The offensive of April 25 in Mali: when the Sahel shifts into strategic unknown

On April 25, 2026, Mali was struck by the largest coordinated offensive the country has experienced since the beginning of the Sahelian crisis in 2012. The Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the jihadist coalition affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), the main Tuareg separatist group, launched near-simultaneous attacks against military installations and strategic sites across the entire Malian territory. From Bamako to Kidal, from Gao to Mopti, including the crucial airbase of Sévaré, no region was spared. The scale and coordination of these strikes mark a change in the nature of the conflict: armed groups are no longer just harassing state forces; they now have the capacity to conduct a conventional military campaign on multiple parallel fronts.

The most striking event of this day of assaults was the car bomb (VBIED) attack against the residence of Malian Defense Minister Sadio Camara, one of the strongmen of the junta in power since the 2020 coup. According to Le Figaro, which cited family, government, and military sources, Sadio Camara succumbed to his injuries. His death represents a major shock for the military regime, especially as he was considered the main architect of the security partnership with the Russian African Corps, which replaced the Wagner Group in the summer of 2024. The neutralization of such a central figure in the Malian security apparatus not only demonstrates an advanced intelligence capability on the part of the assailants but also a willingness to decapitate the enemy command, a tactic previously unseen at this scale in the Sahel.

On the ground, the situation remains fluid but deeply alarming for the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian allies. The city of Kidal, a historical stronghold of Tuareg rebels in the northeast, is reported to have been captured by the FLA, ending several years of joint control by the Malian army and Russian paramilitaries. Consistent testimonies indicate a conditional Russian withdrawal under a "security corridor," with the mercenaries of the African Corps having secured free passage to the airport and the former MINUSMA base, while Malian soldiers were reportedly left behind without equivalent guarantees. This detail is revealing: it suggests a breakdown of trust between the two nominal allies, or at least a clear hierarchy of Russian priorities, where the preservation of their own forces takes precedence over that of local forces.

The airbase of Sévaré, one of the most important in the country and the site of joint operations between the Malian Air Force and the Russian African Corps, has also been the target of intensive assaults. Its potential loss would deprive Bamako of critical air capacity in the center of the country, at a time when air superiority is one of the few advantages still held by the FAMa. Meanwhile, fighting has been reported near the Modibo-Keita International Airport in Bamako, just fifteen kilometers from the city center, as well as around the Kati garrison, the military command's headquarters and a nerve center of junta power. While the capital itself is not immediately threatened with falling, the symbolic significance of these attacks near the heart of power is considerable.

The use of kamikaze drones and suicide vehicles in addition to coordinated infantry assaults demonstrates unprecedented tactical sophistication. The JNIM, formed in 2017 by the merger of several militant groups operating in the Sahel, has significantly expanded its arsenal in recent years. Its ad hoc alliance with the FLA, although the two groups are not formally allied and their objectives fundamentally diverge — one seeking to impose Sharia, the other the territorial independence of Azawad — is nonetheless operationally devastating. In some areas, they coordinate their actions; in others, they operate in parallel against a common enemy, creating unsustainable military pressure on Malian forces already stretched across dispersed fronts.

The broader geopolitical context of this offensive is equally concerning. Since 2022, the Central Sahel countries — Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger — have systematically broken with their Western partners. France was expelled from Mali in 2022, and then from Burkina Faso in 2023. The United States completed its withdrawal from Niger in September 2024, abandoning key drone and intelligence facilities. In December 2025, Bamako and Ouagadougou imposed reciprocal travel bans on American citizens in retaliation for restrictions from the American administration. The three countries withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States to form a trilateral security pact, denouncing the influence of "foreign powers" within the regional organization.

This pivot towards Russia, however, has not produced the expected security results. On the contrary, available data shows a dramatic worsening of violence. Incidents involving Russian paramilitaries in Mali have increased by 81%, with a 65% rise in reported human losses. In July 2024, in Tinzawaten, on the Algerian-Malian border, up to 84 Russian mercenaries and around fifty Malian soldiers had already been killed in a joint ambush by local rebels and jihadist fighters. The April 2026 offensive dramatically confirms this trend: far from stabilizing the country, the Russian presence has coincided with an accelerated deterioration of the security situation, while providing a cover for the worst excesses of the junta against civilian populations.

The regional implications of this crisis are immense. The Sahel has already become, according to several global terrorism indices, the global epicenter of terrorism, concentrating an increasing share of terrorism-related deaths worldwide. Neighboring Nigeria is beginning to fear spillover. Analysts like Mukhtar Ya'u Madobi, a researcher at the Centre for Crisis Communication in Niamey, have called for urgent strengthening of border surveillance, regional cooperation through the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Accra Initiative, and targeted air-ground operations against identified sanctuaries. But the capacity of these mechanisms to contain the expansion of the threat remains uncertain, in a context where the three main countries involved have precisely broken with the partners who could have supported them.

Morocco, for its part, is reported to have considered establishing a military system to conduct airstrikes against groups active in the Sahel, in coordination with the United States and France, according to a recent report on Moroccan military strategy. This perspective, if realized, could introduce a new actor into an already complex theater, but it also underscores the extent of regional concern over the deteriorating situation in Mali. Researcher Niagalé Bagayoko articulated this with striking clarity: what is happening in Mali is not simply a security escalation; it is a redefinition of the geopolitical map of the Sahel.

The offensive of April 25 thus represents a turning point. After years of gradual erosion of state control, the question is no longer whether Mali can regain lost ground, but whether the Malian state, in its current configuration, can survive the convergence of jihadist and separatist threats that are overwhelming it from all sides. The answer will ultimately depend on the junta's ability to rethink its alliances — or to accept that the price of the strategic choice it made in 2022 is now being paid in territory, lives, and sovereignty.