Titao demonstrates the formidable effectiveness of Burkinabé VDP against jihadist groups

On February 14, in Titao, Loroum province in northern Burkina Faso, the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) repelled a jihadist attack in just a few minutes with the decisive support of the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). The enemy suffered heavy losses — several dozen fighters neutralized — and government forces recovered significant military equipment, including light weapons and motorcycles.

This success illustrates the rise of a hybrid defense model that Captain Ibrahim Traoré, in power since September 2022, has systematized throughout the country.

VDP — the citizen militia at the heart of the system

The VDP, officially created in 2020 but massively developed under Traoré, are an auxiliary force composed of armed civilian volunteers who are trained briefly by the regular army. Their mission: to defend their villages against jihadist incursions from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS).

In Titao, a strategic town located about 50 kilometers from the Malian border, the local VDP know the terrain better than anyone else. They identify infiltration routes, monitor suspicious movements, and serve as the first line of defense before the intervention of the FDS.

• Estimated strength: over 50,000 VDP across Burkina Faso
• Armament: AK-47 assault rifles, ammunition supplied by the state
• Training: 2 to 4 week courses provided by the FDS
• Compensation: approximately 50,000 CFA francs per month (about 75 euros)

This decentralized structure allows for a responsiveness that the regular army, deployed over a vast and poorly controlled territory, cannot offer alone.

The post-Barkhane syndrome and forced empowerment

Since the withdrawal of the French Barkhane operation in 2022-2023, the Sahel states — Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso — have been forced to rethink their defense. Burkina has chosen the path of massive popular mobilization, drawing inspiration from the Malian model of Dozo self-defense groups, but with a more formal integration into the state apparatus.

In Titao and elsewhere, this strategy has produced undeniable tactical results. The jihadists, accustomed to operating in areas where military presence is rare or predictable, now face a permanent and unpredictable local resistance.

"The VDP are changing the game on the ground. They do not replace the army, but they fill the territorial void that even Barkhane never managed to control."

However, this model carries structural risks that the victory in Titao cannot mask.

Systemic flaws — ethnic tensions and documented abuses

In several regions, particularly in the North and Center-North, the VDP are accused of systematically targeting Fulani communities, suspected of collaborating with jihadists. In Titao itself, reports from humanitarian organizations indicate that the Fulani are deliberately excluded from VDP recruitment, creating a dangerous community fracture.

Abuses are not limited to discrimination. Summary executions, looting, and reprisals against civilian populations have been documented by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the International Crisis Group. In 2024, violence attributed to the VDP caused more civilian deaths than jihadist attacks in certain provinces.

This drift is partly due to insufficient training and the absence of effective control mechanisms. The VDP often operate without direct military supervision, which opens the door to local vendettas under the guise of counter-terrorism.

A precarious balance between effectiveness and social cohesion

The victory in Titao shows that the VDP model can work tactically. But the war against jihadism in the Sahel cannot be won solely through successful ambushes. It requires preserving social cohesion and not turning entire ethnic groups into internal enemies.

Captain Traoré is betting on patriotic mobilization to compensate for the lack of reliable foreign military partners. This strategy has produced short-term gains — Titao is an example — but the question remains: how long can this system hold without descending into a community civil war disguised as counter-terrorism?

On the ground, the Burkinabé FDS know that every tactical victory like that of Titao must be consolidated by a lasting presence and inclusive governance. Otherwise, the jihadists will return, not because they are militarily stronger, but because local populations will have no reason to fight them.

From experience, I know that an effective militia today can become a security problem tomorrow if it is not properly managed. The Sahel has already paid the price for this lesson — in Mali, the Central African Republic, Nigeria. Burkina Faso would do well not to forget it.