Defense White Paper 2026 Warns of China's Pacific Military Expansion as the "Greatest Strategic Challenge" with a Record 598 Pages

On August 4, the government approved the 2026 edition of the Defense White Paper, which has reached a record volume of 598 pages. Considering that the white paper from ten years ago was about 480 pages, it can be said that the rapid deterioration of Japan's security environment is reflected in the length of the document itself.

The cover features an anime-style illustration, but the content is extremely serious. The characterization of China as "the greatest strategic challenge ever" has been carried over from the 2022 National Security Strategy, but this year's white paper particularly emphasizes the reality that the operational range of the Chinese military is expanding into the Pacific beyond the First Island Chain.

“Establishment of Facts” in the First Island Chain

The white paper uses a more assertive expression regarding the activities of the Chinese military, stating that they are intended not merely for capability enhancement training but for "building facts on the ground (fait accompli)." The repeated joint activities of the Chinese military in the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific beyond the First Island Chain are explicitly noted as "clearly demonstrative activities against Japan and a significant concern for our national security."

Specifically, it highlights the deployment of the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" east of Iwo Jima in June 2025 and the subsequent first operation of an aircraft carrier beyond the Second Island Chain. A new graphic section illustrating the fact that the operational range of the Chinese Navy extends to the Guam and Saipan areas has been added. It also mentions an incident where Chinese military aircraft repeatedly illuminated Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol aircraft with lasers for about 30 minutes over the Pacific east of Okinawa.

What caught my attention is that this year's white paper steps beyond merely listing "threats" and attempts to systematically categorize China's patterns of behavior. This reflects a deepening recognition within the Ministry of Defense of the qualitative changes in crises.

First Section on China-Russia Military Cooperation

The most eye-catching new addition in this white paper is a dedicated section summarizing the evolution of China-Russia military cooperation. Joint maritime exercises, joint patrols by long-range bombers, and participation in each other's exercises—each aspect is expanding in scale, frequency, and geographical range.

The white paper states that security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific "can no longer be considered separately." In my view, this is one of the most important strategic judgments of this white paper. It signifies that the Ministry of Defense has clearly recognized the structure in which, while Russia is redirecting its forces in the Far East towards Europe amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, China is strengthening its activities in the western Pacific to fill that void.

North Korea—"Serious and Imminent Threat" Remains Unchanged

Regarding North Korea, the expression "serious and imminent threat" continues. Since 2023, North Korea has been providing military equipment such as ballistic missiles and artillery shells to Russia, and it has been pointed out that North Korean troops have been dispatched to Russia to participate in combat.

At this point, while it is not evaluated that Russian support has immediately enhanced North Korea's military capabilities, there is a warning that "in the medium to long term, it could lead to technology transfer and military enhancement." The impact of real combat experience on the battlefield in Ukraine on the military balance on the Korean Peninsula should not be underestimated.

"New Ways of Fighting" and Defense Production Base

Another feature of this year's white paper is the establishment of a new section titled "New Ways of Fighting," which extracts lessons from the Ukraine war and conflicts in the Middle East. Drones, artificial intelligence, and sufficient ammunition stockpiles—elements necessary to endure a prolonged conflict are specifically enumerated.

In response, the section on defense production and technological base, which was previously treated as a chapter, has been elevated to an independent "part." Given the reality that companies like Komatsu and Mitsui E&S are withdrawing or scaling back from defense projects, there is a palpable sense of crisis regarding the vulnerability of the industrial base. The emphasis on Australia's decision to adopt the new Mogami-class escort ship as a "result of defense equipment cooperation" also reflects a new policy direction aimed at strengthening the industrial base through exports.

Furthermore, the white paper refers to the "SHIELD" (Synchronized, Hybrid, Integrated and Enhanced Littoral Defense) concept through fiscal year 2027. This concept, which centers on the large-scale introduction of unmanned systems across air, surface, and underwater domains, also addresses the issue of operational sustainability for the Self-Defense Forces amid a declining population—an issue that has not been directly discussed until now.

8.9 Trillion Yen Defense Budget and "Proactive Defense"

As the white paper is published, the government anticipates achieving 2% of GDP for defense spending by fiscal year 2027 and plans to request a record 8.9 trillion yen (approximately 56.1 billion dollars) for the next fiscal year. A budget request will be submitted at the end of the month. The white paper reaffirms the goal of building a defense capability that allows Japan to proactively respond to invasions against the country and to destroy or deter them with the support of allies.

However, it is necessary to pause and consider this. When Japan says it will "proactively respond," what kind of operational concept does that actually mean?

While the increase in defense spending itself is a necessary direction, what concerns me is the content of that increase. The large-scale introduction of unmanned systems under the "SHIELD" concept is indeed rational, but will the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) infrastructure necessary to operate them be sufficiently developed? In an era where the Chinese Navy is operating as far as Guam, is the Self-Defense Forces' sustainable ISR capability critically lacking?

What the White Paper Did Not Address

Despite being a lengthy document of 598 pages, there are points that the white paper hardly touches upon. One of them is the personnel shortage in the Self-Defense Forces.

In recent years, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces have faced difficulties in recruitment. The fulfillment rate for the 2023 recruitment plan for Self-Defense personnel is only about 50%, and particularly, the personnel for the Maritime Self-Defense Force's escort ships are consistently lacking. The reorganization into three surface combat groups was just completed in March 2026, but even if the number of vessels increases, it is meaningless if there are no people to operate them.

The unmanned systems envisioned in the "SHIELD" concept could partially address this personnel shortage. However, unmanned vehicles cannot completely replace manned vessels. The fact that the 598-page white paper does not directly discuss the personnel issue itself illustrates the greatest structural blind spot in Japan's defense policy—this is my unvarnished impression.

"The international community is facing the greatest trial since World War II and is entering a new era of crises. In the future, serious situations similar to Russia's invasion of Ukraine cannot be ruled out in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia." — Defense White Paper 2026