Why Germany's E6 Initiative Will Not Solve Europe's Defense Problems

Germany plans to spend around 83 billion euros on the Bundeswehr in 2026 — over 20 billion more than the previous year. At the same time, a simulation by Die Welt showed that Russia could dominate the Baltic states with just 15,000 soldiers if NATO hesitates. This paradox — more money, less security — is at the heart of the Berlin initiative for a "two-speed Europe."

The E6 Format as an Institutional Escape Forward

At the end of January 2026, Federal Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil, together with his French counterpart, initiated a video conference of the six largest EU economies. The so-called E6 format — Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and the Netherlands — is intended to cover four areas: defense investments, a savings and investment union, strengthening the euro, and securing critical resources.

"The time has come for a two-speed Europe," Klingbeil stated. What he means is that the larger countries should be able to move forward without having to wait for the consensus of all 27 member states. For defense decisions, which usually take years, this sounds tempting.

But is that enough?

The Structural Problems Remain

The E6 format addresses a symptom, not the cause. The slowness of European defense decisions is not primarily due to the number of veto players, but rather to fundamental divergences in interests. France wants European strategic autonomy — under French leadership. Germany wavers between transatlantic loyalty and European ambition. Italy under Meloni prioritizes bilateral deals. And Poland distrusts any format that gives Berlin and Paris too much weight.

The German-Italian protocol, which Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni signed one day before the E6 video conference, illustrates this dynamic. It promises cooperation on integrated air and missile defense, unmanned systems, and electronic warfare. Similar declarations of intent already exist with Poland. But declarations of intent are not tanks.

The Gap Between Ambition and Reality

Merz announced at the World Economic Forum in Davos that Germany intends to spend 5% of GDP on defense in the coming years. According to data from the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW), Germany is expected to be at 3.56% by 2029 — in 2026, it will be 2.83%. These figures sound impressive until one asks: What will the money be spent on?

The special fund of 100 billion euros, which was announced with great pathos in 2022, has not resolved the structural deficits of the Bundeswehr. Procurement processes remain slow. The industry cannot deliver quickly enough. And the political class has no coherent idea of what capabilities Germany actually needs.

The Baltic Test Case Problem

The simulation by Die Welt is sobering: In the event of a Russian attack on Lithuania — even with just 15,000 soldiers and using "gray zone" tactics — NATO could respond "dangerously slowly and disorganized." The problem is not a lack of money. Germany is sending additional troops to Lithuania in April. The question is whether European forces are even interoperable enough to fight together.

An E6 format changes nothing about that. It cannot create a common command structure, enforce uniform procurement standards, or overcome political paralysis in times of crisis. It is an institutional fig leaf for a problem that runs deeper.

The Real Question

Europe is spending more money on defense than ever before since the Cold War. And yet, the continent feels less secure. This is not due to a lack of formats or too many veto players. It stems from a fundamental inability to set hard strategic priorities.

Does Germany want to take on a European leadership role? Then Berlin must be willing to act in a crisis without American reassurance. Does France want European autonomy? Then Paris must stop protecting its own defense industry from European partners. Does Poland want to get serious about defense? Then Warsaw must accept that the front does not only lie in the east.

The E6 format will not answer these questions. It will only circumvent them in a smaller circle. And when the next crisis comes — whether in Ukraine, the Baltics, or elsewhere — it will become clear that institutional innovation is no substitute for strategic clarity.

Europe does not have a format problem. It has a leadership problem. And that cannot be solved with video conferences.