Honghe Ship Leads First Joint Exercise East of Taiwan Island with Indonesia, U.S. Urges PLA to Stop Military Pressure on Taiwan

On the morning of August 12, the PLA Navy's Type 054A missile frigate Honghe (hull number 523) completed all scheduled exercises with the Indonesian Navy's "Lai" frigate in the waters east of Taiwan Island, concluding the maritime navigation drill. From the announcement by the Ministry of Defense on August 11 to the completion of the exercise on August 12, it was less than 24 hours—announced a day in advance and wrapped up the next day, clearly intended to control the media narrative.

Exercise Subjects and Participating Vessels

According to the Eastern Theater Command's report, the two ships formed a joint task force and conducted live exercises on four subjects: maritime communication, formation movement, at-sea replenishment, and division ceremony. The crew of the Honghe used tactical signal shorthand and flag signals to communicate with the other side, achieving all objectives. The list of subjects is not long, but none of them were "just practice."

• Honghe: Type 054A, full load of about 4,000 tons, 32 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, HQ-16 air defense missiles, YJ-83 anti-ship missiles, 1130 close-in weapon system, approximately 35 built, the "universal key" for the Chinese Navy's distant sea missions.
• Indonesian "Lai": Martadinata-class (Dutch SIGMA 10514 platform), about 2,400 tons, commissioned in 2018, the main frigate of the Indonesian Navy.

This is the first time the PLA has conducted joint exercises with a foreign navy in the waters east of Taiwan Island. Military expert Zhang Junsha stated that this move is "significant," reflecting China's sovereign rights over the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf east of Taiwan Island; Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council condemned it as "fake exercises, real expansion." On August 13, U.S. State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott urged Beijing to "stop the ongoing military pressure on Taiwan and engage in meaningful dialogue."

Why 054A, Why Indonesia

Beijing did not send the Type 055 destroyer or an aircraft carrier. The logic lies in production capacity and division of labor: the 055 is a strategic asset, reserved for high-intensity confrontations; over thirty 054As have been built, handling "routine chores" like escorting, visiting, and joint exercises—all without affecting the fleet's combat power structure. This "diplomacy using surplus capacity" is unique to the Chinese Navy.

Indonesia is the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and the largest country in ASEAN, while also maintaining military cooperation with the U.S., Japan, and Australia. What Beijing has always wanted is not "allies," but the image of "even non-allies are here"—even Jakarta is willing to sail with the PLA east of Taiwan Island, reinforcing the narrative that "this sea area is internationalized." The Indonesian military insists this is a routine "transit exercise" and does not involve combat intentions.

U.S. State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott: "We urge Beijing to exercise restraint, stop the military pressure on Taiwan, and engage in meaningful dialogue."

Author's Reservations

Zhang Junsha's assertion of "sovereign rights" is far from legally conclusive; a joint navigation exercise between two ships does not change jurisdiction. However, I judge that what Beijing wants is not a legal conclusion, but the precedent itself: since June, the Coast Guard has been conducting regular law enforcement patrols east of Taiwan Island, and the naval joint exercise is the second layer of this buildup—law enforcement vessels laying the groundwork, combat ships following up, and foreign warships providing endorsement. With these three layers, the perception of "east of Taiwan Island" shifts from a disputed area to a "training ground."

The U.S. response has only remained at the level of "urging," without escalation measures, indicating that Washington views this as a monitoring issue rather than a security event. However, the accumulation of monitoring issues into a norm becomes the starting point for the next round of competition. The truly concerning question is: this time it is Indonesia, who will be next? If warships from Vietnam, Cambodia, or even Pakistan appear in the same waters one after another, how much buffer will remain for Taipei's "eastern depth"?