Prime Minister Gao's "New FOIP" Strategy and Taiwan's Approach: A Turning Point in Northeast Asian Maritime Security (May 2026)

In May 2026, the maritime security architecture of Northeast Asia is entering a quiet yet decisive phase of reorganization. On May 2, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced a revised version of Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" strategy during a foreign policy speech in Hanoi, Vietnam. This comes ten years after the concept was proposed by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016, emphasizing economic security in the AI era, strengthening supply chains, and above all, "enhancing security cooperation to ensure regional peace and stability." Just six days later, Tsai Ming-yen, Director of Taiwan's National Security Bureau (NSB), revealed in the Legislative Yuan that Taiwan and Japan are considering joint actions in three key areas—protection of undersea cables, countering China's "gray zone" tactics at sea, and cooperation in information security and AI—in response to this new strategy. This series of moves signals a significant qualitative change in the security environment of Northeast Asia.

The core of Prime Minister Takaichi's new FOIP strategy is a clear declaration that Japan will play "a more proactive role than ever" in the Indo-Pacific. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' announcement, the revised version consists of three priority areas—building economic foundations in the AI and data era, strengthening supply chains for energy and critical minerals, and deepening security cooperation through collaboration and shared rules. Notably, this strategy goes beyond mere economic diplomacy, clearly positioning maritime security and infrastructure protection as pillars of security. As Tsai Ming-yen mentioned in the Legislative Yuan's Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee on May 8, both Taiwan and Japan, as island nations, share common interests in the resilience and security of undersea communication cables, and Tokyo has shown strong interest in sharing Taiwan's extensive experience and insights regarding Beijing's "gray zone" activities. This indicates that practical security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan is entering a new phase, transcending the constraints of formal diplomatic relations.

The backdrop of this strategic reorganization is the "Balikatan 2026" joint military exercise conducted from April 20 to May 8, 2026. In this exercise, hosted by the U.S. and the Philippines, Japan participated for the first time as a full-fledged combat force. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force deployed the helicopter destroyer "Ise," the transport ship "Shimikita," and the destroyer "Ikazuchi," along with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's C-130H transport aircraft, US-2 amphibious rescue aircraft, and approximately 1,400 combat personnel. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force deployed the Type 88 Surface-to-Ship Missile (SSM-1) system in the Philippines and conducted live-fire training targeting decommissioned vessels in waters close to Taiwan and the South China Sea. The range of the Type 88 missile is approximately 100 kilometers, directly contributing to enhancing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities at chokepoints in the first island chain, such as the Luzon Strait and the Bashi Channel. The fact that Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi inspected this training on-site also demonstrates the depth of Japan's strategic engagement. Balikatan 2026 saw combat forces from the Philippines, the United States, and Japan, along with Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand, participating, with an additional 17 countries joining as observers, making it the largest exercise in history with a total troop strength exceeding 17,000.

China's response was swift and multifaceted. On April 24, the Southern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) announced that it conducted exercises with a surface task group consisting of one Type 055 destroyer, one Type 052D destroyer, one Type 054A frigate, and one Type 903A supply ship in the eastern waters of the Luzon Strait, stating that it was a response to the "current regional situation." Additionally, the PLA Navy's aircraft carrier "Liaoning" transited south through the Taiwan Strait on April 20, and according to unverified satellite images, it is reported to be operating in the South China Sea accompanied by three destroyers and six frigates. This is a clear repetition of the pattern seen during the Balikatan exercise in 2025, where the aircraft carrier "Shandong" exhibited a similar deployment, indicating that China is establishing a pattern of responding to the deepening defense cooperation among the U.S., the Philippines, and Japan by showcasing its maritime power projection capabilities. More broadly, the unprecedented maritime power display by China in early December 2025, with over 100 naval and coast guard vessels simultaneously deployed around the East China Sea, South China Sea, Yellow Sea, and Taiwan Strait—approximately 40 vessels in the East China Sea and about 30 in the South China Sea—serves as evidence that China is transitioning from sporadic signaling to a sustained forward presence as a core national strategic means. This operation involved cutting-edge surface combatants, including Type 055 destroyers, demonstrating simultaneous command and control capabilities across multiple theaters.

Simultaneously, a strategic reorganization concerning the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) is underway. On April 22, USFK Commander Xavier Brunson proposed designating South Korea as a "Regional Sustainment Hub." This plan aims to significantly enhance the U.S. military's responsiveness and logistical efficiency in the event of a Taiwan contingency by conducting maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) of vessels, missile systems, and drones within South Korea, based on the U.S. Department of Defense's 2024 "Regional Sustainment Framework." Concurrently, the South Korean administration under Lee Jae-myung is advancing a roadmap to complete the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) by 2026, along with plans to increase the defense budget to 3.5% of GDP and develop domestically produced nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). On January 30, 2026, a Japan-South Korea defense ministerial meeting was held in Yokosuka, where Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and South Korean Defense Minister An Kyung-duk agreed to resume Japan-South Korea joint maritime training focused on humanitarian assistance, which had been suspended for about ten years. These developments align with the U.S. 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which seeks to require allies to take primary responsibility for their own defense while strategically reallocating focus toward deterrence against China.

In summary, it can be said that maritime security in Northeast Asia is experiencing three layers of structural change. First, the practical implementation of a multilateral deterrence network centered on Japan, the U.S., and the Philippines, including Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand, is rapidly advancing. Balikatan 2026 has qualitatively transformed from a mere exercise to a venue for verifying practical interoperability. Notably, Japan's deployment of the Type 88 Surface-to-Ship Missile in northern Luzon and live-fire training in waters south of Taiwan across the Bashi Channel symbolizes an elevation of Japan's role in the defense architecture of the first island chain from "rear support" to "providing frontline deterrence." Second, practical security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan is being institutionalized through specific agendas such as the protection of undersea cables and countering gray zone tactics, outside the framework of formal diplomatic relations. Tsai Ming-yen's remarks in the Legislative Yuan suggest that information sharing is already underway, rather than being merely a policy intention. Third, China's maritime strategy is qualitatively shifting from sporadic "muscle flexing" to demonstrating sustained forward deployment and multi-domain simultaneous operational capabilities. The deployment of over 100 vessels in December 2025 and the movement of the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" task force into the South China Sea in April 2026 are continuous demonstrations of this shift. As we move toward the latter half of 2026, the potential for the permanent deployment of Type 88 Surface-to-Ship Missiles in northern Philippines, the deepening of the information-sharing mechanism among the U.S., Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan around the Bashi Channel connecting the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the initial training voyage of China's third aircraft carrier "Fujian," and the progress of South Korea's transfer of wartime operational control will further complicate the security equation in this region. The quiet contest surrounding the first island chain is indeed reaching a decisive phase right now.