Sahel: Accelerated Militarization in Response to Terrorist Escalation and Geopolitical Tensions

The bold attack carried out against the Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey on January 29, 2026, marks a worrying turning point in the war against terrorism in the Sahel. Thirty fighters from the Islamic State - Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) used armed drones, small arms, and mortars to assault the airport of the Nigerien capital as well as Air Base 101, which houses the headquarters of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). While all the assailants were killed or captured after two hours of fighting, the incident achieved its strategic objective: to demonstrate that terrorist groups remain an active threat despite the intensification of counter-terrorism operations in the region.

This spectacular attack occurs against a backdrop of accelerated militarization of the Sahel region. In December 2025, the AES - composed of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger - officially launched a joint military force of 5,000 soldiers, presented as a symbol of security autonomy and a break from traditional Western partners. A few days later, on December 25, the United States conducted airstrikes against positions of the Lakurawa group in northwestern Nigeria, with President Donald Trump promising "many more" similar operations. Meanwhile, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) announced in August 2025 an ambitious plan to deploy a counter-terrorism force of 260,000 soldiers, supported by an annual budget of $2.5 billion.

In early March 2026, during a meeting of ECOWAS military chiefs in Sierra Leone, the regional organization decided to activate its Standby Force, with an initial deployment of 2,000 soldiers planned by the end of the year. This mobilization comes as the region faces what experts describe as an "existential security threat": between January and June 2025, West Africa recorded 12,964 conflict-related deaths in 5,907 incidents, with nearly all of these deaths occurring in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In total, 2.6 million people are currently displaced in the three AES countries.

The scale of the terrorist crisis now extends beyond isolated rural areas to directly threaten Sahelian capitals. In Bamako, the Malian capital, JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), the main group affiliated with al-Qaeda in West Africa, orchestrated an economic blockade for three months between September 2025 and early 2026. The group intercepted and burned fuel convoys coming from Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, causing a fuel shortage that paralyzed the daily lives of residents. Although the blockade was lifted in early 2026 without explanation, its psychological impact persists. "And tomorrow?" wonders Aissata, a sales assistant in a supermarket in Bamako. "What if the blockade returns or if the terrorist group decides to attack the market or any infrastructure in the city?"

In Burkina Faso, the security situation is even more concerning. JNIM conducted over 500 attacks in 2025, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, and now controls up to 60% of the national territory, gradually encircling the capital Ouagadougou. Nighttime attacks on military supply lines and the extensive use of improvised explosive devices have confined security forces and volunteer militias to areas close to their bases in the Central-North, East, and Sahel regions. In mid-February 2026, terrorists launched a deadly attack in the locality of Titao, in the north of the country, killing 80 soldiers and militia members as well as at least 20 civilians. JNIM targeted a military camp, the market, and communication facilities in the area.

In the face of this escalation, security analysts highlight a troubling reality: militarization alone cannot defeat terrorism in the Sahel. As noted by Beverly Ochieng, an analyst based in Dakar for the firm Control Risks, any military intervention must be "holistic" and include "social interventions to stop the influence of these groups that allows them to recruit members." Terrorist organizations have indeed rooted themselves in rural communities by collecting taxes, providing resources such as fertilizers, building mosques, and promising security - services that failing states can no longer provide.

The rift between the AES and ECOWAS further complicates the regional response. After leaving ECOWAS in January 2025 to form their own alliance, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger rejected any direct collaboration with the West African organization, which they now perceive as a threat to their sovereignty, particularly due to its partnership with Western powers. The AES has pivoted towards Russia as its main security partner: approximately 2,000 Russian fighters, initially from the Wagner paramilitary group and now from the Africa Corps controlled by the Russian state, have been deployed in the three countries.

This new geopolitical configuration raises fears of a Cold War-style confrontation in West Africa, with an AES supported by Russia on one side, and an ECOWAS backed by the United States and France on the other. Tensions escalated in February 2026 when a Nigerian Air Force C-130 made an emergency landing in Burkina Faso. The AES interpreted this incident as a violation of its sovereignty and airspace, allowing its air forces to neutralize any aircraft involved in future violations. The context was even more sensitive as France was reported to have provided Nigeria with surveillance and intelligence support during a recent intervention in neighboring Benin.

Experts fear two major risks to regional stability. First, the absence of reconciliation between the AES and ECOWAS could lead to direct inter-state military confrontations, plunging West Africa into a regional war. Such a conflict would not serve the counter-terrorism objectives of either side and would create an ideal space for armed groups to expand their operations amid fragmented and distracted security responses. Second, the confrontation risks transforming West Africa into a new theater of global power rivalry, with the potential for a veto power usage in the United Nations Security Council that would further complicate conflict resolution.

On the ground, terrorist groups continue to refine their tactics. JNIM and IS-Sahel have established presences in northwestern Nigeria since 2020 and have operationalized these cells since 2024, consolidating a new front line in the border areas between Benin, Niger, and Nigeria. This strategic expansion has become crucial for both Sahelian groups and Nigerian organizations affiliated with the Islamic State. JNIM, formed in 2017 by the merger of four Malian groups (Ansar al-Din, al-Murabitun, the Macina Liberation Front, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), has between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters and operates in Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, and now Nigeria.

The Islamic State - West Africa Province (ISWAP), which split from Boko Haram after disagreements over the treatment of Muslim civilians, has between 3,500 and 5,000 fighters and operates mainly in northeastern Nigeria. IS-Sahel, with over 400 fighters, claimed responsibility for the January attack on the Niamey airport, and analysts suspect that elements of ISWAP participated in the operation, revealing the extent of cross-border collaboration between these organizations.

Faced with this grim picture, the military juntas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger find themselves in a paradoxical position. They all justified their coups - respectively in 2020, 2022, and 2023 - by promising to defeat the terrorists in a way that their democratic predecessors had failed to accomplish. Yet, the deterioration of security conditions contradicts these claims. As an anonymous lecturer at the University of Legal and Political Sciences in Bamako confides to The Africa Report, "the Malian army is exhausted by persistent terrorist attacks and defections to JNIM. The junta does not seem to have a response to the terrorist expansion, nor do its counterparts in Niger and Burkina Faso."

Analysts Djiby Sow and Hassan Koné from the South African Institute for Strategic Studies note, however, that despite their success in controlling a large part of the Burkinabè campaign, the terrorists lack the manpower and firepower necessary to conquer the capital. This reality offers a limited window of opportunity, but only if military responses are accompanied by broader political, economic, and social strategies.

ECOWAS, as the most experienced regional security organization in Africa, has the diplomatic capacity to negotiate an operational concept that would ensure respect for the sovereignty of the AES while allowing for collaboration on the ground. As several experts suggest, the Francophone member states of ECOWAS should take the lead in these diplomatic efforts, while Nigeria - which usually provides 75% of the personnel for ECOWAS missions - would exercise its influence more discreetly. The ability of ECOWAS to regain control of its security agenda and define the terms of external engagement will shape not only the future of West Africa but that of the continent as a whole.

In the meantime, the civilian population of the Sahel continues to pay the highest price for this multidimensional crisis. Amid terrorist attacks, military operations, mass displacements, and the collapse of basic services, millions of Sahelians live in a state of permanent insecurity that shows no signs of improvement in the short term. The increasing militarization of the region, without a coherent political strategy or reconciliation among regional actors, risks further exacerbating the situation rather than resolving it.