Sahel: Intensification of Counterterrorism Operations and Jihadist Recomposition in February 2026

The first half of February 2026 marks a significant turning point in the security dynamics of the Sahel, characterized by an unprecedented intensification of government military operations and a major reshaping of the regional jihadist landscape. The developments observed between February 6 and 20 reveal not only an escalation of violence but also the profound changes affecting the armed terrorist groups operating in the Liptako-Gourma region.

The spectacular defection of Saa'd, commander of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), to the Islamic State in the Sahel province, announced on February 11, 2026, constitutes the most significant event of this period. Saa'd, who controlled a strategic area in eastern Burkina Faso, joined the Islamic State with a significant number of his fighters, immediately triggering violent clashes between the two rival jihadist organizations. This defection illustrates the growing fragmentation within the Sahelian jihadist movement and the fierce competition for territorial control and the allegiance of local fighters.

The consequences of this defection manifested quickly on the ground. On February 11, the Islamic State attacked JNIM positions south of Arbinda, in northeastern Burkina Faso, killing and capturing several JNIM militants and taking control of their positions. On February 13, clashes continued in Djika and Bilehout in northwestern Burkina Faso, where the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara eliminated 18 JNIM fighters. This intra-jihadist war adds a new dimension to the Sahelian security crisis, paradoxically creating tactical opportunities for government forces while further complicating the regional security landscape.

Malian security forces intensified their offensive operations during this period. On February 9, the Malian army neutralized 35 jihadists during surveillance and strike operations conducted in the Ségou region, demonstrating increased operational capacity. On February 11, Bamako bolstered its internal security capabilities with the delivery of 57 trucks to the police and the National Guard, a substantial material investment aimed at improving the mobility and effectiveness of law enforcement forces. Joint operations between the Malian army, the African Corps, and ASM militias also intensified their demining activities between Ménaka and Ansongo, critical areas where improvised explosive devices pose a constant threat.

In Niger, authorities made record drug seizures that reveal the extent of transnational criminal networks operating in the Sahel. On February 16, the Departmental Directorate of the National Police seized 800,000 Ecstasy tablets worth 8 billion CFA francs in Illéla, in the Tahoua region, a first in the country's history. This operation was followed by the seizure of 1,652 kilograms of cocaine valued at an estimated 55 million CFA francs in Tchintabaraden, also in the Tahoua region, with the arrest of two foreign nationals. These massive seizures demonstrate the crucial role of the Sahel as a drug trafficking corridor linking sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and Europe.

At the same time, Nigerien forces conducted targeted counter-terrorism operations, arresting 28 suspects during a large-scale sweep operation in the Tillabéri and Dosso regions. These arrests targeted cells involved in arms trafficking and improvised explosive device networks, essential infrastructures of terrorist groups. However, Niger also suffered significant losses, notably on February 13 when 24 soldiers from the Defense and Security Forces were killed during an attack by the Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice against the Dibella oil site in the Diffa region. On the same day, at least eight people were killed and others injured when a mixed transport vehicle exploded on an improvised explosive device in the Diffa region.

The political dimension of the Sahelian crisis has also intensified. On February 11, Nigerien General Amadou Ibro publicly declared: "We will go to war against France," a statement that reflects the growing tensions between the new military authorities in the region and the former colonial power. This rhetoric fits into a broader context of geopolitical realignment, where the military juntas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are seeking new security partners, notably from Russia, as evidenced by the increased presence of the African Corps (formerly Wagner) in Mali.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM claimed to have killed at least 50 Burkinabè soldiers during the attack on Tandjari, north of Fada Ngourma, in the east of the country. JNIM fighters also took control of a Burkinabè military base in Barga, in the Lorum province. JNIM accused government forces of executing 30 civilians in the Dédougou region, a serious allegation that, if verified, would raise significant questions about respect for human rights and could fuel local resentment towards the authorities. However, Burkinabè forces also recorded operational successes, neutralizing many fighters, dismantling drone networks, and strengthening their control of the terrain during operations conducted in January and February 2026.

The analysis of these developments reveals several concerning trends. First, the fragmentation of the jihadist movement, illustrated by Saa'd's defection, intensifies violence but also creates increased unpredictability in the security landscape. Second, the growing intersection between terrorism and organized crime, particularly drug trafficking, generates considerable financial resources for armed groups while corrupting state structures. Third, despite some tactical successes, government forces struggle to sustainably secure reclaimed territories, allowing jihadist groups to maintain their capacity for disruption.

The vacuum created by the gradual withdrawal of international forces, notably French and European, has not been effectively filled by regional initiatives or new security partners. Jihadist organizations, whether JNIM affiliated with Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, continue to exploit governance weaknesses, local grievances, and ethnic fractures to expand their influence. The resilience of these groups, despite the losses suffered, suggests that purely military solutions are insufficient without a comprehensive strategy addressing the root causes of insecurity: poverty, marginalization, corruption, and the absence of state services in rural areas.

The coming months will be crucial in determining whether Sahelian forces can capitalize on jihadist disunity and reverse the security dynamics, or if the region will continue its descent into fragmented but endemic violence that threatens to destabilize the entire West Africa.