PLA Information Support Force Established for Nine Months: The Strategic Logic Behind Technical Integration and Organizational Restructuring

In December 2024, news of President Xi Jinping's inspection of the PLA Information Support Force was quietly released by official media. This newly established force, which has only been in existence for nine months, has taken over some functions of the Strategic Support Force, which was established in 2015 and disbanded in less than ten years. A noteworthy detail is that the official press release referred to it as a "completely new strategic force" rather than the more common term "new type of combat force." This subtle difference in wording reveals the positioning of the Information Support Force—it is not a frontline combat unit but rather the technical support base for the entire PLA combat system.

Why the Strategic Support Force Only Existed for Nine Years

When the Strategic Support Force was established during the military reform in 2015, it was seen as a significant innovation in the organizational structure of the PLA. It integrated capabilities that were originally dispersed among the General Staff and various military branches, including cyber offense and defense, electronic countermeasures, space operations, and psychological warfare. However, just nine years later, this force was split and reorganized—the Cyber Space Force and the Aerospace Force were separated, and the Information Support Force took over the remaining functions.

From an organizational perspective, the problem with the Strategic Support Force was its overly complex functions. A command structure was responsible for offensive cyber warfare, ensuring the stable operation of communication infrastructure, and coordinating space-based intelligence support—these tasks have vastly different natures and rhythms. According to industry insiders, there has been ongoing resource competition between "offensive tasks" and "support and guarantee tasks" within the Strategic Support Force in recent years.

The establishment of the Information Support Force is essentially a functional separation: it strips away offensive tasks (cyber attacks, space confrontations) and focuses on "building, protecting, and utilizing networks"—ensuring that the PLA's command and communication systems can operate normally in any confrontational environment.

Core Capabilities of the Information Support Force from Fiber Optic Repair Exercises

In October 2024, the PLA publicly reported on a relatively low-profile exercise: a unit of the Information Support Force completed rapid field repairs of optical cables under simulated enemy attack conditions. The exercise required the repair team to restore communication links within 15 minutes under multiple threats, including electronic interference, drone reconnaissance, and potential fire strikes.

This exercise revealed the true positioning of the Information Support Force—it is not about attacking the enemy's network but ensuring that its own network remains operational when under attack. Technically, this is more challenging than offensive cyber warfare. Offense can choose weak points to break through, but defense must protect every node.

Notably, the technical details of the exercise included the repair team being equipped with Optical Time Domain Reflectometers (OTDR) for rapid fault location, prefabricated optical cable junction boxes, and drones for route reconnaissance. This configuration of technical equipment indicates that the Information Support Force considered "intelligent repair" from the outset—using sensors and algorithms to predict potential failure points rather than relying on manual inspections.

Military-Civilian Integration to Address Technical Shortcomings

A practical issue facing the Information Support Force is a talent gap. Cybersecurity, big data analysis, artificial intelligence algorithms—these are strengths of civilian technology companies, and the traditional military training system struggles to produce enough technical talent in a short time.

Public reports indicate that starting in 2024, the Information Support Force began to recruit graduates from Tsinghua University, Beihang University, and the National University of Defense Technology, specializing in computer science, communications, and cryptography. Unlike traditional conscription, the service period for these technical personnel is more flexible, and their compensation is aligned with civilian market standards. This is a pragmatic signal— the PLA acknowledges that it cannot fully rely on military academies to cultivate high-end technical talent.

More critically, there is military-civilian integration at the supply chain level. The Information Support Force needs not just individual high-end equipment but also network devices, encryption systems, and situational awareness platforms that can be deployed on a large scale and iterated quickly. The research and production of these systems cannot be separated from private or state-owned telecommunications companies like Huawei, ZTE, and Qihoo 360. It is understood that some companies have already established dedicated departments to meet the needs of the Information Support Force.

Where Are the Technical Bottlenecks in Joint Operations?

During the inspection, Xi Jinping emphasized "cross-service coordination" and "systemic confrontation." These two terms point to the same issue: the PLA's level of informatization is already high, but the data between different military branches has not truly been integrated.

For example: if the Air Force's early warning aircraft detects a target, it needs to notify the Navy's air defense destroyer. This process sounds simple technically, but in practice, it involves different data formats, encryption standards, and communication protocols. Without a unified data platform and standardized interfaces, "cross-domain coordination" can only remain a slogan.

One of the important tasks of the Information Support Force is to build this "data bridge between services." According to reports from the PLA Daily, the force is advancing the construction of an "integrated command platform," aiming to allow real-time sharing of situational information among various military branches. However, this involves the transformation of existing systems in each branch, which presents significant resistance—no military branch is willing to hand over its core systems to a newly established force for unified planning.

Unresolved Issues

The rapid establishment of the Information Support Force demonstrates the PLA's determination for organizational reform, but it also leaves many questions. One of the most critical is: what is the boundary between it and the Cyber Space Force?

According to official statements, the Cyber Space Force is responsible for "offensive cyber operations," while the Information Support Force is responsible for "network infrastructure support." However, in actual combat, offense and defense are often intertwined—you must ensure your own command system is not attacked before you can attack the enemy's command system; to defend against network intrusions, you must understand the enemy's attack methods. How to delineate this functional gray area will directly affect the collaborative efficiency of the two forces.

Another issue worth noting is the speed of technological iteration. The update cycle for information technology is measured in months, but the military's equipment procurement and deployment processes often take years. By the time a network security system completes project approval, testing, and deployment, the threats it was designed to counter may already be outdated. Whether the Information Support Force can establish a more flexible technology update mechanism will be a key indicator of its combat effectiveness.

From publicly available information, the Information Support Force is still in the early stages of capability building. Whether it can truly become the "nerve center" of the PLA's joint operations remains to be seen.