Washington Returns to Bamako: The New American Strategy in the Sahel Challenges Russian Influence

On February 3, Nick Checker, head of the African Affairs Bureau at the U.S. State Department, landed in Bamako. No media fanfare, no official joint statement. Just a handshake with Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop and two priorities on the table: counter-terrorism security cooperation and economic relations.

It’s discreet. It’s calculated. And it’s a major turning point in Sahelian geopolitics.

No More Democratic Sermons

Washington is abandoning the rhetoric that has failed for years. No more conditions on democracy, human rights, or electoral timelines. The State Department's statement speaks of "respect for Mali's sovereignty" and a willingness to "move beyond past political mistakes."

Translation: we recognize that our Biden strategy has only served to push you into the arms of Moscow.

This new approach also extends to Burkina Faso and Niger, the other two members of the Sahel States Alliance (AES). The three countries broke with France between 2020 and 2023, expelled Western forces, and signed contracts with the Russian African Corps (formerly Wagner). Washington had cut all military cooperation after the coups. Today, the Americans are returning without demanding a democratic roadmap.

Massad Boulos, senior advisor for Africa at the State Department, made it clear to the newspaper Le Monde last year: "Democracy is still appreciated, but our policy is not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries."

Lithium, Gold, and Uranium Against Terrorism

The new American policy is called "trade, not aid." Donald Trump dismantled USAID as soon as he returned to power in January 2025. Development assistance? Over. Governance programs? Forgotten.

What interests Washington today are strategic minerals and the jihadist threat.

Mali produces gold in large quantities and lithium (essential for rechargeable batteries). Niger has vast uranium reserves – the junta has just nationalized the main mine, formerly operated by the French company Orano, and is now negotiating with Russia. Burkina Faso, on the other hand, is rich in gold.

Meanwhile, jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda (JNIM) and the Islamic State (ISGS) control vast portions of territory in the "three borders" area where Mali, Burkina, and Niger converge. According to some assessments, the Sahel now accounts for half of the terrorism-related deaths worldwide.

Western diplomats now refer to the Sahel as "the global epicenter of terrorism."

Intelligence Sharing and Weapons, No Boots on the Ground

General John Brennan, deputy commander of Africom (the U.S. Command for Africa), confirmed in January that Washington is already sharing intelligence with the three AES countries to target key jihadist leaders.

"We have actually shared information with some of them to attack key terrorist targets," he told AFP.

"We are still talking to our military partners across the Sahel states, even if it’s not official."

Weapons could follow. But no American troops on the ground. Trump promised his electoral base to end "endless wars" abroad. The large drone base that the U.S. had built in Agadez, Niger – where 800 American military personnel were stationed – will not be reopened. The junta closed it after the Biden administration insisted on a democratic transition.

This time, Washington is not demanding anything like that.

Countering Moscow Without Fighting It

About 1,000 contractors from the Russian African Corps are operating in Mali, with smaller contingents in Burkina Faso and Niger. They are there to support local armies against jihadists, but their record is mixed. Terrorist attacks continue to multiply, and accusations of human rights violations against the Russians are piling up – particularly in Mali.

The juntas are beginning to show signs of frustration. The military effectiveness promised by Moscow has yet to materialize.

This is where Washington sees an opening. Not to demand the expulsion of the Russians – the Trump administration does not view their presence as a threat – but to offer a complementary alternative. According to a Malian diplomat quoted anonymously by RFI, Checker came to "make a service offer to the AES countries to see under what conditions the United States can get involved in the fight against jihadists in the Sahel."

Two conditions are said to have been set: a return to constitutional order and the end of the contract with the African Corps.

Bamako has not officially confirmed these demands. But even if they exist, they are framed as a commercial negotiation, not as a moral ultimatum.

France, the Big Loser?

While Washington adjusts its strategy, Paris remains marginalized. Operation Barkhane, which lasted a decade and mobilized up to 5,000 French soldiers, ended in 2022 with a humiliating evacuation. The three AES countries severed all military ties with France, which is accused of neo-colonialism.

Captain Ibrahim Traoré, leader of the Burkinabé junta, has positioned himself as a standard-bearer of anti-Western pan-Africanism. His message resonates massively with young people across the continent, amplified by social media.

The new American approach – pragmatic, transactional, devoid of moralism – could succeed where Paris has failed. But it also raises a question I have been pondering since my return from the field: can a counter-insurgency war be won solely with intelligence and weapons, without addressing the socio-economic roots of instability?

The answer is probably no. But Washington seems ready to try, and the Sahelian juntas have few options.

What Will Happen Now

If discussions progress, one can expect a gradual resumption of American military cooperation with the AES – targeted training, deliveries of light weapons, surveillance drones. No massive return, but a sufficient presence to hinder Moscow and protect American mining interests.

The jihadists, meanwhile, continue to expand. The JNIM has just struck central Nigeria (Kwara State, over 160 dead in early February). The ISGS maintains its pressure in the Lake Chad region. Mali is losing dozens of soldiers each month in ambushes.

The question remains: who, between Washington and Moscow, can truly help these states regain control of their territory?

For now, no one has the answer.