Multidimensional Game in the South China Sea and Western Pacific: PLA's 107th Fleet Exercises East of Luzon and Sino-Russian Defense Ministers' Talks in Moscow

In late April 2026, the security pattern in the Western Pacific is showing signs of accelerated transformation. On April 24, the Southern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army announced that the Navy's 107 Task Force recently conducted a multi-subject live-fire training exercise in the waters east of Luzon Island in the Philippines, focusing on live-fire shooting, air-sea coordination, rapid maneuvering, and logistical support, among other subjects, to test the integrated joint combat capabilities of the troops. The Southern Theater Command clearly stated in its announcement that this exercise is a "necessary action in response to the current regional situation." Almost simultaneously, General Dong Jun, the Chinese Minister of Defense, made an official visit to Russia, where he held talks with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on April 24, with both sides exchanging in-depth opinions on the relations between the two countries and their militaries, as well as international and regional situations. These two actions resonate on both temporal and geopolitical strategic levels, reflecting China's strategy of advancing military and diplomatic efforts in response to regional security challenges.

The immediate background for the 107 Task Force's exercise is the "Shoulder to Shoulder 2026" (Balikatan 2026) joint military exercise that began on April 20. This exercise, led by the United States and the Philippines, lasts for 19 days and will conclude on May 8, involving over 17,500 military personnel from seven countries: the United States, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and France. This year's exercise has seen significant upgrades in both scale and nature: Japan is participating for the first time as an official participant, sending approximately 1,400 Self-Defense Force personnel, while Canada is also joining for the first time as a fully participating country. More critically, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force will conduct live-fire launches of the Type 88 anti-ship missile during maritime strike drills in northern Luzon, marking the first time Japan has used this weapon system outside its territory. The Philippine Marine Corps plans to simulate the launch of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile procured from India. The U.S. Marine Corps' 3rd Littoral Combat Team has deployed an expeditionary vessel interception system equipped with "Navy Strike Missiles" near Cagayan North International Airport in the Luzon Strait, with a range of up to 185 kilometers, covering the core passage of the first island chain between Taiwan and the Philippines.

From an equipment composition perspective, the 107 Task Force is led by the Type 055 destroyer "Zunyi." This class of destroyer has a full-load displacement of approximately 12,000 tons and is equipped with a 112-cell universal vertical launch system, capable of carrying "YJ-18" anti-ship missiles, "HQ-9B" air defense missiles, and "CJ-10" land-attack cruise missiles, making it one of the most advanced surface combat platforms in the Chinese Navy. Officially released images show the task force consisting of four ships sailing in a column formation. Additionally, the South China Morning Post cited satellite images indicating that the aircraft carrier Liaoning may also be active in the relevant waters, with the number of participating large vessels potentially reaching 14. If this information is accurate, it suggests that the scale and complexity of this operation far exceed routine training exercises. The Southern Theater Command emphasized in its official statement that this exercise "fully complies with relevant international laws and practices" and clearly stated that it will "regularly organize relevant military activities" based on security situation needs.

It is noteworthy that the exercise area was chosen in the waters east of Luzon Island rather than within the South China Sea, which carries a clear signaling significance. The northern part of Luzon Island is about 360 kilometers from the southern tip of Taiwan, and the Luzon Strait is one of the key waterways of the first island chain. Demonstrating air-sea joint strike capabilities in this area is not only a direct response to the "Shoulder to Shoulder" exercise but also a practical test of joint combat capabilities in the Taiwan Strait direction. Especially as the U.S. deploys medium-range strike capabilities (the "Typhoon" system can launch "Tomahawk" cruise missiles and SM-6 missiles) in northern Luzon, and Japan conducts its first overseas live-fire launch of anti-ship missiles, the PLA has chosen to showcase the joint operational capabilities of its surface strike group in the same strategic direction, forming a clear "capability against capability" strategic interaction model.

In the Northeast Asia direction, the institutionalization and deepening of military cooperation between Japan and the Philippines is accelerating in 2026. In September 2025, the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement officially came into effect, simplifying the procedures for troop deployments between the two countries. In January 2026, both sides signed the Agreement on Mutual Provision of Supplies and Services, establishing a framework for joint exercises and logistical mutual assistance during crises. Currently, both sides are negotiating a Military Intelligence Security Agreement, which, once signed, will enable real-time intelligence sharing. Philippine President Marcos is scheduled to make a state visit to Japan from May 26 to 29. Xiang Haoyu, a researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, pointed out that Japan is using the Philippines as a strategic springboard, attempting to link the three geopolitical hotspots of the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea through a military linkage mechanism to construct a cross-regional containment framework. Ma Bo, an associate professor at the School of International Relations at Nanjing University, believes that the framework of Japan-Philippines military cooperation largely remains subordinate to the broader framework of the U.S. "Indo-Pacific Strategy," with Tokyo and Manila's deepening military ties aimed at attracting more strategic resources from the U.S. in the region.

At the same time, military diplomacy between China and Russia is also progressing steadily. Minister of Defense Dong Jun's visit lasted six days, covering Russia and Kyrgyzstan, and he attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Defense Ministers' Meeting. In talks with Belousov, both sides emphasized that under the strategic guidance of President Xi Jinping and President Putin, China-Russia relations have consistently maintained a high level of healthy development. Both sides agreed that the two militaries should adhere to the consensus reached by the two heads of state, continuously strengthen strategic communication, and further deepen practical cooperation in various fields. Notably, an assessment report released by the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service on April 22 indicated that China maintains a "pseudo-neutral" stance on the Ukraine war, but in reality, military cooperation with Russia has "significantly strengthened" over the past year. Dong Jun's visit is the second by a Chinese defense minister to Russia since January 2024, and the increased frequency of visits itself conveys a signal of the continued deepening of military relations between the two sides. Following the visit of the Russian Navy fleet to a southern Chinese port city on April 15, high-level interactions between the Chinese and Russian militaries have achieved two-way flow within a month.

In summary, the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region in late April 2026 exhibits three characteristics: "escalation of confrontation, camp differentiation, and institutional solidification." The escalation of confrontation is reflected in the fact that the U.S.-Japan-Philippines joint military exercise has for the first time introduced Japanese combat troops and various long-range strike weapon systems, while the PLA has responded with a similarly scaled maritime exercise. Camp differentiation is demonstrated by Japan and Canada joining the "Shoulder to Shoulder" exercise for the first time as fully participating countries, reaching a new height in the institutionalization of the seven-nation joint exercise. Institutional solidification is reflected in the progressive development of agreements between Japan and the Philippines, from the Reciprocal Access Agreement to the Supplies and Services Agreement to the Intelligence Sharing Agreement, as well as the high-density military diplomatic interactions maintained between China and Russia. In this complex multidimensional game, all parties are shaping a strategic situation favorable to themselves through military deployments and institutional arrangements, while the strategic competition from the South China Sea to the Western Pacific is transitioning from sporadic friction to systematic and sustained confrontation.