China's Navy 052D Kaifeng Conducts First Shooting in the EEZ Off Okinotorishima, Presenting New Challenges for Japan and the U.S.

A brief radio report received by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's destroyer "Samidare" well illustrates the nature of this incident. On July 19, the Chinese Navy's 052D-class missile destroyer "Kaifeng" conducted machine gun fire approximately 180 kilometers southwest of Okinotorishima. According to the Joint Staff Office of the Ministry of Defense, this is the first time the government has publicly announced shooting exercises by foreign warships within Japan's exclusive economic zone.

Identified Vessels and Tracks

According to the Joint Staff Office's materials, around 2 a.m. on the same day, vessels believed to be the Chinese Navy's 055-class destroyer "Anshan," 052D-class destroyer "Kaifeng," 903A-class supply ship "Kekexili Lake," and the Russian Navy's Steregushchiy-class frigate "Lazarev" were advancing northeast about 330 kilometers southwest of Okinotorishima. These vessels had been moving south between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island on July 16, consistent with the flow of the Chinese side moving to joint navigation in the Pacific after the Sino-Russian "Maritime Joint 2026" exercise in the Yellow Sea.

Stars and Stripes reported that Kaifeng fired machine guns at a target in waters approximately 110 miles southwest of Okinotorishima. The Diplomat also reported that Kaifeng communicated its position and time to surrounding vessels via radio, and that this communication was confirmed by "Samidare." The shooting itself occurred outside the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, and the Japanese government has not determined it to be a violation of international law. This point needs to be kept in mind calmly.

Significance of the 052D Kaifeng

The 052D class is the main air defense destroyer of the Chinese Navy, equipped with vertical launch systems, phased array radar, and fleet air defense capabilities. The weapon used this time was a machine gun, not missile fire. However, considering the ship's capabilities, it is more important to note that this incident confirmed not just small arms training, but also shooting safety management in the open sea, continued operations accompanied by supply ships, and maintenance of formation with Russian vessels.

In my view, the core of this incident is not just whether they fired in Japan's EEZ. While China demands strong restrictions on foreign military activities in the South China Sea, it broadly asserts freedom of navigation and training around Okinotorishima. Beijing positions Okinotorishima as a rock rather than an island under Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and does not recognize Japan's EEZ claims. This dual legal stance will likely continue to complicate Japan's responses.

Operational Implications for the Japan-U.S. Alliance

This time, the Sino-Russian force consisted of a small formation of two large combat ships, one supply ship, and one Russian frigate. However, when combined with the Ministry of Defense's understanding that more than 15 Sino-Russian vessels passed through key points around Japan from June to July, this incident is not just a point but a line. The surveillance burden connecting the Miyako Strait, Osumi Strait, Tsushima Strait, and Soya Strait will weigh on the JMSDF's patrol aircraft, escort ships, and ground radar.

For the U.S. Navy, this is a sign that China and Russia are synchronizing their operational rhythms outside the first island chain. The Indo-Pacific Command tends to speak of deterrence with the presence of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, but peacetime vigilance and monitoring are finely supported by Japan's vessels and aircraft. The task of protecting sea lines of communication, or SLOC, relies more on the accumulation of such routine tracking and reporting than on a single strike in times of crisis.

Responses Tokyo Should Avoid

The Japanese government's protest is valid in that it cites safety concerns. Allowing fishing boats and commercial vessels to avoid live-fire areas with only brief radio notifications is not a desirable practice. On the other hand, if Japan steps into the logic of viewing foreign military activities within its EEZ as illegal, it risks undermining the principles of freedom of navigation that Japan and the U.S. have sought to uphold in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.

The issue is not a legal victory or defeat, but that China and Russia are gradually raising the risk tolerance around Japan under the guise of "normal training."

We should not rush to conclusions. The machine gun fire from Kaifeng is not an incident that changes the strategic environment on its own. However, the overlapping of the Chinese fleet accompanied by supply ships, joint navigation with Russian vessels, and legal challenges surrounding Okinotorishima all coincide on the same track. The truly concerning blind spot is not that the JMSDF loses sight of the vessels, but that the government has not yet sufficiently organized warning standards for actions that are "dangerous but not illegal."