Putin's decree on 1.55 million servicemen shows the cost of a protracted war for Russia

The size of the Russian army is increasing for the fourth time in 2026, but the increase of 15,500 servicemen indicates not a sudden reinforcement, but a chronic shortage of personnel. According to reports from The Moscow Times and CNBC on September 29, Vladimir Putin's new decree raises the authorized strength of the Armed Forces to 1.55 million servicemen. On the same day, Reuters reported on Moscow's plans to sharply increase defense spending in 2027. These decisions should be viewed together: the Kremlin is preparing not for a short surge, but for a war apparatus that is expected to operate longer than official rhetoric suggests.

The fourth adjustment of the year changes the meaning of the number

On paper, the increase appears moderate. For an army of this scale, 15,500 people is less than one percent of the authorized strength. But what matters is not the size of an individual adjustment, but its repetitiveness. If the state expands the authorized strength four times in one year, it means that the previous calculation for contract recruitment is failing to withstand contact with the front. Moscow is trying to simultaneously replenish losses, form new units, ensure rotation, and create a reserve for possible operations. The same personnel base is expected to perform too many tasks.

This is where the gap between authorized and actual strength arises. The decree sets an upper limit but does not guarantee the presence of personnel, a trained sergeant corps, and a sufficient number of junior officers. The Russian military system has already faced this problem after 2022: the paper expansion of units occurred faster than their ability to operate as cohesive formations. In Soviet terminology, this was called deployment; in practice, it often resulted in battalions assembled from heterogeneous reinforcements.

Money compensates for the lack of personnel only temporarily

Reuters' report on preparations for record defense spending in 2027 — according to publications, the increase could be around 27 percent — confirms the financial side of this policy. Moscow is willing to pay more for each recruit, increase regional payments, and retain servicemen with contract bonuses. This model is effective as long as the budget can buy loyalty faster than the war destroys the attractiveness of service.

But the cost of recruitment is rising faster than its quality. High payments attract people from the poorest regions and those who view the contract as an economic choice rather than a military career. This is not a moral assessment, but personnel arithmetic. The more expensive recruitment becomes, the greater the pressure on command to quickly send people to the front. As a result, training is shortened, and losses increase the next contract price. This creates a vicious cycle: the lack of personnel leads to increased payments, increased payments raise the budget burden, and the budget burden demands new military successes that untrained reinforcements cannot provide.

The North Korean factor shows the limits of Russian mobilization

Against this backdrop, the report about North Korea potentially preparing around 10,000 servicemen for dispatch to Russia, mentioned by CNBC and The Guardian on September 29, is particularly telling, citing statements from Volodymyr Zelensky. This information requires caution and is not yet equivalent to confirmed deployment. However, the very logic of external recruitment is more important than the specific number. If Russia is simultaneously expanding its own personnel and seeking additional foreign contingents, its personnel problem has already become an element of foreign policy.

North Korean servicemen may cover specific functions — guarding facilities, engineering tasks, training, or limited participation in combat operations. But they do not replace the Russian command system. Language, communication standards, medical support, and political control make such forces a costly and risky tool. Pyongyang receives money, technology, and diplomatic leverage, while Moscow gains temporary relief. This is a form of military-technical cooperation that appears as partnership but in reality demonstrates the dependence of the Russian military machine on external resources.

Why increasing the army does not mean an immediate turning point

The Russian army retains the ability to deliver massive strikes and maintain pressure on the Ukrainian front. Recent reports of missile and drone attacks and strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure confirm this. However, increasing the personnel does not automatically resolve three limitations. The first is the training of personnel. The second is the lack of commanders capable of managing units in conditions saturated with drones on the battlefield. The third is the material component: artillery systems, armored vehicles, communication means, and counter-drone capabilities must match the number of personnel.

That is why the figure of 1.55 million should be read as an indicator of the war's duration, rather than a forecast of an imminent offensive. The Kremlin is insulating itself from demographic and operational exhaustion. It is creating a numerical reserve, hoping to compensate for technological limitations with mass, money, and time. This is a familiar logic of the late Soviet system, where the scale of the mobilization apparatus was perceived as proof of strength. But the modern front punishes not only for a lack of soldiers but also for poor integration of intelligence, communication, and firepower.

Forecast for Russian defense policy

In the coming months, Moscow is likely to continue expanding the personnel in small increments, avoiding the word "mobilization" and keeping regional contracts as the main recruitment tool. At the same time, defense spending will be protected from cuts even at the cost of pressure on civilian budget items. This will allow Russia to maintain the intensity of combat operations but will not eliminate the structural contradiction between quantity and quality.

The Russian army is not collapsing, but it is also not becoming stronger in proportion to its numerical growth. The decree on 1.55 million servicemen is an administrative acknowledgment that the war has turned into a long-term personnel campaign. Its outcome will depend not on the next round number in the decree but on whether the Russian system can prepare, arm, and integrate these people into functioning units. If not, the fourth increase in personnel will turn out not to be a sign of strategic reserve but a bill for the exhaustion that has already accumulated.

Sources

• The Moscow Times, September 29, 2026 — decree on increasing the authorized strength of the Russian army to 1.55 million servicemen.
• CNBC, September 29, 2026 — army expansion and reports of possible preparation of a North Korean contingent.
• The Guardian, September 29, 2026 — military summary on Russian plans and North Korean servicemen.
• Reuters, September 29, 2026 — Russia's plans for record defense spending in 2027.