Why the NATO Command Transfer to Europe Does Not End Strategic Dependence

Three of NATO's most important operational commands – Norfolk, Naples, and Brunssum – will be led by European officers in the coming years. The alliance announced this last week as part of a "fairer burden-sharing." The United Kingdom will take over Norfolk, Italy will take Naples, and Germany and Poland will share the leadership in Brunssum on a rotating basis. A historic turning point? At first glance, yes. But a closer look reveals that this command transfer is less a testament to European autonomy and more a well-staged concealment of structural deficiencies.

The Arithmetic of Responsibility

Approximately 80,000 to 90,000 U.S. soldiers are currently stationed in Europe – the highest number since the Cold War. That Undersecretary Elbridge Colby will assure the majority of these troops at the NATO defense ministers' meeting on Thursday sounds reassuring at first. However, Colby is no friend of Europe. He is considered a hardliner who has been advocating for the relocation of American forces to the Indo-Pacific region for years. His commitment is therefore not a strategic shift, but at best a tactical postponement.

The calculation is simple: If Europe takes over the operational commands but continues to rely on American troops, intelligence, logistics, and nuclear assurance, then nothing has changed regarding dependence. What has changed is the symbolic level – and that is quite attractive for Washington. Because the Trump administration can now claim that Europe is taking "more responsibility" without the U.S. having to relinquish its strategic control. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) remains American. The three functional commands – Navy, Army, Air Force – are all led by the U.S. And the decision-making authority over nuclear deterrence lies in Washington anyway.

Command Structures Without Substance

The three Joint Force Commands (JFC Norfolk, Naples, Brunssum) are responsible for operational leadership in crises. Norfolk focuses on the Atlantic and the Arctic, Naples on the southern flank, and Brunssum on the central and eastern front. However, operational leadership presupposes that one also has the means to implement decisions. And here lies the problem: Europe lacks both satellite-based intelligence and strategic airlift capacity to conduct larger operations without American support.

Germany, which is supposed to take over Brunssum along with Poland, has increased its defense spending in recent years. However, the Bundeswehr still suffers from chronic procurement problems, inadequate spare parts supply, and a personnel structure that is only partially suitable for territorial defense. Poland, on the other hand, is investing heavily in modern weapon systems – primarily from the U.S. and South Korea. Both countries are therefore far from forming a European counterweight to American military power.

Italy, which is taking over Naples, is in a similar situation. Rome nominally spends more than two percent of GDP on defense (as recently achieved through statistical reclassification), but the actual readiness of the Italian armed forces remains limited. The armed forces are chronically underfunded, and investments tend to flow into prestigious projects rather than operational sustainability.

The Colby Paradox

That Colby – and not Defense Minister Pete Hegseth – is appearing at the NATO meeting is telling. Hegseth is missing for the first time since taking office at a NATO defense ministers' meeting. The message is clear: Europe is no longer Washington's top priority. Colby holds the position that Europe must take over its conventional defense so that the U.S. can focus on China. Yet his commitment to keep most troops in Germany, Italy, and on the eastern flank contradicts this logic.

So why the commitment? The answer lies in the political economy of deterrence. A sudden troop withdrawal would send the signal that the U.S. is abandoning European security – and that could encourage Putin to further aggression. At the same time, it would jeopardize the already fragile cohesion of NATO. Colby's commitment is therefore a compromise: the troops will remain for now, but the structural preparation for a withdrawal has already begun. The command transfer is part of this preparation.

Symbolic Politics Instead of Strategic Change

What NATO sells as "fair burden-sharing" is, in truth, a redistribution of responsibility without corresponding power resources. Europe takes over the commands but not the capabilities necessary to actually bear this responsibility. The result is a hybrid structure: European flags over American foundations.

This would be less problematic if Europe were simultaneously massively expanding its own capacities. But little of that is in sight. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has a budget of 343 million euros – a fraction of what would be needed for genuine industrial consolidation. PESCO projects are progressing slowly and without clear prioritization. And the EU Commission is pursuing an industrial policy that systematically excludes non-European NATO partners (the UK, U.S., Turkey) – further weakening transatlantic cooperation instead of strengthening European autonomy.

The Lesson from Norfolk

The command in Norfolk, which is now being transferred to the United Kingdom, is NATO's newest operational headquarters and focuses on protecting transatlantic connections and the Arctic. It is located on an American naval base that remains under U.S. control. A British officer will therefore use American infrastructure to plan operations that ultimately depend on American satellites, American logistics, and American ships.

This is not a criticism of the United Kingdom. It is a description of reality. And this reality shows: Command structures are only as valuable as the means they can access. As long as Europe is unable to independently ensure strategic intelligence, air defense, and nuclear deterrence, dependence on the U.S. will persist – regardless of whose flag flies over the headquarters.

A Way Out?

The command transfer could be a first step – if Europe sees it as a wake-up call. But for that, the political class would have to accept three uncomfortable truths: First, higher defense spending alone does not create capabilities if the structures remain inefficient. Second, European defense autonomy requires painful concessions of sovereignty to supranational institutions. Third, the time for gradual reforms is running out.

Instead, we are witnessing symbolic politics. Germany, Poland, and Italy are taking over commands that they cannot effectively lead without American support. The U.S. is not withdrawing but shifting responsibility – and retaining power. And Europe is lulled into the illusion that flag changes and press releases mean strategic autonomy. They do not.