The RSF drones strike 25 energy sites in Sudan — the war enters the power grid in 2026

In Abou Hamad, in the Nile State, a power plant was struck on November 1. In Debba, in the Northern State, another power plant and two fuel depots suffered the same fate. The Sudanese army accuses the Rapid Support Forces (RSF); they have not yet responded. The outcome, however, is confirmed by Sudanese authorities: extensive power outages are affecting the center and north of the country.

This is not just another episode in the war that began in Khartoum on April 15, 2023. Since mid-October, the Sudan Electricity Company claims that more than 25 energy facilities have been attacked. The campaign now targets the infrastructure that allows the Sudanese army to hold its rear, but also enables civilians to live, hospitals to operate, and convoys to supply the front.

A series of attacks, not an isolated incident

The available information remains incomplete. The exact material toll of each strike has not been independently verified, and attribution to the RSF currently relies on the Sudanese army. But the geographical repetition is hard to ignore: power plants, oil pipelines, and fuel stocks are being hit in areas controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces, from the center to the east and north.

The statement from the UN Secretary-General, published on October 31, highlights the human depth of this development. António Guterres condemned the escalation of drone attacks by all parties in Sudan and in the Abyei region. According to the UN, these strikes have killed hundreds of civilians, including women and children, and have targeted civilians as well as critical infrastructure, including medical facilities. The UN describes these attacks as violations of international humanitarian law.

Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between two levels. The claim of a specific strike may remain contested; the transformation of drones into a regular tool of pressure on urban centers and essential services is no longer in dispute. On the ground, this distinction changes little for a hospital deprived of electricity.

Why the power grid has become a military target

The Nile and Northern States are not the most visible contact lines of the war, but they form the strategic depth of the area held by the army. The roads that run up the Nile connect cities, depots, airfields, and crossing points to Egypt. A damaged power plant is not just a technical facility out of order: it slows down communications, reduces water pumping capacity, disrupts workshops, and immobilizes part of the logistics.

Fuel is even more sensitive. The generators of hospitals, trucks, and pumping systems depend on the same reserves. Striking a depot can thus produce cascading effects without the need to conquer a city. This is the logic of a denial campaign: making the territory administratively and militarily costly to hold.

For the RSF, such a campaign also compensates for a classic weakness of irregular forces. There is no need to maintain a brigade on the road between Atbara and Dongola if a few drones can interrupt the power, force convoys to disperse, and compel the army to protect each depot. For the Sudanese Armed Forces, control of the low-altitude airspace becomes a condition for territorial continuity.

The drone changes the economics of war

For three years, both camps have demonstrated that they can employ drones for reconnaissance and strikes. But attacking a fixed energy facility requires less intelligence than reaching a mobile position: its coordinates are known, its schedules predictable, and its vulnerable points identifiable. A relatively inexpensive munition can thus impose long repairs, additional escorts, and accelerated fuel consumption.

The calculation is particularly favorable to the attacker when the defense must cover a dispersed network. A battery or patrol can protect a power plant; it cannot simultaneously cover a high-voltage line, a pumping station, and a depot located several dozen kilometers away. Military maps do not only show positions: they now show the electrical nodes that keep an army in motion.

This dynamic does not mean that the RSF has achieved air superiority. It rather indicates that neither camp yet possesses a sufficiently dense anti-drone defense to secure all critical infrastructures. The war becomes a competition of stocks, sensors, and repairs. Whoever repairs faster can regain operational tempo; whoever spends more interceptors than they can replace will ultimately lose the battle of attrition.

A humanitarian crisis that becomes an operational constraint

The outages in the north and center do not only affect neighborhoods favorable to the army. They interrupt water services, cold chains, telecommunications, and healthcare. In a country already fragmented by population displacements, each outage pushes civilians toward areas still supplied and complicates the work of humanitarian organizations.

The strategic danger for the Sudanese Armed Forces is to hold cities without being able to guarantee their functioning. An army can hold a crossroads with armored vehicles; it cannot sustainably hold an urban area where pumping stations and hospitals stop. The RSF, on its side, must measure the backlash: a campaign that indiscriminately punishes the population can strengthen the army in areas where protection becomes the absolute priority.

The next battle will be one of resilience

The UN's calls for a ceasefire and the protection of civilians remain necessary, but they do not repair a power plant. In the coming weeks, three concrete indicators will need to be monitored: the army's ability to restore power around Abou Hamad and Debba, the emergence of new strikes against oil pipelines and fuel depots, and the potential dispersion of attacks toward the axes connecting the Nile to the Red Sea.

The Sudanese war thus enters a phase where control of a territory is measured by the light that remains on. The 25 facilities reported since mid-October may not yet constitute a fully coordinated strategic campaign; they already bear its signature. If the parties cannot protect the energy nodes, the next offensive will not necessarily begin with an armed column. It may start with a blackout.

Sources

• UN, statement from the Secretary-General on drone attacks in Sudan, October 31, 2026.
• Sudanese Armed Forces and Sudan Electricity Company, information reported on November 1, 2026.
• ACLED, Jihadist groups pose a growing and expanding threat in Africa, for the regional context of the spread of drones and asymmetric attacks.
• Council on Foreign Relations, Violent Extremism in the Sahel, for the comparative context of armed conflicts and the weakening of security partnerships.