosing measures. Therefore, a drone attack on a factory in Germany, Poland, or France would not mechanically equate to a joint entry into war. Key factors would be attribution, extent of damage, and whether the attack is assessed as an armed attack on alliance territory.

It is precisely this ambiguity that makes the Russian threat effective. Moscow does not need to immediately destroy a factory to burden European decision-making. It is sufficient to raise insurance premiums, delay investments, unsettle workforces, or disrupt individual supply chains through sabotage and cyberattacks. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has simultaneously emphasized that the alliance will defend every inch of its territory, while currently, there is no immediate Russian military threat to NATO states. This is the classic gray zone: below the threshold of open war but above ordinary industrial crime.

Europe's Industrial Vulnerability

The European defense industry has grown larger but not automatically more resilient. Rheinmetall, Diehl Defence, MBDA, and numerous medium-sized suppliers work with highly specialized production steps. A single final assembly plant can be protected; however, a whole network of electronics, explosives, optics, engines, and transport routes is significantly harder to secure. The political debate continues to focus on order volumes and production targets. The physical resilience of the facilities remains a secondary issue.

This is the central mistake of European rearmament rhetoric. More money creates demand but does not provide protected production capacity overnight. A factory requires air defense, drone defense, redundant power supply, alternative sites, cyber resilience, and emergency plans. For critical components, Europe also needs alternative suppliers. Those who only sign new contracts without securing production against sabotage and missile attacks are financing vulnerability with public funds.

What Germany and the EU Must Decide Now

• Protection as a Collective Task: Securing critical defense sites must not remain solely the responsibility of the respective nation-state. NATO air defense, national police, intelligence services, and factory security must practice in joint scenarios.
• Distributed Production: The EU should finance a second production line for Leopard 2 components, air defense missiles, and artillery ammunition in another member state. Redundancy is more expensive than concentration but cheaper than a production halt in wartime.
• Clear Escalation Signals: Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw must establish before an attack which acts of sabotage will be considered armed attacks and what response will follow. Deterrence formulated only after the strike is not deterrence.
• Protection of Suppliers: A large corporation can maintain security departments. A small sensor or chemical manufacturer often cannot. Funding programs must therefore finance security investments and not just production quantities.

The Political Consequence

Europe thus faces an uncomfortable contradiction. It wants to support Ukraine longer, expand its own industrial base, and at the same time avoid direct confrontation with Russia. These goals are not incompatible, but they require a decision about risk. If European governments label arms production as part of their strategic autonomy, they must also treat this production as critical defense infrastructure.

The Russian threat therefore not only demonstrates Moscow's willingness to intimidate. It exposes Europe's institutional gap. NATO can promise territorial defense, and the EU can mobilize billions through SAFE and other programs. However, as long as no one clearly takes responsibility for the protection of factories, supply chains, and workforces, European rearmament remains politically loud and militarily fragile. More production is necessary. Only protected and distributed production can turn it into deterrence.

Sources: The Kyiv Independent, September 30, 2026; Politico Europe, October 1, 2026; Reuters, September 30, 2026; NATO statements on Russia's nuclear rhetoric and the defense of alliance territory.