690 Targets Over Kyiv — “Oreshnik” Turns Russian Doctrine of Intimidation into a Logistics Operation

The most important figure in the night strike on May 24 is not just one “Oreshnik,” but 690 aerial targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported 90 missiles of various types and 600 drones; Associated Press, citing the same data, indicated that 549 drones and 55 missiles were destroyed or suppressed, while about 19 missiles did not reach their targets. In Russian military culture, rare weapons are usually turned into symbols. But in this case, the symbol only works within a much more prosaic machine: the accumulation of drones, preparation of carriers, routing, deployment of decoys, and political authorization from above.

“Oreshnik” as a Signal, Not a Wonder Weapon

According to Ukrainian data, the medium-range missile “Oreshnik” struck the area of Bila Tserkva in Kyiv Oblast. Reuters and AP note that this is only the third known use of the system during the full-scale war; TASS, citing the Russian Ministry of Defense, confirmed the use of “Oreshnik” alongside “Iskanders,” “Dagger,” “Zircon,” and drones, naming military command points, air bases, and defense industry enterprises as targets. This formula is familiar: official messages always describe the strike as surgical, even if the geography of destruction passes through residential areas, schools, markets, and diplomatic sites.

The technical function of “Oreshnik” in such a strike is not limited to the destruction of a specific building. Conventional air defense systems are poorly adapted to intercept maneuvering warheads of medium-range missiles, especially if their appearance is preceded by hundreds of cheap targets. Therefore, “Oreshnik” here acts as a heavy hammer, but a hammer raised after the enemy has already been forced to expend interceptor missiles, reveal radars, and distribute fire among Shahed drones, Gerbera, “Italmas,” decoys, and cruise missiles. In Soviet terminology, this is closer not to “retribution,” but to an operation to expose the air defense system.

Logistics of Mass Strikes

Le Monde, citing Ukrainian air defense representatives and military experts, described the preparation for such strikes as the work of tens of thousands of people: strategic aviation, the Black Sea Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla, missile troops, drone crews, and units servicing launch systems. According to this assessment, Russian industry produces about 130 strike drones per day and a comparable number of false Gerbera, while accumulating a package of 500 drones takes about a week. The missile direction shows more modest but important rates: about one 3M14 “Kalibr” per day, two to three X-101s, and two to three 9M723 “Iskanders.”

These figures should be read cautiously. In wartime, each side inflates the accuracy of its estimates, and the Western press sometimes turns approximate intelligence data into accounting. But the order of magnitude is plausible. It explains why mass strikes come in waves rather than daily: Russia can maintain a constant background of 100–200 drones, but cannot launch a package of 600 UAVs and 90 missiles every night without a pause for assembly, transportation, loading, and preparation of carriers. Even an authoritarian system does not eliminate the railway, warehouse, maintenance regulations, and wear on pylons of old Tu-95MS. War, as one of my old professors liked to repeat, is won not by beautiful schemes in the General Staff, but by those who found a working tractor in the morning.

Why Kyiv Remains the Main Target

The choice of Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast is not accidental. A strike on the capital simultaneously solves three tasks: it forces Ukraine to concentrate its best air defense resources around the political center, demonstrates to the Russian audience the ability to “reach out,” and sends a signal to the West about the cost of further support. After the May nuclear exercises of Russia and Belarus, which Reuters reported on May 21, the use of “Oreshnik” takes on additional meaning. Moscow connects a conventional strike with a nuclear shadow: formally, it concerns a conventional warhead, politically — a reminder that the carrier can be different.

It is important not to succumb to a primitive interpretation. This does not mean that Russia is preparing for a nuclear strike on Ukraine or NATO. The Russian doctrine is more complex and cynical: the nuclear hint is used to protect a conventional operation. The louder the word “Oreshnik” sounds, the more cautious Western governments discuss the depth of strikes on Russian territory, the supply of long-range systems, and the expansion of air defense zones. The Kremlin is not so much increasing the likelihood of nuclear use as trying to raise the political cost of any decision that hinders it from conducting a conventional war.

The Economics of Air Defense Depletion

The main military problem for Ukraine is not the fact of a single breakthrough, but the arithmetic of interception. If a significant part of the 690 targets is destroyed or suppressed, it shows the high resilience of Ukrainian air defense. But resilience costs money. One Shahed or false Gerbera is cheaper than a PAC-3, NASAMS, or IRIS-T missile, while ballistic “Iskanders” and “Dagger” require the most expensive and scarce interceptors. Le Monde cites an estimate from Defense Express editor Oleg Katkov: Russian production of “Iskanders” may reach 60 per month, while American production of PAC-3 is about 56 per month, with one complex ballistic object often requiring two missiles. Even if these figures are not accurate to the unit, the logic is unpleasant for Kyiv.

Therefore, the Russian bet is not on the complete destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure in one night. Such a goal is unattainable. The bet is on forcing Ukraine to expend ammunition faster than the West can replenish it, and gradually expanding the “windows” for ballistic strikes. This is a classic strategy of attrition, only transferred from the artillery duel of 1916 to the air-missile environment of 2026. The difference is that now the expenditure is measured not in 152 mm shells, but in millions of dollars for a single launch button.

What Has Changed for the Russian Doctrine

After 2022, the Russian army underwent a painful evolution from hope for a quick maneuver to an industrial war of attrition. The strikes of May 24 show the next phase: the integration of cheap drone masses, rare hypersonic and ballistic means, as well as informational support into a single campaign of pressure. This is no longer the improvisation of the first months of the war and not a pure missile campaign of winter 2022–2023 against energy. This is a regular procedure: accumulate, scout, overload, strike, announce the defeat of “military objects,” then repeat after a production pause.

The weak point of this procedure is also visible. A mass strike requires predictable preparation, which means it leaves traces: movement of aircraft, ships, launchers, loading of missiles, activity of airfields and ranges. Ukrainian and Western intelligence systems increasingly see the approach of such attacks days in advance. This does not negate the damage, but reduces the effect of surprise. The Russian system, like the late Soviet military machine, is strong in repeatable large-scale operations but poorly conceals their bureaucratic traces.

Forecast

In the coming months, Russia is likely to continue using “Oreshnik” rarely, not as an ordinary missile, but as a political amplifier for the largest strikes. The bulk of the pressure will remain with drones, “Iskanders,” X-101s, “Kalibrs,” and decoys. For Ukraine, it will be crucial not only to receive additional Patriots or SAMP/T but also to create a cheaper layer of interception against drones and decoys; otherwise, expensive air defense will be fighting against Russian cost-effectiveness on terms favorable to Moscow.

The Russian strategy does not guarantee victory. It guarantees the continuation of the war in a form where industrial discipline and political readiness to expend resources become no less important than the quality of weapons. “Oreshnik” intimidates with its name, but the real danger lies elsewhere: Russia has learned to turn rare weapons into part of a serial logistics operation. This is less spectacular than the television graphics of the Ministry of Defense, but much more serious.

Sources

• Associated Press, May 24, 2026 — data on 600 drones, 90 missiles, the use of “Oreshnik,” and the consequences of the strike on Kyiv.
• Reuters, May 24, 2026 — confirmation of the third known use of “Oreshnik” and the strike on Bila Tserkva.
• Le Monde, May 25, 2026 — analysis of the logistics of mass Russian strikes and assessments of drone and missile production.
• TASS, May 24, 2026 — position of the Russian Ministry of Defense on the targets of the strike and the systems used.
• Ukrainian Truth and Babel, May 24, 2026 — detailing the report of the Ukrainian Air Force on 690 aerial targets.