Saudi Arabia expands ballistic missile production in 2026 reshaping Gulf deterrence

On October 23, 2026, commercial satellite images revealed a clear expansion at the Al-Dawadimi missile complex, located about 200 kilometers west of Riyadh. The assessment published by Defense News and relayed by researchers at the Foreign Policy Research Institute does not state that the kingdom has tested a new missile, but it offers something more militarily significant: new infrastructure that may allow for the production of larger solid rocket motors, and thus missiles capable of carrying heavier warheads or reaching further ranges.

What has changed at the Al-Dawadimi complex

Sam LaGrone and Michael Dweitzman from FPRI analyzed images captured by Planet Labs between April 2025 and September 2026. The images show a new building that appears to contain fuel casting pits, facilities where motor casings are filled with a solid fuel mixture and then left to cure. The new building is at least twice the size of the facility believed to house the old casting pits, and it is protected by walls designed to deflect blast waves away from adjacent buildings. Construction has also begun on another building that could be used for storing fuel or missile components.

These are technical details, but they are not secondary details. A solid-fuel missile can be stored for longer periods and launched more quickly than a liquid-fuel missile. Therefore, the expansion of the casting pits signifies an increase in industrial capacity and operational readiness, not just the purchase of an off-the-shelf platform from abroad. However, the images alone do not allow for the determination of the type of missile or when it might enter service; researchers estimated that the installation of casting equipment could take several months, making the end of 2026 closer to the beginning of a potential capability rather than an announcement of possessing a completed weapon.

From the Chinese DF-3 to a more flexible local capability

The roots of Saudi missile power trace back to the purchase of about 40 Chinese DF-3 liquid-fueled missiles in 1987. In recent years, there have been indications of the complex's connection to Chinese technology, with researchers comparing its characteristics to those of Chinese missile factories. LaGrone believes that Riyadh may produce a solid-fuel version of the DF-15, or that the expansion is intended for a longer-range missile like the DF-21 or a similar system. These are analytical estimates and not a Saudi confirmation, so one should not convert an image of a building into a range or payload number that is unverified.

However, the overall trend is clear. The United States has historically restricted the export of longer-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, while Iranian missile and drone attacks have prompted the kingdom to seek a capability that does not rely entirely on Washington's approval at every stage. Additionally, the Yemen war has made the missile a tool of both political and military pressure. Possessing local production capability gives Riyadh a more renewable stockpile and reduces the risk of external supply disruptions during wartime, even if electronics, guidance systems, and testing remain tied to foreign partners.

Deterrence against Iran does not mean air superiority

Practically, the value of a potential Saudi missile lies not in replacing the F-15SA or Western aircraft, but in adding a long-range option to the deterrence equation. Researchers at IISS noted that a longer-range missile could threaten Iranian targets without exposing a Saudi aircraft to danger within the Iranian air defense network. This changes the adversary's calculations, as Riyadh would no longer have to choose between accepting a strike or sending manned aircraft on a high-risk mission.

However, missile deterrence requires more than just a factory. There must be real strike accuracy, intelligence and reconnaissance to identify targets, secure communications, a sufficient stockpile, and battalions capable of deploying, camouflaging, and repositioning. Here lies the capability triangle that procurement data often overlooks: equipment is important, but training and institutions are equally so. A larger factory does not guarantee a better crew, nor does it solve the problem of maintaining command systems, nor does it prove that forces can manage a long missile campaign under bombardment.

A new missile race and increasing nuclear pressure

The expansion is not interpreted in Tehran as merely a defensive project. Iran possesses a missile arsenal and drones capable of reaching Saudi territory, and thus it will view any Saudi increase in range and payload as an attempt to close the attack gap. Other Gulf states and Turkey have also begun to expand their offensive and defensive capabilities, according to analysts cited in reports. The potential outcome is not a stable balance, but a cycle of alert and armament that makes every new facility evidence of the necessity for a corresponding facility.

The sensitivity of the issue is heightened by U.S.-Saudi negotiations over a civilian nuclear agreement that includes uranium enrichment arrangements. There is no available information indicating that the Al-Dawadimi expansion is linked to a military nuclear program, and one should not conflate missile capability with nuclear capability. However, the combination of producing long-range missiles and expanding a domestic nuclear fuel cycle would provide opponents in the U.S. Congress with an additional political argument for demanding stricter guarantees and oversight.

Military governance

Saudi Arabia is not building, in my estimation, a weapon that guarantees it superiority over Iran as much as it is building a margin of independence at a moment when the American guarantee no longer seems free or immediate. This is a reasonable investment after years of attacks on oil facilities, but it carries a regional cost. The missile may give Riyadh a retaliatory capability, but it does not alone provide the ability to absorb a strike or protect its cities and facilities. The structural contradiction will remain between the pursuit of military decision-making independence and reliance on foreign support for reconnaissance, guidance, and air defense. As any military officer who has served in the region knows, possessing the weapon is much easier than building the institution that knows when to use it and how to bear the consequences.

Sources

• Defense News, October 23, 2026, Analysis of the Al-Dawadimi missile complex expansion
• Foreign Policy Research Institute, Analysis of Planet Labs commercial images of the Al-Dawadimi complex, as relayed by Defense News
• International Institute for Strategic Studies, CNA, and Janes, independent assessments relayed by the same coverage regarding production pathways and potential missile ranges