Taiwan's HIMARS Fires 32 Rockets in First Launch Across the Taiwan Strait, PLA Faces a 3-Minute Window for Anti-Landing Suppression

On June 10, the live-fire exercise at the mouth of the Dajia River in Taichung appeared to be a new equipment acceptance test for the Taiwanese Army, but in reality, it presented a problem that had previously remained on paper to the PLA's staff: if HIMARS is no longer just conducting closed tests at Jiupeng Base, but is instead entering the operational area on the west coast, the timeline for fire suppression during an amphibious landing must be recalculated.

Details Behind the 32 Rockets

According to a report by Central News Agency via the Economic Daily, the Taiwanese Army's 10th Corps deployed 6 HIMARS launchers on both sides of the Dajia River mouth, originally planning to fire 36 M28 reduced-range training rounds, but actually fired 32, with 4 rounds not launched. The firing was divided into 3 waves, with the final wave using a Time on Target (TOT) method, allowing rockets fired from different vehicles to hit the target area simultaneously.

USNI News quoted Taiwan's defense department stating that the focus of this exercise was not merely to fire rockets, but to verify rapid relocation after launch, with vehicles moving to a new position within about 3 minutes after firing. AP's on-site report also emphasized that this was the first time HIMARS had fired live rounds towards the Taiwan Strait, with the exercise aimed at countering potential amphibious landings. In simple terms, what the Taiwanese military wanted to demonstrate was not just a piece of artillery, but a complete "fire and maneuver" small closed-loop system.

The PLA Is Not Just Concerned About Range

HIMARS itself is not mysterious. Conventional rockets cover distances of several dozen kilometers, while ATACMS-class munitions can reach about 300 kilometers, and future long-range munitions may go even further. However, the rounds used this time were reduced-range training rounds, which cannot be directly equated to striking deep into Fujian during wartime. I believe the truly significant numbers are three small figures: 6 vehicles, 32 rounds, and 3 minutes. They indicate that Taiwan is shifting its anti-landing firepower from static displays to mobile process validation.

• First, 6 vehicles are sufficient to simulate coordinated firing of a small-scale fire unit.
• Second, the density of 32 rounds fired can cover the beachhead assembly area, ferry points, or temporary unloading zones.
• Third, a 3-minute relocation means that a near-real-time link must be established between counter-battery radars, drones, and long-range firepower.

This is not a revolutionary challenge for the PLA, but it will increase the difficulty of fire planning in the hours leading up to an amphibious operation. In the past, discussions about amphibious operations across the Taiwan Strait often focused on the width of the strait, weather windows, and the number of landing ships; the trouble with mobile rocket artillery like HIMARS is that it does not necessarily need to sink vessels; as long as it disrupts the unloading and subsequent troop rhythm at critical moments, it can amplify tactical friction.

The Mainland Needs to Supplement Its Reconnaissance Suppression Chain

Of course, the PLA is not without countermeasures. Rocket forces, army aviation, reconnaissance-strike integrated drones, long-range rocket artillery, electronic warfare, and special operations reconnaissance can all be integrated into a system to suppress Taiwan's mobile firepower. However, the issue lies in whether the chain is short enough: detecting launch vehicles, confirming real and false targets, allocating firepower, and completing strikes—if these steps take more than ten minutes, HIMARS will have long departed its original position.

This highlights a key focus of the PLA's training and equipment development in recent years: not just stacking one or two types of longer-range missiles, but making unmanned reconnaissance, low-orbit satellites, electronic reconnaissance, and land-based long-range fire more like an industrial assembly line. In operations against Taiwan, high-value targets are not necessarily large radar stations; they could also be a truck that has just launched and is now moving into a riverbank road. This target is small, moves quickly, and has a short exposure window, which poses a greater challenge to command systems than the range of munitions.

The Taiwanese Military Also Exposed Its Shortcomings

However, this exercise should not be interpreted as Taiwan having a mature long-range anti-landing fire network. The 4 rounds that did not launch are not a minor incident. For a system that has just been integrated and is expected to expand to a larger scale in the future, software versions, ammunition batches, battlefield maintenance, and personnel proficiency will all affect operational availability. Taiwanese media mentioned that the U.S. had previously assisted in updating the system software, indicating that integration does not equate to stable combat capability.

Another easily overlooked detail is airspace control. During the live-fire exercise, operations were paused due to airspace factors, with tasks first stored in the command vehicle and launched only after airspace was reopened. In peacetime training, this is a safety procedure; in wartime, it means that the fire window may be squeezed by air situations, residual management of civilian flight routes, and friendly drone activities. HIMARS is highly mobile, but it is not a guerrilla weapon that operates outside command control.

The Firepower Competition in the Taiwan Strait Enters a Process Stage

In the same week, the mainland also conducted maritime and coast guard operations in the waters east of Taiwan, with official statements emphasizing control capabilities in the relevant sea areas. This is not the same as the HIMARS firing, but when viewed on a map, the competition around the Taiwan Strait is shifting from single-platform displays to process demonstrations: verifying mobile firepower on the west coast while showcasing maritime control around the island. The number of platforms remains important, but the key to the next stage is who can connect reconnaissance, command, firepower, and logistics into a shorter closed loop.

Li Minghui's assessment is that HIMARS will not alone change the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, but it will force the PLA to refine the "first wave suppression" in anti-landing operations. The real unanswered question is: when Taiwan integrates HIMARS, cruise missiles, shore-based anti-ship missiles, and unmanned vessels into the same operational network, can the PLA's existing reconnaissance-strike chain operate stably within a minute-level window?

Main Sources

• Central News Agency/Economic Daily, June 10, 2026, Details of the Taiwanese Army's 10th Corps HIMARS live-fire exercise.
• USNI News, June 11, 2026, Taiwan Tests HIMARS Missiles on Island’s West Coast in Major Live-fire Drills.
• Associated Press, June 10, 2026, Taiwan fires rockets in China’s direction from a US-supplied mobile launching system in drill.
• Global Times, June 7, 2026, Reports on Chinese Coast Guard and maritime operations in waters east of Taiwan.