U.S. Military Establishes Army Rotational Force in the Philippines to Maintain Typhon Deployment; Ground-Based Mid-Range Missile Competition Enters New Phase

On January 29, the U.S. Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS) released a set of photos showing the U.S. Army's Army Rotational Force-Philippines engaging with the Marine Corps locally. This seemingly ordinary news actually marks an important turning point: the U.S. military has established an army rotation mechanism in the Philippines for the first time, aimed at maintaining the continuous deployment of the Typhon mid-range missile system.

This system was first deployed to Luzon Island in the Philippines in April 2024, originally intended for exercises, but subsequently, both the U.S. and Philippine sides decided to retain it indefinitely. By early 2026, the U.S. Army will finally transition from "temporary assignment" to "permanent rotation," and the information behind this shift is worth careful analysis.

True Capabilities of the Typhon System

The full name of Typhon is the Strategic Mid-range Fires System (SMRF), which essentially relocates the Navy's Mark 41 Vertical Launch System to land. Each system includes four launch units housed in a module the size of a 40-foot shipping container, capable of launching two types of missiles:

SM-6 Standard Missile: With a range of approximately 370 kilometers, it was originally a naval air defense missile, later modified into an anti-ship variant. The 64-kilogram warhead poses limited threats to large surface vessels but is sufficient for destroyer-class targets.

Tactical Tomahawk Missile: With a range of about 1600 kilometers, it is a classic cruise missile of the U.S. Navy. The Army version is known as the Tactical Tomahawk, and its actual performance is not fundamentally different from the Navy version.

Launched from northern Luzon Island, the SM-6 can cover the entire Luzon Strait, while the Tomahawk missile can reach much of the southeastern coast of China and the South China Sea. In the words of the U.S. military, "it can reach all PLA bases in the South China Sea."

Production Capacity is Key

Interestingly, both types of missiles used by Typhon are naval equipment. The SM-6 is produced by Raytheon at the Huntsville Redstone Arsenal, with over 330 units delivered by 2017, and production is ongoing. The annual production of the Tomahawk missile is around 150-200 units, most of which supply the Navy.

Now that the Army wants a piece of the pie, problems arise.

According to the U.S. Army's plan, each Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) is equipped with at least one Typhon battalion, with each battalion containing four launch systems. It is known that the 1st MDTF is equipped with two battalions (a total of 8 launch systems), comprising 32 launch units. The fiscal year 2025 budget indicates that the Army plans to procure 32 Tactical Tomahawks and associated Mk 14 launch tubes, in addition to equipping a new battalion.

If the U.S. military plans to deploy Typhon in Germany, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, at least 4-6 battalions will be needed. If each battalion is equipped with 32 missiles as an initial stock, that amounts to 128-192 missiles. This does not account for replenishment and wartime consumption.

Can Raytheon's SM-6 production line simultaneously meet the Navy's fleet air defense and the Army's mid-range strike needs? This is a question worth doubting.

Asymmetry in Ground-Based Mid-Range Missiles Between China and the U.S.

Even more interesting is the comparison that the PLA has been cultivating its ground-based mid-range missile capabilities for decades, while the U.S. is essentially starting anew.

After the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987, the U.S. destroyed all ground-based missiles with ranges of 500-5500 kilometers, including the BGM-109G Gryphon (the land-based version of the Tomahawk) and the Pershing II. China never signed this treaty, and models like the DF-21 and DF-26 have continued to develop, forming a complete ground-based mid-range strike system.

It wasn't until the U.S. withdrew from the treaty in 2019 that the Army began developing the Typhon and Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW). However, the development progress of the LRHW has lagged far behind schedule, and Typhon is essentially an emergency solution to "landify" existing naval equipment.

From this perspective, the rapid deployment of Typhon is more a political gesture than a result of technological maturity. Using a container-based mobile launch system equipped with naval missiles sends a message to allies: "We have the capability to deploy mid-range strike forces in the first island chain"—this signal is more important than the operational effectiveness of the system itself.

Why the Philippines is Willing to be a "Forward Post"

In December 2024, the Philippines announced plans to procure the Typhon system, becoming the first potential user outside the U.S. The logic behind this decision is clear: if the situation in the South China Sea deteriorates, the Philippines needs a long-range strike capability to deter PLA surface vessels.

However, the problem is that the Philippine Army is still in the training phase for basic maintenance and operational capabilities. During the exercises from April to September 2024, Philippine soldiers only learned how to "handle and maintain" the Typhon system and did not conduct live-fire launches. To truly form combat capability, a complete command and control, target detection, and ammunition support system needs to be established.

In simple terms, the Philippines is currently procuring Typhon more to exchange for U.S. security commitments and technology transfers rather than expecting this system to immediately change the balance of power in the South China Sea.

The Real Game is in the Supply Chain

Returning to the core question: Can the U.S. maintain multiple Typhon deployment points simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East?

In July 2024, a joint U.S.-German statement announced the deployment of Typhon in Germany starting in 2026. In September, the U.S. Army Secretary revealed during a visit to Japan that discussions were underway regarding the deployment of MDTFs (including Typhon) in Japan. In July 2025, the German Defense Minister announced that a procurement request had been submitted to the U.S. government.

Including the Philippines, Australia (which sank a maritime target using the SM-6 in the Northern Territory in July 2025), and the potential deployment in Japan, the U.S. military needs to maintain at least 5-6 Typhon deployment points. If each point is configured with two battalions, that amounts to 10-12 battalions and 40-48 launch systems.

This means an initial stock of at least 160-192 launch units is needed, along with ongoing ammunition replenishment. Can Raytheon's SM-6 and Tomahawk missile production lines support this scale while meeting Navy demands?

A detail that is easily overlooked is that the Mk 41 launch tubes and missiles used by Typhon are standard naval equipment, and maintenance requires naval technical support. This land-based system is highly dependent on the Navy's supply chain and support system, while the Navy's own fleet expansion plans (especially the DDGX new destroyer project) are also competing for the same resources.

Conclusion

The establishment of rotational deployments by the U.S. Army in the Philippines marks the transition of Typhon from "exercise equipment" to "permanent force." However, what truly deserves attention is not the technical performance of this system itself, but whether the U.S. can establish a supply chain and support system to sustain multi-point deployments.

Given that the PLA already possesses a mature DF series missile system, how long can the U.S. military's ground-based mid-range strike capability, pieced together with naval missiles, be sustained? This question may only be answered after the first real consumptive conflict.